Waltz

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume VIII, Number 3 April 1956

Price $6.00 per year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

FREDERICK S. DUNN, *Chairman*
BERNARD C. COHEN, *Managing Editor*
JEAN MACLACHLAN, *Assistant Managing Editor*
KLAUS KNORR, *Review Article Editor*
PERCY E. CORBETT — WILLIAM T. R. FOX
GORDON A. CRAIG — EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR.
HAROLD SPROUT

ADVISORY EDITORS

GABRIEL A. ALMOND — GRAYSON L. KIRK
CYRIL E. BLACK — HAROLD D. LASSWELL
BERNARD BRODIE — WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD
JEROME S. BRUNER — EDWARD S. MASON
MCGEORGE BUNDY — MAX F. MILLIKAN
RUPERT EMERSON — PHILIP E. MOSELY
HAJO HOLBORN — RICHARD C. SNYDER
PHILIP C. JESSUP — HANS SPEIER
JOSEPH E. JOHNSON — JACOB VINER
STEPHEN B. JONES — ARNOLD WOLFERS
QUINCY WRIGHT

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems of international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.

Circulation and Advertising: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Box 231, Princeton, N.J.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *International Index to Periodicals*, and abstracts of its articles appear in *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone, and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers.

Copyright, 1956, by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. April 1956. Vol. VIII, No. 3. Entered as Second Class matter in the Post Office at Princeton, New Jersey, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press. Subscriptions $6.00 per year (two years $10.00); single copies $2.00. Foreign postage 25 cents additional per year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. VIII • APRIL 1956 • No. 3

CONTENTS

The Soviet Reaction to Vlasov
Alexander Dallin and Ralph S. Mavrogordato 307

Cultural Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy *Frederick C. Barghoorn, with the assistance of Paul W. Friedrich* 323

Economic Aspects of the Soviet "New Course"
David Granick 345

The First Capitulation: France and the Rhineland Crisis of 1936
R. A. C. Parker 355

Mr. Toynbee and World Politics: War and National Security
Kenneth W. Thompson 374

Struggle Against Power: Notes on Indian Political Behavior
Myron Weiner 392

REVIEW ARTICLES

France's Chronic Crisis: Its Cause and Cure
Gordon Wright 404

American Foreign Economic Policy in the Context of World Politics
Howard S. Ellis 413

Problems of Democratic Adjustment in Modern Japan
Robert E. Ward 423

Latin America: Responsibility or Freedom?
Howard F. Cline 433

International Labor Problems
Adolf Sturmthal 441

The Contributors ii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

ALEXANDER DALLIN was Associate Director of the Research Program on the USSR and Director of Research of the War Documentation Project at Columbia University. Now a research fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard, he will teach at the Russian Institute at Columbia in 1956-1957 as a Visiting Assistant Professor.

RALPH S. MAVROGORDATO, a former Research Associate of the War Documentation Project at Columbia, is on the staff of the Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN, Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale and Visiting Professor of International Relations at Columbia, is the author of *The Soviet Image of the United States* (1950) and *Soviet Russian Nationalism*, to appear in May 1956.

DAVID GRANICK is Associate Professor of Economics at Fisk University, Nashville. The author of *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR: A Study in Planning* (1954), he is preparing a book on economic development and technology, using Soviet metalworking as a case study.

R. A. C. PARKER, Lecturer in Modern History at the University of Manchester, is engaged in research in recent international history and English agrarian history in the eighteenth century.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON, Assistant Director of the Social Sciences division of the Rockefeller Foundation, edited, with Hans J. Morgenthau, *Principles and Problems of International Politics* (1950). He is also co-author, with Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., of *Man and Modern Society* (1953).

MYRON WEINER, Instructor in the Department of Politics and a staff member of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, is writing a book entitled, *Parties and Politics in India: A Study of the Development of a Multi-party System.*

GORDON WRIGHT is Professor of History at the University of Oregon. Author of *The Reshaping of French Democracy* (1948) and co-author of *European Political Systems*, edited by Taylor Cole (1953), he is working on a book with the tentative title, *Peasant Politics in France.*

HOWARD S. ELLIS is Flood Professor of Economics at the University of California. Among his recent publications are *The Economics of Freedom: The Progress and Future of Aid to Europe* (1950) and, with N. S. Buchanan, *Approaches to Economic Development* (1955).

ROBERT E. WARD, Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the staff of the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan, is a specialist in the political affairs of Eastern Asia.

HOWARD F. CLINE, Director of the Hispanic Foundation in the Library of Congress, is the author of *The United States and Mexico* (1953). He is currently engaged in a long-term study of developmental problems of particular Indian areas in Mexico.

ADOLF STURMTHAL is Philip Murray Professor of International Labor Studies at Roosevelt University, Chicago. His published works include *The Tragedy of European Labor, 1918-1939* (2nd ed., 1951) and *Unity and Diversity of European Labor: An Introduction to Contemporary Labor Movements* (1953).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVIET REACTION TO VLASOV

By ALEXANDER DALLIN and RALPH S. MAVROGORDATO

I

IN recent years a good deal of attention has been focused on the Vlasov movement as an outstanding example of "Soviet opposition to Stalin" and as a wartime opportunity (largely missed by Germany) to utilize defectors and prisoners for military as well as political propaganda purposes.[1] One important facet of the Vlasov problem has eluded systematic investigation: the reaction of the Soviet authorities to the movement. The themes employed in their campaign to reduce the political force of the Vlasov challenge provide some insight into their political behavior under the stress of indigenous opposition.

Before the war—as indeed today—the Soviet state, party, and police machinery was geared to detecting and uprooting actual or potential opponents of the regime. By its own standards, this endeavor was eminently successful. Yet the price to be paid for security-by-terror is the creation of a vast reservoir of potential supporters of an opposition movement, should exceptional circumstances permit its organized growth. Such unusual conditions prevailed during the Second World War, when millions of Soviet soldiers became German prisoners of war and millions of Soviet civilians lived under German occupation. Desertion became a possible alternative to life under Soviet rule. Beyond a doubt, a potent anti-Soviet movement could have been molded from this material; indeed, the initiative for it came from the prisoners themselves. How successful such a movement could have been under optimum conditions remains a matter for speculation, for the Nazi leadership looked with distinct disfavor upon a political movement of Russians for Russia and stifled its growth. Despite this hostility, the Vlasov movement became a limited political force in 1943 and again in 1944, when, for reasons of military expediency and propaganda, an indigenous anti-Soviet political campaign was sanctioned by the Reich.

In 1942 the Soviet leadership could not have failed to recognize the first feeble attempts at German "political warfare" for what they were: thinly disguised appeals for defection, intended to weaken the Red Army and to gain mercenary auxiliary troops. Germany's war aims in Russia precluded the formulation of a political program that might

[1] The standard accounts are George Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin*, Cambridge, Mass., 1952; and Jürgen Thorwald (pseud.), *Wen sie verderben wollen*, Stuttgart, 1953.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have appealed to anti-Soviet Russians. Even the appearance of Vlasov's name on German propaganda leaflets in the fall of 1942 did not change Moscow's evaluation of German intentions, and Vlasov's capture did not of itself lead Soviet observers to assume treason on his part, for his military and political career had stamped him as a capable and theretofore loyal officer.

Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov had been a professional Red Army commander for over twenty years, and a Communist Party member for over ten, when the German invasion began. That he was trusted is reflected in his assignment abroad as military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in 1938, his remaining untouched by the Great Purges, and the promotions and new assignments he received up to and during the first phase of the war.

In the spring of 1942 Vlasov, who was recognized to be one of the generals chiefly responsible for the successful defense of Moscow, was given command of the Second Assault Army, which was assigned to slash the German lines in the Volkhov area in an effort to break the siege of Leningrad. Lacking adequate troops, supplies, and support, and confronted with superior German forces, the Second Assault Army was ground to pieces in April-May 1942. The bulk of its survivors were captured by the Germans. Smaller numbers made their way to nearby Soviet armies, while others sought to submerge among the civilian population in adjacent villages, hoping to evade detection by German as well as Soviet authorities. Of the army's staff, some escaped, others committed suicide, and a few surrendered. Throughout the month of June 1942, the Germans exerted some effort to find those of the staff who remained unaccounted for, including Vlasov himself. At that same time, the Soviet command likewise attempted to contact and save Vlasov. It almost certainly did not suspect or expect defection on his part; there was little in his past to suggest such an action.[2] It was only natural for the Soviet command to seek to rescue one of its higher-ranking generals who, it was assumed, had lost contact but would be anxious to return to the Soviet lines. The search was organized by order of the Leningrad area headquarters headed by Marshal Voroshilov.

[2] There were certain facets of his background that might have aroused some suspicion—among them, his peasant origin; his past association with some of the purged generals; and his advocacy of the reduction of authority of political commissars in the army (a view which, incidentally, was shared by such "reliable" commanders as Marshal Timoshenko). Vlasov's reliability, however, seems never to have been questioned prior to his defection, for Stalin personally received him and entrusted him with the special operation assigned to the Second Assault Army. Also, he was singled out to be interviewed by such important foreign correspondents as Eve Curie.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The ranking partisan commander, M. N. Nikitin, ordered partisan units operating in the area to find Vlasov and assist him in reaching safety on the Soviet side.[3] In addition, special teams were flown into the area with radio equipment, codes, maps, and instructions as to where and how to look for Vlasov. One member of such an intelligence team (who had encountered in the woods a colonel from Vlasov's staff) actually maintained contact with Leningrad until July 11, asking for supplies to be dropped by plane. He surrendered to the Germans on July 13, the day after the general was captured.[4] The partisans were apparently unable to find evidence of Vlasov's whereabouts, for as late as July 22, a wireless message to Sazonov, a partisan leader in the Volkhov area, went out over Andrei Zhdanov's personal signature: "Reply to question from headquarters what you know about Vlasov. Is he alive? Have you seen him? What measures have you taken to find him? Headquarters orders that Vlasov, Vinogradov, and Afanas'ev be picked up by plane. The plane will land immediately after you find them, at the landing strip captured by you. I expect immediate reply."[5] If there was a reply, it is not available. Vlasov was captured alive by the Germans after hiding out—aimlessly, it seems—for several weeks. The first Soviet attempt to rescue him, which ended with his capture, was basically without political significance; it was largely an effort to help the Soviet war effort and, incidentally, Vlasov himself.

II

During the initial phase of Vlasov's captivity, Moscow was uncertain of his fate and attitude. Actually he was prepared, from August 1942 on, to collaborate with the Germans under certain conditions. However, official Berlin was loath to promote a "Red general" or to entrust him with authority and armed forces, which were bound to develop dynamics of their own once the true nature of German war aims and methods became apparent. Still, Vlasov's name, like that of other captives, could be used in German propaganda leaflets and broadcasts seeking to induce defection from the Red Army. After the Germans had avoided all political promises in their psychological warfare for more than a year, a propaganda innovation like the "Vlasov theme"

[3] X. A.K., Ic, "Tätigkeitsbericht," November 1, 1942. This citation and the German sources cited hereinafter refer to captured records now in the custody of the Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's Office, U.S. Army, in Alexandria, Va.

[4] XXVII. A.K., Ic, "Vernehmung des Gefangenen," July 14, 1942.

[5] AOK 18, Ic, to OKH/Gen.z.b.V., July 22, 1942. Vinogradov and Afanas'ev had been officers on Vlasov's staff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was bound to reverberate, not only in German policy-making circles and the occupation government and among the target population, but also among the Soviet leadership itself. However insincere or imperfect, here was an indigenous—and therefore potent—political challenge to the Soviet regime. Vlasov propaganda, as it developed from then on, exemplified the belated German espousal of "political warfare"—the use of political themes and a political program, ostensibly addressed by Russians to Russians and intended to serve as an incentive for desertion to, and political collaboration with, the German side.

The first German leaflets to appear over Vlasov's signature were released in September 1942 and blamed Stalin for the sufferings of the Russian people. Others followed later in the fall. In December 1942, the so-called Smolensk Manifesto, a German-inspired program for a Russian Liberation Committee, was formalized; copies of it were soon distributed in the East. From early 1943 on, the use of Vlasov's name by the Germans was steadily stepped up—at first experimentally, and later in the spring on a large scale. The numerous small units of military collaborators already in use on the German side were given the collective name of "ROA" (*Russkaia osvoboditel'naia armiia*), the Russian Army of Liberation. Though neither the character of these units nor their subordination to the German command had been in any sense altered, the creation of even a mythical army apparently gave some of the collaborators a sense of belonging and was susceptible of propaganda exploitation.

Initially the Soviet authorities preferred to remain silent on the entire issue. Vlasov's capture had not been announced by them, for it is not their custom to publicize surrenders and defections. Then, when Vlasov's name appeared as the signatory on German leaflets, Moscow pretended to believe—or actually did believe—that he was being used involuntarily and that the whole movement was but a clever trick of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. In reality, the Propaganda Ministry played a negligible role in the Vlasov movement, whose real promoters were in the Armed Forces Propaganda branch, in intelligence, and in military government circles. At any rate, until the end of 1942, Soviet propaganda seemed content to discount Vlasov as at most a potential danger: the launching of a genuine movement under his banner would have represented a substantial departure from earlier Nazi practice.

In 1943, however, the situation changed. Presumably in response to a switch in German psychological warfare tactics, a high-level decision on the Vlasov problem must have been made in Moscow, ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parently on the recommendation of both the *Agitprop* section of the Communist Party's Central Committee and the Main Political Administration of the Red Army. There are indications that the issue was at least considered, if not decided, on the Politburo level. Vlasov's overt employment by the Germans dates from mid-March 1943, when, for the first time, the Germans permitted his name to be used in German domestic dispatches and in propaganda releases to the neutral foreign world. At the same time, the Germans published Vlasov's "Open Letter" which explained the reasons for his defection, and he himself went on a speaking tour of German-occupied Russia. The formation of *Osttruppen* was on the increase. On the other hand, since Stalingrad, the immediate military menace to the Soviet Union was on the decline. Then, and only then, did Moscow decide to break its silence.

Clearly the Soviets would have preferred to ignore the entire issue. However, the new German approach presented a challenge to Soviet propaganda, which had insisted on the mercenary, non-political character of the collaborators. The promulgation of a political program led to an exaggeration of the scope and potential of the Vlasov movement. Indeed, the Soviets appear to have ascribed more logic and consistency to the Germans than the latter's doctrinaire approach justified. As the reduction of Russia to a German satrapy by purely military means became less and less likely, Moscow apparently feared that Germany, by pretending to abandon her initial objectives, might still be able to rally the anti-Soviet nationals at her disposal with an appeal to Russian national sentiments. Indeed, some of the Moscow analysts seemed to be afraid that the change in propaganda was a harbinger of a genuine shift in German policy; the backstage struggle in German circles which prevented such a reversal of policy from being instituted was unknown, or only imperfectly known, in Moscow. At the same time, Moscow considerably overestimated the armed forces "under" Vlasov (which actually were not under his command at all). Above all, it seemed to fear him as a competing political movement to such an extent that it viewed his functions and status under the Germans with more concern than the facts warranted.

A variety of sources confirm that the defector movement caused consternation among high-ranking Soviet officials. Alexander Shcherbakov, head of the Moscow Party organization, a member of the Politburo, and the successor to Lev Mekhlis as head of the Main Political Administration of the army, is quoted as having characterized the pre-Vlasov phase of the war as the golden opportunity without which the partisans could not have gained grass-roots support: "We must be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thankful to the Germans that their policy enabled us to fan the flame of the partisan movement in the Ukraine." Similarly, Timofei Strokach, chief of staff of the Ukrainian Partisan Movement (an associate of Khrushchev and at present Minister of the Interior of the Ukraine), realized that it had been primarily the stupidity and cruelty of German occupation policy which enabled the underground and partisans to score some successes. Conversely, Moisei Spivak, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, admitted to his associates that Vlasov propaganda necessitated a substantial change in Soviet tactics; and he fearfully described the so-called Smolensk Manifesto as capable of arousing the people against the Soviet regime. Stalin himself is said to have declared that the Vlasov movement constituted "at least a great obstacle on the road to victory over the German Fascists." If he did not actually say so, the fact that such accounts circulated in high Soviet circles is in itself revealing.[6]

The Soviet decision on how to deal with the challenge of Vlasov had several aspects. One phase concerned the personal fate of Vlasov and several of his top aides. They were to be neutralized or liquidated at all cost. An opportunity presented itself during Vlasov's German-sponsored trip through the northwestern part of the German-held area of the USSR—around Pskov, Porkhov, and Gatchina. The same Nikitin who a year earlier had ordered the partisans to search for the missing Vlasov, in May 1943 charged other partisan units with the mission to capture or assassinate the general. Radio communications from Nikitin's staff to the Third Leningrad Partisan Brigade contained the following instructions: "Communicate [by radio] whether Vlasov arrived in Dedovichi 10 May. On 6 May he was in Porkhov and Pasherivitsy. Nikitin orders you to be alert to Vlasov's arrival in your *rayon*. Report immediately what steps are being taken to receive him. . . ." And another message, soon after, stated the mission more bluntly: ". . . Our people work poorly. Take all measures to capture or kill Vlasov, no matter what the cost. Otherwise we will be too late."[7] If the partisans did anything in response to these orders, they failed. Vlasov returned to Berlin safely, if none too happily. Immediately

[6] Many of the above comments were reported by captured Soviet officers and officials, in particular by Captain Boris Rusanov, adjutant to Strokach, who worked in Khrushchev's headquarters for some time and was captured by the Germans when his plane crashed behind the German lines in the summer of 1943. Rusanov was interrogated by experienced "Russia hands," and parts of his testimony were utilized for German radio and newspaper propaganda; other portions remained unpublished. (See Reichsführer-SS [Himmler], Persönlicher Stab, "Betr. Kapitän Boris Russanow," October 19, 1943.)

[7] 281. Sich. Div., Ic, "Übersetzung aus den Beutepapieren des am 3.6. vernichteten Stabes des 1. Regiments der 3. Leningrader Brigade."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thereafter Hitler personally barred his further appearances in the East.

An entirely different endeavor involved the dispatch of agents to infiltrate the ROA and subvert or kill its leaders. While unsubstantiated reports have labeled a variety of figures around Vlasov as Soviet agents, authentic evidence has come to light on very few of them.[8] The most interesting of all is the Kapustin case.

Semion Nikolaevich Kapustin, a major in the Soviet army, had been recruited by the NKVD to execute a mission in Berlin after having been convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced to prison for several years. By accepting this mission, he was told, he could redeem himself and perhaps achieve a position of great honor. After a thorough briefing on the Soviet side, Kapustin was taken into the German-held area in order to "join" the ROA. There, on May 24, 1943, he deserted to the Germans, to whom he gradually revealed his assignments: to contact Vlasov and others in his entourage, to set up cells to subvert the movement from within, and, if necessary, to kill Vlasov. Kapustin had even been given detailed instructions in Moscow regarding the themes to be used in winning followers—an index to Soviet perception of the effectiveness of themes addressed to the Vlasov movement. They included the following:

(1) *Germany wants to enslave, not liberate, the Russian people.* (2) *The ROA is a German, not a Russian, enterprise; it results from a lack of German manpower.* (3) *Russian troop concentrations before the German invasion had no offensive purposes against Germany or any other country, but were designed to forestall possible German expansion into Turkey and to protect the Dardanelles.* While the first two contained nothing novel, the third reflected an awareness of the impact of German propaganda dealing with Soviet offensive intentions, and a perception of the nationalist flavor of the ROA, to whose members such a traditional area of Russian interest as the Straits was presumed to appeal.

(4) *Soviet Russia has already satisfied many demands of the people by reopening churches, abolishing the Comintern, and discontinuing the commissar system in the Red Army.* Overt Soviet propaganda never depicted these moves as "concessions," because of an understandable reluctance to admit that the state had found it necessary to barter for the support of its subjects.

(5) *The war has proved the instability of the Soviet system of a multinational union of republics. The burden rests on the Great Russian*

[8] In other instances, the suspicion remains strong but unproved; in still others, it was apparently based on nothing more than denunciation by political foes among the *émigrés.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people, all others having failed. For this reason the republics will be abolished after the war and will be merged in one undivided Soviet Russia. This theme was obviously meant to appeal to Great Russian nationalists within the Vlasov movement. It illustrated the lengths to which Moscow was willing to go on this occasion to pose as the champion of Russian nationalism, just as on other occasions it had championed the cause of the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR. Presumably Moscow felt (or even exaggerated) the potency of the national appeal.

(6) *The political system of the USSR is to undergo important changes after the war: (a) the Union Republic system will be dissolved; (b) the Communist Party will be reorganized into a people's party—with special emphasis on education and propaganda; (c) Stalin will be replaced as head of state by Andrei Andreev; (d) kolkhozes will be dissolved after the war, a step which is not feasible during the war.* Such a program was, of course, tailor-made for the ex-Communist cadres in the Reich. If adopted, its authors seem to have hoped, it might provide a meeting ground (however deceptive and insincere) for the anti-Stalinists and the Soviet incumbents in a semi-Communist amalgam.

The choice of Andreev as head of the mythical reformed Soviet state is of special interest. He had the reputation of being somewhat drab and mediocre, but at the same time somewhat less doctrinaire than most of his fellow-members in the Politburo. Concerned primarily with agricultural affairs, he placed greater emphasis on individual responsibility within the collective farm. He allegedly maintained that kolkhozes which had been partitioned in the German-held areas should, for the time being, be permitted to remain so. If, as it appears, he clashed on this and other questions with the "left" wing of the Politburo—notably, Khrushchev and Zhdanov—his nomination by the intelligence personnel who concocted Kapustin's story was indeed significant. The palliatives they promised tended in the direction of the Communist Party's "right" wing. After 1948, Andreev rapidly lost out when he again crossed swords with Khrushchev on agricultural policy. Although still a member of the Central Committee, he no longer occupies any leading position in party or state.

(7) *Collaborators serving in the Vlasov movement who return voluntarily to the Soviet fold will be well treated, decorated, and given new clothing and a furlough.* Though perhaps striking to the outsider, this offer was regularly carried in standard Soviet and partisan propaganda to the military collaborators of the Germans from late 1942 on.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(8) *Russians will correct their own mistakes and do not need the assistance of Germans.* Though noteworthy as an admission that there were errors to rectify, this was primarily another appeal to the patriotic spirit, well-calculated to play on the emotions of the Russians, who were irritated, time and again, by their experiences with the Germans.

The above themes were to be spread by Kapustin among Vlasov's men; in addition, he was to recruit agents within the ROA. To facilitate his infiltration, he was instructed to write anti-Soviet articles in the German-controlled Russian-language press of the Vlasov movement, *Zaria* and *Dobrovolets*, using such phrases as the "Jewish-Bolshevik state" and such devices as attacks on Stalin and the NKVD—all revealing indications of the way Moscow assessed German-sponsored propaganda. Should he accomplish part or all of his mission, Kapustin was to make his way back to the Soviet lines by October 1943, whereupon he would be decorated as a Hero of the Soviet Union and promoted to colonel.[9]

The strange fare which Kapustin and others like him were to serve up would probably have been fairly effective. The truth of some of the themes dealing with existing conditions was widely enough known, and it cost little to make promises for the future.[10]

III

In addition to such efforts directed at the cadres of the Vlasov leadership, Moscow faced the problem of explaining the existence of the movement to its own population. The formula adopted—probably in March 1943—was tripartite.

(1) The civilian population on the Soviet side would presumably learn least about the Vlasov problem from German sources; therefore, the need for counterpropaganda here was slight, while there was some

[9] OKH/GenStdH/FHO(IIIf), "Übersetzung: Gesamtergebnis der Vernehmung des Spions Ssemjon Nikolajewitsch Kapustin," July 22, 1943.

[10] Rumors also circulated in other areas. According to one Vlasovite officer, Soviet agents or partisans around Pskov were spreading the clandestine theme that "the weapons are now in the hands of the people. The people will oust Stalin after the war. However, one should not forget that the Germans are the most treacherous enemy and must therefore be beaten first. In order not to weaken the fight against the Germans, we must, for the time being, continue to fight under Stalin's leadership." Such a notion may have been the product of a partisan's spontaneous, rather sophisticated, construct. Its exploitation by Soviet agents, however, is surprising.

Another Soviet effort to respond to the Vlasov theme was reported in the summer of 1943 by a German security unit in the Ostrov area: "In one case it has been reported that partisans pretended to be members of the Vlasov army in order to reconnoiter popular attitudes in this manner and to spread insecurity in the ranks of the population" (281. Sich. Div., Ic, "Erfahrungsbericht," June 25, 1943).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

danger in spreading information about it. Hence it was decided to ignore the question entirely in the Soviet civilian domestic press.[11]

(2) The Red Army press, on the other hand, was to attempt to neutralize the effect of German "Vlasov propaganda." There was a certain lag between the onset of the German leaflet campaign and the Soviet reaction to it, but by the late spring of 1943, as will be shown, front-area newspapers began "explaining" the movement to the troops. The very fact that the Soviet authorities abandoned their earlier tactics of what the Germans not inappropriately called *totschweigen* (killing by silence) and reacted openly when the Germans forced the issue reveals both their initial inclinations and also the seriousness with which they viewed the development. A typical sample of Red Army counterpropaganda prior to the early summer of 1943 argued that (1) Vlasov had been forced to give his signature to the appeals issued over his name; (2) the ROA was merely a German propaganda device; (3) German treatment of prisoners of war was barbarous, whatever the assertions of German leaflets; (4) the German shift in propaganda themes was but a reflection of the setbacks inflicted at Stalingrad and elsewhere; and (5) hostile collaborators were traitors to the Soviet people.[12]

(3) On the German side of the front, the Vlasov movement became known widely and rapidly, so that Moscow deemed it necessary to respond to it sooner there than on the Soviet side—lest silence be interpreted as a lack of effective counterarguments. Countermeasures (in addition to agents' missions) included leaflets produced by partisans or by the Main Political Administration of the Red Army; newspaper articles in the underground press; rumors spread by agents and partisans about the "real" nature of Vlasov's forces; and widespread covert measures aimed at the infiltration of collaborator units and attempts to secure their aid or defection.

IV

Printed Soviet propaganda designed to neutralize the effect of the Vlasov appeals dwelt on themes that discredited Vlasov, the ROA, and the ROA's political program.

[11] This Soviet tactic of ignoring the matter also extended to the Western Allies. There was no confirmation that the defector was identical with the Andrei Vlasov who had been a lieutenant general in the Red Army—a fact which led to such unwitting distortions as the comment of Eve Curie in a later edition of her book that the German-held Vlasov was "not to be confused" with the Vlasov she had interviewed in January 1942 (Eve Curie, *Journey Among Warriors*, Garden City, N.Y., 1943, p. 180)—a statement repeated by others; for example, Frederick L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*, New York, 1946, p. 631.

[12] AOK 20, Ic, "Nr. 214/43," June 26, 1943.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By the summer of 1943, Moscow no longer maintained that Vlasov's name was being used against his will. Attempts to discredit Vlasov personally were still sporadic and haphazard, however. In mid-May, army papers spoke of him as "Judas Vlasov," "Vlasov the traitor," and "the spy of 1936." He was accused of having sold out the Second Assault Army, which he had commanded. Other leaflets and articles ridiculed his claim to the role of "savior of Moscow." The most serious and perhaps most telling accusation, however, was leveled not against his own performance but against his alliance with the Germans, which made him an accomplice in their atrocities. Finally, he was rebuked for having, in cowardly fashion, failed to take the opportunity to be rescued when encircled by the Germans. A characteristic article declared: "They call Vlasov a patriot. But has it ever happened in Russian history that real patriots, let alone generals, went over to the side of foreign invaders? Yet Vlasov deserted to the enemy. For the sake of saving his lousy skin, this cowardly little general violated his military oath, voluntarily laid down his arms, and spattered the honor of the Russian uniform."[13]

In July 1943 the line changed somewhat. Several Red Army newspapers made outspoken references to Vlasov in a version which was also widely disseminated in the German-held areas (or at least in those parts which the partisans could reach). The manner in which Vlasov was discredited there is strongly reminiscent of the standard treatment employed in Soviet purges, from Tukhachevsky to Beria. A clever amalgam of unverifiable assertions and sleight-of-hand was used to "prove" Vlasov not only a spy and traitor but a capitalist agent during most of his career. In an official release (not, however, published in the civilian home press), the Main Political Administration of the Red Army accused him of "participation in the Trotskyite conspiracy." It alleged that he was "unmasked" only after the danger from the Tukhachevsky clique had been eliminated and that for this reason he was given another chance. He was further charged with conspiring with the Germans and Japanese during his tour of duty with Chiang Kai-shek in 1937-1938, and with having tried to "sell" the Far Eastern maritime province to Japan, and the Ukraine and Belorussia to Germany. Allegedly he had been convicted by a Soviet court but was pardoned on the condition that he redeem himself in active service.

When the Germans attacked in mid-1941, the official release continued, Vlasov had been captured in the encirclement near Kiev and had rejoined the Red Army as a German agent. To explain his performance

[13] A. Pavlov, "Iudushka Vlasov," *Za sovetskuiu rodinu,* No. 5 (May 15, 1943), p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

before Moscow, the official version alleged that he had become fearful and therefore had backed out of the assignment the Germans had given him. In mid-1942, however, he reverted to his role as a German agent and "sold out" his army at the Volkhov front.[14]

Needless to say, there is a considerable body of evidence to disprove this version. It is worth noting, moreover, that it took the Soviet government a whole year after Vlasov's capture to make its charges public. While some Soviet troops may have believed the official version, it is unlikely that it convinced any collaborators on the German side. It is significant, therefore, that these charges, though leveled by the Main Political Administration, were not widely used by the partisans. Partisan propaganda concentrated on Vlasov's activities after his capture by the Germans—taking his capture for granted, as it were, but insisting on his implication in German "crimes," things within the universe of the people's recent experience.

Leaflet propaganda aimed at members of the ROA did not differ materially from general appeals to other collaborators, a fact which suggests that in this area Moscow drew no sharp line between Vlasov's rank-and-file followers and other "ordinary" collaborators. Indeed no such differentiation was possible, for the ROA was no more than a "phantom army"—a paper organization, consisting of battalions spread widely over the area, under German command, and without central and effective indigenous direction. Possibly not realizing how close they came to the truth, the authors of a leaflet attacking the ROA argued that it was not Russian- but German-led, that the Germans were out to enslave Russia, not to liberate it, and that the ROA was not an army but an assemblage of prisoners amassed through duress and deceit.[15] Even this leaflet, however, mirrored Soviet fear that a change in Nazi policy was about to give substance to Vlasov's claims.

Some leaflets, mostly those distributed by the partisans, took issue with specific points of the Smolensk Manifesto. Red Army propaganda had attacked the "vagueness" or "meaninglessness" of Vlasov's concept of a "New Russia." The partisan publications, however, were more direct. The promise to abolish forced labor was countered by a reference to the "right to work" as an inalienable prerogative of the Soviet citizen; on the other hand, German use of forced labor was condemned, and evidence of the practice was cited from captured

[14] Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie Krasnoi Armii, "Smert' prezrennomu predateliu Vlasovu, podlomu shpionu i agentu liudoeda Gitlera!" *Za pravoe delo*, No. 76 (July 4, 1943), p. 4.

[15] WBfh. Ostland, Ic/WPr., "Übersetzung eines Feindflugblattes," May 15, 1943 (Archives of the Yiddish Scientific Institute [YIVO], New York, Document Occ E 3).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wehrmacht orders.[16] To those collaborators who knew of the existence of forced labor camps in the USSR such an argument could scarcely have been convincing.

Equally weak were Soviet attempts to ridicule Vlasov's agrarian program. Actually, Vlasov's notions were vague and probably confused, except in his insistence on the abolition of collective farms. While rumor propaganda sporadically reported that the Soviet government would abolish the collectives, printed Soviet appeals emphasized that the regime had given the land to the peasantry in perpetuity and that the kolkhoz members had the use of the fruits of their labor. At the same time, such leaflets insisted that Germany aimed at the re-establishment of large landed estates, owned and operated by "barons" and landlords. Popular hostility to the kolkhoz system was ignored.[17]

Soviet propaganda went to some lengths to refute the claim that Vlasov was working in the interests of the people. His committee was ridiculed as consisting of fascist puppets; its slogan of "neither Bolshevism nor capitalism" was countered by the assertion that Vlasov's German masters were in fact the worst capitalist exploiters. As for Vlasov's appeal to Russian patriotism, the Soviet leaflets replied that he was actually offering incitement to a civil war from which only Germany stood to gain. Perhaps most persuasive was the insistence, especially in partisan media, that Germany's basic insincerity was demonstrated by its failure to establish the ROA in 1941—doing so only in 1943 when it was losing the war and needed cannon fodder.

Finally, a systematic effort was made to attract the military collaborators operating under Vlasov's name or aegis back to the Soviet fold. While insisting (with more truth than they could have suspected) that the Germans were not giving Vlasov a free hand (indeed, rumors in the summer of 1943 had it that he had been arrested[18]), the partisans also professed to know that a Stalin order gave returning ROA deserters immunity from punishment, provided they "redeemed" themselves in combat on the Soviet side.[19]

> Think for yourselves [a partisan leaflet appealed to the collaborators] how serious a crime it is to which you have been incited by traitors and

[16] OKH/GenStdH/FHO(IIId), "Sowjetpropaganda zur Wlassow-Aktion," July 18, 1943.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] E.g., OKH/GenStdH/FHO(IIIa), "Unterredung Obertsleutnant Tarassow," June 29, 1943.

[19] Such rumors were not entirely unfounded. From the end of 1942 on, the partisans and, within limits, the Red Army "accepted" returning collaborators, though of course keeping them under surveillance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spies like Vlasov. These loathsome people are selling out the troops at the front, and they will never be forgiven for this. Yet for you there is still hope. Others [here names and numbers are given] have come over to our side. Together with us, they will greet with a shower of bullets all those who, like obedient sheep, are willing to die in the cause of the German fascists. . . .

Consider once more your own fate and that of your kin. Come over to our side, the side of the united family of the peoples of Russia. The people will forgive your errors. They will punish you cruelly, however, if you blindly follow the corrupt half-wit Vlasov. . . . Everyone who comes over to our side voluntarily will be allowed to live and will be accepted in our ranks as a true son of the homeland.[20]

V

The peak of Soviet counterpropaganda came during the summer of 1943, just as the Germans were curtailing Vlasov's use to an absolute minimum and his entire movement was being shelved as a result of Hitler's decision of June 8. To Hitler, a Russian defector movement was too risky—and superfluous—an undertaking to endorse.[21] Moscow apparently did not learn of this change in German tactics until a few months later. Only as evidence trickled in, revealing that references to Vlasov's name and movement were diminishing, did the Soviet authorities on their part turn off the countercurrent of anti-ROA materials. The result was a relative lull of about a year, from mid-1943 to mid-1944. Another reason for the silence was that the Germans transferred most *Osttruppen* from the occupied Soviet territories westward to other parts of German-occupied Europe, largely to avoid the increasingly frequent defections of military collaborators to the Red Army or to the Soviet partisans. The growing anti-German attitude of the population in the occupied areas made further Soviet propaganda efforts almost superfluous, and Moscow preferred to forget the entire Vlasov episode.

Only once again, in the last year of the war, did the problem recur. As the Red Army advanced, it encountered groups and individuals who claimed to belong to "Vlasov" units—strictly speaking, a falsehood, but significant of their chosen loyalty. Reputedly there was a Stalin order—effective from the time the Red Army crossed the Soviet frontier westward into Polish, and later German, territory—forbidding, on threat of punishment of up to ten years of forced labor, the killing of captive Vlasovites or other military collaborators. Such captives were

[20] WBfh. Ostland, Ic/WPr., "Übersetzung eines Feindflugblattes," May 15, 1943 (YIVO, Occ E 3).

[21] For the protocol of this conference, see Fischer, *op.cit.*, pp. 176-87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be screened and punished—or remanded to forced labor—in orderly, institutionalized fashion, and no arbitrary actions of the rank and file were to interfere with this process.[22] Indeed, from then until the end of the war and well beyond, special police and army teams, in jails, camps, and "filtration" points, went over the record of each known or suspected Vlasovite or other collaborator, meting out a variety of sentences.

The other reason for the brief re-emergence of the Vlasov issue was the launching, in November 1944, of Vlasov's "Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" with belated German approval, on a more ambitious scale and with considerable radio and leaflet propaganda directed to the Red Army. Even though its staff hopefully and rather naïvely reported individual instances of defection to Vlasov's side, and reproduced intercepted radio messages and signals among Soviet personnel revealing interest in, if not sympathy for, the movement, the impact on the Red Army was bound, to all intents and purposes, to be nil. At a time when the Soviet forces were within a few months of total victory, patriotic pride (regardless of their view of the regime) was bound to make Vlasov appear to them as a genuine traitor to his country's cause. While curiosity about him remained strong among Red Army personnel, he no longer represented an effective challenge.[23] The German attempt to exploit the political potential of the defector movement came far too late to matter; it remained half-hearted and distrustful; and it floundered between different concepts whose proponents were bitterly fighting each other, to the detriment of successful propaganda work.

In the last analysis, it was neither Soviet propaganda nor German defeats that bore the major responsibility for the failure of the Vlasov movement. The unwillingness of the Nazi leadership to permit a palatable political program, implement it, and utilize it fully in political warfare forced the "Vlasov operation" to grind to a halt. It was furtively revived only in a desperate, last-minute attempt when all else had failed to stem the onrushing tide of defeat. So much more significant, then, is the Soviet reaction to the entire Vlasov complex. The studied effort to ignore it in its early and late phases and in the domestic Soviet press, and the frantic attempt to counter it at the front lines and beyond in mid-1943, both indicate the striking oversensitivity of the Soviet leadership to an indigenous political challenge. This reaction led, quite

[22] AOK 2, Ic/AO, "Auszüge aus Gefangenenvernehmungen," August 19, 1944.

[23] This image is confirmed by interrogations of recent defectors who were at that time in the Red Army. To postwar defectors he appears invariably as a negative symbol.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

typically, to an exaggeration of the actual and potential strength of the Vlasov movement. This is the more striking since not a single prominent officer deserted from the Red Army to join Vlasov, and no significant number of Red Army men defected in response to his appeals.

Soviet fear of the movement was at its height in the late spring and summer of 1943, when Red Army victories were not yet so decisive or numerous as to preclude the possibility of a German comeback, and when German tactics were not yet so apparent as to permit Moscow the conviction that Vlasov was in reality no more than another "Goebbels trick." Yet the exaggerated proportions of the problem lingered. In the fall of 1944, Soviet indoctrination in the army was reportedly using the argument that "had it not been for the ROA, we [the Red Army] would already have won the war," thus conveniently removing any blame from the Soviet armed forces themselves.[24] Perhaps even more interesting is the complete silence which the Soviet press has maintained on the subject since the end of the war. A brief official "announcement of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR" appeared on the back page of *Pravda* fifteen months after the German collapse, announcing the trial of Vlasov and eleven associates for treason and various other charges: "All accused admitted their guilt. . . . The sentence has been executed."[25] Since then Vlasov has been an "un-person" and his cause an "un-movement."[26] There must, it seems, be no reminder or suggestion that the monopoly of power of the Soviet leadership can be challenged and that, at a moment of weakness, Moscow—right or wrong—acknowledged the existence and potency of such a threat.

[24] Luftwaffen Ic beim AOK 2, "Auszug," November 25, 1944.

[25] *Pravda*, August 2, 1946.

[26] The movement and wartime collaborators generally are the implicit subjects of the striking political amnesty decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on September 17, 1955 (*Izvestia*, September 18, 1955). Its tenor and treatment tend to support the thesis of this paper. The oversensitivity to indigenous (and *émigré*) political opposition, it would seem, was not a personal idiosyncrasy of Stalin, but apparently extends to his "collective" heirs as well. The amnesty—curiously ignored by the bulk of the Soviet press, including *Pravda*—was geared to a campaign aimed at neutralizing or recapturing Soviet *émigrés* abroad.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CULTURAL RELATIONS AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

By FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
with the assistance of
PAUL W. FRIEDRICH

WE attempt in this article to identify some politically significant characteristics of Soviet policy in the field of "cultural relations." These are discussed in the context of international affairs since the death of Stalin.[1] The significance of this topic for governments was reemphasized by its prominence at the two Geneva East-West meetings of 1955. It impinged noticeably upon world attention once the "Geneva spirit" had rekindled hope for a lessening of tension.[2]

Relatively little scholarly research has been done on this somewhat elusive aspect of international relations—an aspect which is so closely and often confusedly intertwined with propaganda and diplomacy, but which is also a matter of considerable autonomous significance.[3]

It is as difficult to define "cultural relations," or "cultural exchange"—the Russian equivalents of both terms are used frequently in Soviet sources—as to define "culture" itself, but the following may serve as a useful definitional framework. "Cultural relations" refers to activities, especially the exchange of scientific and artistic achievements and of associated personnel, conducted to increase the foreign influence of the culture of at least one of the states participating. It is an obvious but often neglected fact that the way in which such activities are reported and interpreted by the communications media of the countries involved plays a vital role in determining their effects and significance.

[1] We are grateful to the administrators of the Stimson Fund of Yale University for financial assistance which facilitated preparation of this study. The writer received major assistance in assembly of data and valuable anthropological counsel from Mr. Friedrich. He was also assisted by Mr. George Chranewycz and Mr. George Carnett. Mrs. Thelma Freides and Mr. Stephen Hosmer, graduate students in International Relations at Yale University, brought certain facts to his attention.

[2] In 1955, the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States took steps to establish new administrative arrangements to deal with travel, and associated cultural and scientific exchange, with the Soviet Union. See, for example, *Christian Science Monitor* editorial, June 2, 1955; *New York Times* article by Harrison E. Salisbury, August 1, 1955.

[3] Useful historical material on the role of cultural relations in the foreign policy of various states, including Soviet Russia, is contained in Ruth Emily McMurry and Muna Lee, *The Cultural Approach*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1947; pp. 110-36 deal with the Soviet Union. On the organizational structure of Soviet foreign cultural activity, see Louis Nemzer, "The Soviet Friendship Societies," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XIII (Summer 1949), pp. 265-84.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is a truism that a state's foreign policy reflects its internal regime. Thus the differences in the behavior of the "democratic" and "totalitarian" states in the export of cultural influence seem, upon examination, to be more significant than the similarities. Communist behavior in this area can be interpreted by examination of the record of political manipulation of cultural materials on the Soviet side. This analysis should, however, be prefaced by a comparison of Soviet and "Western," particularly American, views regarding the nature and purpose of cultural relations.

There is, of course, no official American doctrine of cultural relations, and not much consensus regarding its goals, but the belief that what is done in intercultural relations "shall bear some meaningful relation to the cultural values and expectations of both sides" seems to be representative of American expert opinion, and probably corresponds closely to United States government policy.[4] As one writer puts it, "The free nations believe in an open and unhampered exchange of ideas and influences."[5] At what we regard as its best, the contemporary "democratic" conception of cultural relations emphasizes the values of both the "elementary common purposes" of peoples and the diversity of forms in which these find expression.[6]

In the Soviet Union, the ruling Communist Party exercises monopoly of control in the theory and practice of cultural exchange. Depressing as the consequences of this fact may be from the point of view of liberal values, they confer upon the leadership of the "socialist camp" strategic advantages of coordination and flexibility. Like Soviet foreign policy in general, Soviet cultural policy is conducted in accordance with a centrally determined but at the same time appropriately differentiated pattern. Skillful adaptation to local circumstances, careful selection of facts and symbols, tact, and the apparent appreciation of foreign cultures serve to conceal the exploitation of cultural exchange for the extension of Soviet power. Instead of mutual understanding, the results can be a unilateral communication of Soviet ideas.

The extreme "politicization" of Soviet cultural relations reflects not only the unity of Soviet adminstration but also the Kremlin's chauvinistic mentality. Moscow's approach is shaped by the mixture in Soviet thought of pseudo-Marxism and Soviet nationalism. The most recent authoritative Soviet study develops militantly the thesis of a world

[4] Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man*, New York, 1949, p. 289.

[5] Edwin O. Reischauer, *Wanted: An Asian Policy*, New York, 1955, p. 206. See also Robert S. Schwantes, *Japanese and Americans*, New York, 1955, especially p. 3, defining cultural relations as "all the ways in which peoples learn about each other."

[6] Kluckhohn, *op.cit.*, p. 289.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struggle between Soviet, "socialist," culture and American, "bourgeois," culture, which must inevitably end in the establishment of a "single, universal human culture, which will take place as the result of the world proletarian revolution."[7] Despite the "new look," Soviet sources continue to assert that "Leninism was the culmination of Russian national culture as well as of world culture."[8]

When Soviet statesmen proclaim, as they have so frequently and conspicuously in recent months, that they desire the "free development of contacts between East and West," we must assume, then, in the light of the above official Soviet doctrine, that they mean something quite different from the American conception of mutual understanding of peoples and governments. The Soviet program strives to achieve "controlled interaction," or "directed diffusion."

Of course, it is questionable to what extent such an approach is capable of realization in practice. One weakness of the regimented society consists in an acute fear of "spontaneity" and in the susceptibility of its population to "alien" influences. These conditions, concerning which much in Soviet behavior, including the continued maintenance of an elaborate system of communications controls, furnishes evidence, give grounds for believing that in the long run anything like a free exchange of ideas would exert a far more revolutionary influence in Communist than in non-Communist countries. However, Soviet propaganda astuteness and the Communist control system may make it possible for Moscow to conceal the reality of domestic regimentation behind a façade of apparent enthusiasm regarding cultural exchange.

It will now be useful to survey available data regarding numbers and kinds of persons participating in travel across Soviet frontiers, and the organizational structure through which such activities are channeled. The dimensions and circumstances of Soviet cultural exchange confirm the impression that, by Western standards, this is an "abnormal" pattern, although it has become somewhat less strange since the death of Stalin.

Three characteristics of this pattern are especially worthy of comment. The first is the relatively small number of persons involved, despite the fanfare of publicity in connection with exchange activities of recent months. It should be particularly emphasized that the Krem-

[7] G. Karpov, *O sovetskoi kulture i kulturnoi revolyutsii v sssr*, Moscow, 1954, p. 78. This book received a highly favorable review in the Central Committee theoretical organ, *Kommunist*, No. 17 (1954), pp. 123-28. A similar "two worlds" approach is taken in the article on "Culture" in Volume 24 of the new edition of *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, released by the Soviet censorship in December 1953, and, indeed, in all other available Soviet sources.

[8] Karpov, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lin is much more cautious about permitting Soviet personnel to go abroad than about allowing foreigners to enter Russia. The second element is the retention of rigid and frustrating restrictions on travel inside Russia and on access to all but innocuous information, although these have been slightly relaxed. The third point is the continued, although somewhat diminished, predominance of Communists, "progressives," and fellow-travelers in the cultural exchange pattern, and a corresponding coloration of Soviet press comment on such matters. Despite some seemingly spectacular developments, continuity with the Stalinist era is greater than change. The degree to which this remains true will furnish an index of the intent and significance of the further developments that lie ahead. This is, however, an index to be applied with caution because of the capacity of the Kremlin for sometimes baffling political stage management.

The limited, somewhat confusing, and contradictory statistical information available shows that cultural relations between the Soviet Union and non-Communist countries are still on a relatively small scale. For example, fewer travelers visited the Soviet Union in 1954 than any of the Low Countries of Europe.[9] The numbers involved are certainly minuscule in comparison with the close to one million foreigners who annually travel to the United Kingdom. However, there has been a substantial increase in contacts if one compares the restricted flow of 1947-1952 with the period which began in the spring of 1953. Even during the late Stalin years, there were exceptional events, such as the Moscow Economic Conference of April 1952, in which such thoroughly capitalistic individuals as Oliver Vickery, a California manufacturer, participated.[10] But the general picture of that era was one of small numbers and limitation to Communists, as is indicated by a Soviet publication, according to which, "From 1945 to 1952, 290 workers' delegations visited our country, including 140 from capitalist, colonial, and dependent countries."[11] By contrast, in the year 1954 alone, some 390 delegations from Free World countries visited the USSR, and 204 USSR groups visited Free World countries. A rough estimate yields a figure of between six thousand and eight thousand citizens of non-Soviet countries and between three thousand and four thousand Soviet citizens as participants in "cultural" or related missions during 1954.[12] The head of the Soviet delegation at the 44th Conference

[9] F. Bowen Evans, ed., *Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities*, New York, 1955, p. 89.
[10] See his amusing article, "Capitalist on the Loose in Moscow," *Life*, June 2, 1952.
[11] *Inostranmye delegatsii o sovetskom soyuze*, Moscow, 1953, p. 4.
[12] Evans, *op.cit.*, pp. 90-91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Interparliamentary Union in Helsinki stated that more than 2,300 delegations had visited the Soviet Union "during the last two years alone" and that during the summer months of 1955, 395 delegations, from sixty-one countries, had visited the All-Union Agricultural Exposition.[13] Clifton Daniel reported in the *New York Times Magazine* for September 18, 1955, that up until August 1 of that year "some 30,000 foreigners" had made use of the facilities of Intourist, the Soviet travel agency, and that several thousand more came under other auspices. Apparently, there were more foreigners in the Soviet Union in 1955 than ever before.

There are now more foreign correspondents in the USSR, either on long-term assignments or on short visits, particularly the latter, than at any time since the "cold war" began, and perhaps more than before World War II. American radio correspondents are again broadcasting from Moscow, and the origination of television reports by American reporters in Russia has added a novel feature to the world communications picture. Some two thousand Soviet "tourists" were permitted to go abroad in 1955, some even to capitalist Sweden, and there has been some talk on the Soviet side of the possibility of "thousands" of Soviet visitors coming to America if necessary financial arrangements can be made.

Finally, it is of particular interest to Americans that a substantial increase in the number of visas issued to Americans for travel to the Soviet Union occurred during the summer of 1955. It was estimated that some three to four hundred American officials, businessmen, and leading citizens in other categories would make the trip in 1955, a greater number than in any year since before World War II.[14] If present trends continue, we may expect a further considerable increase in American travel in the Soviet Union in 1956.[15] An interesting and, on the whole, encouraging development of 1955 was the granting of permission and, in some cases, of invitations to American scholars, including some with a knowledge of Russian, to visit colleagues, engage in research, or deliver a small number of lectures in the Soviet Union. Thus far, only thirty-day visas have, as a rule, been given to such visitors. However, Professor Malia of Harvard spent several months on a book-exchange mission. The number of long-term visitors or students

[13] *Sovetskaya kultura*, September 1, 1955.

[14] *New York Times*, August 4, 1955. It appears to be impossible to obtain, either from American or from Soviet sources, exact figures on Soviet-American travel. The figures referred to above do not, of course, include American official personnel stationed in the Soviet Union.

[15] According to *Pravda* for January 20, 1955, 104 American citizens visited the USSR "in 1953 and 1954." *New Times* for February 27, 1954, revealed that only 42 persons from all countries visited the USSR on an individual basis in 1953.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from non-Communist countries remains extremely small, although the writer was recently reliably informed that seven French students are now studying in Soviet higher educational institutions. Six Columbia University students traveled in the Soviet Union in 1954 and 1955.[16]

Traditionally, most travel to the Soviet Union has been by invitation, usually extended by the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS). It has normally assumed the form of visits by "delegations," consisting in part of Communists or fellow-travelers, who have in effect assisted the Soviet authorities in making available to the outside world an approved image of Soviet life. Censorship, the techniques of the "guided tour," and refusal to permit foreigners to establish normal personal contacts with Soviet citizens have also prevented a free flow of ideas and impressions. Most important of all, probably, has been the ordinary Soviet citizen's fear of the consequences of unauthorized communication with foreigners, based upon experience and upon thinly disguised official warnings.

The Soviet control system as we know it took shape during the early and mid-1930's. In the 1920's, at least until the period of tension inaugurated by the First Five-Year Plan, foreign economists, sociologists, political scientists, and others were able to make valuable field studies.[17] Even during the 1930's, it was sometimes possible for tactful and persistent scholars to obtain permission to use archival material. Many Western European and American physicians, teachers, and scientists studied or were employed in the Soviet Union as late as 1936-1938, when Stalin's great purges and a paroxysm of xenophobia led to a drastic reduction and constriction of contact between the Soviet Union and the non-Communist world. However, a trickle of tourist traffic continued and, even in 1940, American engineers in the Soviet Union were "counted in tens," in contrast to more than one thousand around 1930.[18]

It is necessary to recall this background in order to appraise post-Stalin trends. Soviet cultural relations policy has now returned, approximately, to the pattern of 1937-1939. By and large, both foreigners traveling in the Soviet Union and Soviet citizens abroad participate in programs planned by governments, and are to only a limited degree left

[16] A Columbia Russian Institute student, Francis D. Randall, contributed a delightful article, entitled "Four Holes in the Iron Curtain," to the *Amherst Alumni News* for January 1955.

[17] Some of the most interesting of these, by such men as H. N. Brailsford and Karl Borders, were published by the Vanguard Press in its Vanguard Studies of Soviet Russia.

[18] Andrew J. Steiger, "American Engineers in the Soviet Union," pamphlet, New York, 1944, p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to their own devices. This situation results primarily from the Soviet governmental control of cultural relations, and secondarily from the attempt of non-Soviet states to cope with Soviet methods. A member of the United States agricultural delegation that visited Russia in 1955 complained that his group had been tied to a schedule that "did not give us much freedom," and that they had visited only one collective farm that they had picked out themselves.[19] The corresponding Soviet delegation apparently had no grounds for complaint. On the other hand, the Soviet journalists visiting the United States in October were refused permission to go to Detroit. In private conversations with Americans, members of the party of journalists complained, although politely, that it was very difficult for Soviet citizens to get into the United States at all. The writers' impression, based on reading, correspondence, and interviews with Americans who have visited the Soviet Union since 1953, is that the most obnoxious interferences imposed upon foreign travelers during the late Stalin period have disappeared. The picture is still spotty, and there have been reports of foreign visitors being "shadowed," although the practice of assigning members of the secret police to follow foreign ambassadors was apparently abandoned shortly after the death of Stalin. A number of American visitors, such as Senator Purtell of Connecticut, have reported refusal of requests to visit such points of interest as small factories. It is easier than it has been since 1946 to engage in innocuous, casual conversations on the streets, in the theater, and in trains. Informative conversations have taken place between foreign experts and their Soviet colleagues in various fields. Yet it is still virtually impossible for foreigners to meet Soviet Russians on the terms of informality or even intimacy which are the norm in most non-Communist countries.

In connection with the phenomena of restrictions on choice of activities imposed on non-Communists, and preferential treatment of foreign Communists or citizens of Communist China and the European captive countries, it should be noted that in addition to ideological factors, problems of comparative standards of living and of physical facilities, such as hotel and restaurant accommodations, are involved. These matters are important to the prestige-conscious Kremlin. Even Moscow still has only half a dozen hotels, at the most, suitable for travelers from relatively prosperous countries. Among many other limiting factors of a relatively non-political character, mention should be made of the astronomical level of prices in the Soviet Union, owing to scarcities and to the artificial rate of foreign exchange. Judging from accounts

[19] *New York Times*, August 21, 1955.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by recent travelers, however, Intourist now offers board and room at about $20 a day. In some cases, of course, the Soviet government solves the problem of expenses of foreign "guests" by assuming this burden completely.

The language problem is another serious barrier. Most visitors from non-Communist countries know little or no Russian, and are forced to rely upon Intourist interpreters. There has been a tendency for the Soviet authorities to insist that foreign visitors, particularly distinguished ones, be provided with official guides. In view of some of these factors, particularly the possibility that the Soviet authorities are afraid to expose their impressionable population to too rapid an influx of foreigners with an "alien" outlook on life, it is perhaps not surprising that the revival of contact with the outside world, particularly with the United States, has proceeded at a pace disappointing to some in the West.

But despite all qualifications, the unbiased foreign student can scarcely fail to be impressed by the degree to which Soviet cultural policy is still dominated by narrowly political considerations. It is difficult to acquire statistical proof, but it seems clear that the majority of the thousands of "tourists" who have visited the Soviet Union in recent years were either citizens of Communist-controlled countries, or else foreign Communists and fellow-travelers. At the same time, reporting and comment on cultural exchange in the Soviet press, particularly in the newspaper of the Ministry of Culture, *Soviet Culture*, continues to devote most of its attention and praise to the activities of Communist visitors and of such non-Communists as are prepared to disseminate Soviet propaganda abroad. Occasionally, however, brief favorable items are now published even on aspects of American "bourgeois" culture, as in the case of an article entitled "Foreign Music on the Soviet Radio" in *Soviet Culture* for September 17, 1955, which praised Mario Lanza and said that measures were being taken to satisfy the interest of Soviet listeners in contemporary American music. Perhaps more important is the fact that the extensive reporting in *Pravda* and other Soviet newspapers of the activities of Soviet and American agricultural delegations in the summer of 1955 was, on the whole, favorable. But the tone taken toward exchange with the United States and other major "capitalist" countries is very reserved in comparison with the growing enthusiasm for exchange with other Communist countries, or with unindustrialized, particularly non-European, countries which are ardently wooed by Soviet propaganda.

Cultural exchange takes place in many fields and serves many pur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

poses. The individuals and groups which participate are concerned with literature and the arts, science and technology, sports and chess, student and youth activities, "peace" and many other fields. Clues to the Kremlin's conception of the purposes and results of these activities are numerous. Let us now survey the major themes of post-Stalin Soviet reporting and comment on cultural relations with non-Soviet societies.

Today, as always, the main proclaimed purpose of Soviet cultural relations policy is the furtherance of Soviet "peace" policy.[20] In the present period, cultural exchange is closely coordinated with the activities of the World Peace Council, with campaigns against NATO and West German rearmament, for the neutrality of European and Asian states, and for numerous other policy objectives of the Soviet government. Some of the slogans which have been employed in this connection include the expression of a desire for "relaxation of international tension," emphasis upon the need for "mutual understanding" and "freedom of contact among the peoples." Through all of the Soviet propaganda on such subjects runs the theme of a conflict of interest between "capitalist" governments and their "peoples"; a harmony of interests of the Soviet Union and the "peoples" of the non-Soviet states is, however, assumed.

The importance attributed by the Kremlin to cultural relations as a vehicle of Communist "peace" and "co-existence" propaganda is indicated by the fact that Prime Minister Bulganin devoted five paragraphs to the subject in his report of August 4, 1955, on the results of the Geneva "summit" conference. Bulganin hailed the results of the exchange of agricultural delegations and quoted the paragraph of the Geneva Conference communiqué relating to freedom of information and freedom of contacts. He then said that success in this area "would in many ways foster the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of mutual confidence among states, as well as the development of international cooperation."[21] It is important in connection with all this to remember that the present expanded cultural relations drive was launched in June 1953 at a meeting of the World Peace Council, when Wanda Wasilewska announced that the Soviet delegation was authorized to state that the "widest masses of the Soviet people are ready to extend their cultural and scientific relations with other countries con-

[20] Three of the nine objectives of VOKS identified by McMurry and Lee from the *Voks Bulletin* and other official sources were concerned with the "struggle for peace," and the remaining six objectives consisted mainly of means to this end. McMurry and Lee, *op.cit.*, pp. 110-18.

[21] *Pravda*, August 5, 1955, p. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

siderably."[22] Almost every Soviet communication connected with cultural relations stresses the "peace" theme and every effort is made to demonstrate that by offering to participate in cultural relations the Soviet Union is advancing the cause of world peace.[23]

Another apparent purpose of the current Soviet drive for "freedom of cultural exchange" is to prove the existence of an "American iron curtain." The logic of this tactic appears to be as follows. Since the Soviet Union favors cultural relations and peace, the United States, which allegedly interposes barriers to cultural exchange, is an obstructor of peace. This seems like peculiar logic to most informed Americans, in view of the fact that for years the United States government vainly attempted to persuade the Soviet government that international goodwill would be fostered by an exchange of artists, scholars, and students.[24]

However, because of certain restrictions upon entry into the United States contained in the McCarran Act, and the experiences of some European intellectuals in connection with entry into this country, or attempts to obtain permission to enter it, the Soviet argument may have some effect. Some of the articles published in the Soviet press on this point deal in fantastic exaggeration. A typical one states that "the American government closes the doors before thousands of Americans not only to a part of Soviet territory, but to the entire territory of the Soviet Union, by denying them passports. The very intention of visiting the Soviet Union is regarded as suspicious. The Soviet 'iron curtain,' invented by Goebbels, is a myth which has long since been exposed. The American iron curtain is a reality."[25]

In the above fashion, and in many other ways, the problem of cultural relations is approached from the point of view of psychological warfare against the United States. Our third category, now, is the "positive" approach to cultural relations, at least from the point of view of the Kremlin, consisting in their employment to win sympathy and support for Soviet policies among foreign intellectuals. A wide variety of techniques is employed, ranging from appeals to the idealism, the egotism, or the grievances of individuals, to manipulation of national and "racial"

[22] *Pravda*, June 18, 1953. Three days earlier, the *Pravda* editorial entitled "The Word of Truth" had already stated that all who came with "honorable intentions" would be welcomed in the Soviet Union.

[23] See, for example, the statement by the Soviet journalist Litoshko, quoted in *New York Times*, August 2, 1955.

[24] See "Cultural Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union," *Department of State Publication 3480*, released April 1949, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1949.

[25] D. Zaslavski, "The Iron Curtain in the United States of America," *Pravda*, January 20, 1955. Scores of such items have appeared in all leading Soviet newspapers and magazines during the past two years.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

symbols. Appeals to the material interest of individuals and groups also play a prominent role in this pattern.

One of the most important methods by which the Soviet Union attempts to win the goodwill of individual foreign intellectuals is by making their work available to the Soviet public, to the accompaniment of flattering publicity. An article entitled "The Art of the Indian People," by Georgi Aleksandrov, then Minister of Culture, in September 1954, offers impressive evidence on Soviet methods calculated to win the goodwill of foreign, in this case Indian, intellectuals. According to Aleksandrov, numerous concerts have been performed by Indian artists in Russia, several Indian films have been shown, and over a hundred books and anthologies of Indian writers have been published in Russian translation, 1,400,000 copies in all.[26]

Commenting on such methods, a perceptive Indian editor has written, "In a society where the artist or writer finds it difficult to live, even the smallest support or patronage assumes importance. In the last four years, Communist patronage of the arts has become a strong factor. Indian fiction is being translated and published in East European languages. Indian music put down in staff notation is being sent to Moscow and other Communist capitals. The Communist Party of India which arranges for such patronage to the artists is, thereby, able to win their allegiance."[27]

Cordial hospitality extended to foreign intellectuals visiting the Soviet Union doubtless plays an important part in the process of persuasion. It is important to note that in the Soviet Union top-level personnel are assigned to the tasks of cultural diplomacy. High officials of the government receive visiting scientists and scholars, or are sent abroad on cultural missions. Closely connected with this practice, which is naturally flattering to the recipients of such attention, is the use on the Soviet side of first-class artistic, scientific, and academic talent, well-supplied with money, for the purpose of making the best possible impression abroad.

It is apparent from the mass of excellent material published in Soviet sources on foreign cultures, including the smallest and most obscure, that a vigorous effort is made to equip Soviet personnel participating in cultural relations with the knowledge and appreciation necessary for effective work. For example, *Soviet Culture* for June 7, 1955, published a series of articles by middle-rank Soviet intellectuals presenting their impressions—naturally, favorable—of works by living Indian writers recently published in the Soviet Union. One of the Soviet readers was

[26] *Pravda*, September 24, 1954.

[27] Hamdi Bey, "The Indian Intelligentsia and the Western World," *New World Writing*, 3rd Mentor Selection, New York, 1953, pp. 213-17; quotation on p. 216.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quoted as saying that the works of the Indian writers "will contribute to the greater consolidation of sincere friendship among the two great peoples, the Soviet and the Indian." The same issue contained a laudatory account of a concert performance by Yugoslav artists in Leningrad, under the title "Art Unites the Peoples." The point is also illustrated by a long article in *Pravda* for August 10, 1954, entitled "In the Mountains of Tibet," packed with ethnological facts, and an article in the same paper for August 15, 1954, containing, among other things, a lyrical description of the pyramids of Egypt, intermingled with expressions of pity for the conditions of life of Egyptian villagers, and praise for the "work-loving" Egyptian folk.

Soviet sources sometimes reveal ways in which foreign intellectuals who have been in Russia are mobilized to convey a desired message upon returning home. An article in *Pravda* for October 21, 1954, entitled "More Power to Indo-Soviet Cultural Relations," described the work of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, which was formed in 1951 shortly after the return of a group of Indian intellectuals to their native land from a visit to the Soviet Union. The Society has organized many exhibits, on such subjects as "Stalingrad Today," "Moscow University," and "A Happy Childhood." During three months of 1954, more than 600,000 Indians saw Soviet films presented under the auspices of the Society. Once the Society sent a film into the hills; when the peasants heard about it, they came down and carried the projectors and other equipment on their backs, along difficult trails, to their home settlements. In Madras, Bombay, and other cities the Society organized clubs for the study of the Russian language. As soon as the Society announced its intention of organizing such clubs, it received hundreds of letters requesting information about courses and textbooks.

Probably the fourth main theme of post-Stalin comment on cultural relations is the necessity of learning from "advanced" foreign achievements. Despite the progress made in recent decades, Soviet Russia's scientific and technological position still compares unfavorably in many important respects, such as productivity of labor, with that of advanced capitalist countries. Some of the most important speeches of Soviet leaders during the past two and a half years have emphasized the importance for Soviet science, technology, industry, and agriculture of learning from the capitalist West.

For example, Premier Bulganin, in his speech of July 4, 1955, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said, "We cannot forget—and we do not have the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

right to—that technology in capitalist countries does not stand still, but, under the influence of the arms race, and of the striving of capitalists for maximum profits, it has, in a number of fields, moved ahead."[28]

The fact that an increasing proportion of Soviet delegations sent abroad since 1953 consists of engineers and scientists tends to support the hypothesis that a desire to break out of the isolation which threatened the Soviet Union as a result of the extremes of Stalin's policies is one of the motives for the present more liberal and rational approach toward cultural relations.

It is also possible that the desire of the Soviet elite to enjoy a greater measure of modern comforts and conveniences may play a part in this new approach. It is interesting that Ilya Ehrenburg, in *Soviet Culture* for August 9, 1955, expressed the opinion that an exhibition of Swedish home furnishings should be opened in Moscow. This proposal also forms part of a concerted Soviet effort to win Swedish goodwill.

Two other elements in Soviet foreign cultural behavior perhaps deserve attention. The first is the recent trend toward favorable reporting of the results of Soviet travel in the United States. At least for some time after the "summit" conference, Soviet correspondents reported back to their readers on the cordiality displayed by Americans toward Soviet visitors. This behavior may reflect the desire of the new Soviet leadership to use cultural relations as an instrument of "legitimization," in the eyes of the Soviet and satellite population. Possibly the Kremlin thinks that an apparent improvement in relations between the two major powers, in which cultural exchange plays a conspicuous part, may serve to enhance the domestic prestige of Stalin's successors and to discourage the disaffected and discontented inside the Soviet Union and in the Soviet-controlled countries of Eastern Europe. Some Soviet and East European refugees fear that cultural relations can even be utilized as a method of "compromising" foreign governments.

Finally, attention is called to the enhancement of Soviet national pride afforded by the current increase in recognition of Russian culture on the part of most countries of the world. In spite of Russia's vast power, the Soviet elite still seems to suffer from an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West. That this is the case is indicated, so far as the material dealing with cultural relations is concerned, by often labored but sometimes interesting and valid attempts to demonstrate the influence of Russian classical culture on foreign countries.

We turn now to a brief "area" survey. Because of space limitations

[28] *Pravda*, July 17, 1955.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it will be impossible to deal with more than a few countries individually or in detail.

The application of Soviet cultural effort to particular areas seems to be guided largely by two criteria. The first is the significance of the area from the point of view of the world power balance. The second is a calculation of comparative susceptibility. It should be noted, also, that Soviet policy is quick to pour resources into areas which may not appear immediately important by either of these criteria, but in which opportunities for the exertion of influence, or for engaging in symbolic acts vis-à-vis one country which may have a desirable effect on other areas, have presented themselves. The sudden spurt of Soviet attention to Egypt in the summer of 1955, or the apparently disproportionate attention paid to tiny Iceland, illustrates the point.

More Soviet cultural resources have been devoted during the past two and a half years to Western Europe than to Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Data compiled by Bowen Evans and us on exchange of persons and our count of space devoted to this subject in *Ogonek* (the closest Soviet equivalent of *Life*) shows that greater attention is paid to Western Europe and the United States than to the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries. In 1954, Sweden, France, Italy, and England led the European countries in volume of reporting. These results correspond closely to the number of delegations from these countries to the USSR in that year. In free Asia, India, which sent thirty-two delegations to Russia in 1954, received by far the greatest volume of space in *Ogonek*; Afghanistan was next, but far behind.

In terms of employment of the most potent cultural and psychological tools, such as relatively intimate contacts among students, scholars, and specialists, the sending of scientists and technicians abroad on a relatively long-term basis, or willingness to express admiration for a non-Soviet culture, the major effort is devoted to the underdeveloped areas. In the unindustrialized world, "bourgeois" culture is weak. The Soviets do not have to fear that Burmese, Syrians, Egyptians, Indians, or even Brazilians are likely to exert a "capitalistic" influence on Soviet intellectuals or masses. It is safe as well as profitable, therefore, to display enthusiasm for the national culture and national character of such peoples; this can be a potent instrument for winning the affection of peoples still smarting under a sense of inferiority to, or burdened by resentments against, "Western imperialism."

Moscow is trying to convince the elites and the ambitious and disaffected counter-elites of the relatively non-industrialized areas that industrialization of the Soviet type is free of the evils allegedly associated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with American-style industrialization. Moscow asserts that American "cosmopolitanism" destroys national independence and national cultures. By contrast, the Soviet Union stands ready to furnish technical assistance and at the same time displays, apparently, a sensitive appreciation of cultural distinctiveness. In effect, the promise is made to the discontented intellectuals of the underdeveloped areas that their countries can achieve "modernization" and yet preserve the cherished values of folk culture. A large role is played by carefully planned trips of Oriental statesmen to the Soviet Asian republics, and by propaganda regarding the respect and assistance accorded non-Russian cultures by the Soviet government.[29]

The success of Soviet cultural relations is facilitated, perhaps especially in the Orient, by a well-planned program of study and research in foreign languages and cultures. Beginning in the fall of 1955, students entering Soviet higher educational institutions were required to pass an examination in one foreign language.[30]

This measure adds to an already highly developed system of instruction. According to a recent American publication, "Soviet school children begin study of a foreign language early as part of the compulsory curriculum in all schools. In a sixth grade, state published, English textbook, pupils learn that 'a Soviet officer must be . . . stronger in technique than his enemy. He must know . . . especially mathematics, physics, and languages.' "[31] A growing interest is displayed in the languages of Eastern Europe and China. According to a Soviet press notice, "More and more of our people are mastering the Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Rumanian, and other languages, and, naturally, they wish to read books in these languages; there is also great interest in Chinese publications."[32] In 1953, a textbook in Spanish for the third and fourth grades of elementary school was published, and a review of this volume stated that some Soviet schools introduced the study of Spanish as the required foreign language in 1949.[33]

This program is accompanied by extensive publication of foreign-language dictionaries, apparently far surpassing the corresponding American effort.[34] Particular stress is placed upon the study of Orien-

[29] See, for example, *Pravda* editorial, October 14, 1955, on "The Flourishing of the Arts in Socialist Nations," which proclaims, as one of the major values of Soviet socialism, the ideal of "mutual cultural enrichment"; *New York Times*, October 30, 1955.

[30] *Izvestiya*, May 20, 1955.

[31] Department of State, *The National Interest and Foreign Languages*, prepared by William R. Parker for Citizens Consultations, initiated by the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Washington, D.C., 1954, p. 71.

[32] *Sovetskaya kultura*, June 30, 1955.

[33] *Inostrannye yazyki v shkole*, No. 1 (1953), pp. 104-8. [34] *Pravda*, April 11, 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tal languages and cultures; and Soviet art students, social scientists, and historians assert that the attention they pay to "the peoples of the East" contrasts sharply with the practice of "bourgeois" scholars who, they assert, neglect or even despise Oriental, as well as Slavic, cultures.[35]

A recent article in *Kommunist* revealed the magnitude of Soviet efforts in Oriental studies and indicated that these are to be redoubled. The article urged that Oriental and African studies be integrated into secondary-school and university curricula, so as to furnish all students with a necessary knowledge of Eastern countries. Eastern studies, it said, must contribute to "the consolidation of friendship between Soviet people and peoples of the East."[36] This article also recommended increased study of the "struggle for national liberation," as well as the history and culture, of Egypt and other countries of Africa.[37]

There are indications that the Kremlin, while supporting Communist China's major foreign policy goals, is at the same time seeking to orient the intellectuals of Asia primarily to the Soviet Union. For example, in October 1954, a joint press conference of Indian, Burmese, and Japanese economic delegations was held in Moscow. This may have been part of an effort to develop a sense of common interest among anti-capitalist Asians in developing a coordinated, Moscow-directed program.[38] Similarly, a recent article on the Mongolian People's Republic dwelt in considerable detail on the intimacy of Russian-Mongolian linguistic, literary, technological, and artistic intercourse, but said nothing about China.[39]

Current Soviet interest in Egyptian culture, and the success of Soviet efforts in achieving cultural penetration, are indicated by a growing program of publications, and by the gala opening in Cairo, on September 7, 1955, of a "permanent" VOKS exposition. This event was attended, apparently, by the cream of the Egyptian opinion-making elite, as well as by the VOKS "plenipotentiary" for Egypt.[40]

So much has already been said about Soviet-Indian cultural relations that we shall confine ourselves here to some observations regarding one of the most significant events thus far in both political and cultural relations between the two countries, the visit of Prime Minister Nehru to Russia in June 1955. This visit culminated in the joint communiqué

[35] This point is stressed in Soviet encyclopedias and in the announcement in *Sovetskaya kultura* for June 9, 1955, of a ten-volume "universal history."

[36] *Kommunist*, No. 8 (May 1955), pp. 74-83; quotation on p. 83. A condensed version is available in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VII, No. 28 (August 24, 1955), pp. 21-24.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[38] *Pravda*, October 5, 1954.

[39] *Sovetskaya kultura*, September 17, 1955.

[40] *Pravda*, September 4, 1955; *Sovetskaya kultura*, September 8, 1955.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

signed by Mr. Nehru and Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin on June 22, which was a signal success for Soviet diplomacy. Probably no other foreign visitor, certainly no non-Communist, has ever received as magnificent a reception in Russia as did the Indian leader. In entertaining Mr. Nehru, the Soviet authorities overlooked no detail which might contribute to the desired atmosphere. For example, on May 31, in the presence of the Indian Ambassador and the new Soviet Minister of Culture, Mikhailov, a monument was unveiled to the fifteenth-century Russian traveler to India, Afanasi Nikitin. The press emphasized that Nikitin was the first European to visit India "with a friendly purpose." Nikitin had been impressed by the "love of work, wisdom, and talent" of the Indian people.[41] A Russian translation was published of Mr. Nehru's book, *The Discovery of India*, and a highly laudatory review appeared in the main theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.[42]

For weeks, in May and June, front-page photographs and editorials on Mr. Nehru and his party dominated the press. Moscow and its population gave the Indian leader a reception calculated to create an impression of warmest friendliness. *Pravda* describes how Indian songs were sung by Soviet youngsters, and Russian interpreters translated Mr. Nehru's speech of greeting, delivered in his native tongue, Hindustani.[43]

Nehru's visit was followed by events of ceremonial significance, such as the Soviet gift to him of an Arabian stallion, and by more concrete developments such as signature on September 20, 1955, of an agreement on "commercial cooperation" between the Soviet Civil Air Fleet and the Indian State Air Lines.[44] Moreover, it paved the way for the more recent return trip by Bulganin and Khrushchev to India.

It would, of course, be a mistake to assume that Soviet cultural policy has fully achieved its objectives in India, where it operates under relatively favorable conditions. Indian intellectuals, students, and industrialists have, in many cases, displayed considerable skepticism with regard to the quality of Soviet culture and technology, and what they offer to India.[45] The Soviet government refused to grant visas to some Indian journalists who wished to accompany Mr. Nehru on his journey to Russia, an indication that the Kremlin was by no means certain that it could favorably impress all Indian intellectuals.

[41] *Pravda*, June 1, 1955; *Sovetskaya kultura*, June 2, 1955.
[42] "A Book on the Great Indian People," *Kommunist*, No. 9 (1955), pp. 96-106.
[43] *Pravda*, June 8, 1955. Almost the whole front page was devoted to Nehru's arrival.
[44] *Pravda*, September 21, 1955; *Sovetskaya kultura*, October 12, 1955.
[45] See, for example, *New York Times*, January 11 and February 5, 1954, and May 22, 1955; *Christian Science Monitor*, December 28, 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, Soviet comment following Nehru's visit indicated confidence that much had been accomplished. For example, *Izvestiya* for June 26, 1955, emphasized "the significance for the further strengthening of Soviet-Indian friendship, and for the relaxation of international tension, of the visit to the Soviet Union of the Prime Minister of India." Similarly, the 1955 visit to Japan of the noted Soviet violinist David Oistrakh, which was linked up in Soviet reporting with the sufferings which had been experienced by the Japanese people because of the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan, apparently, in Soviet eyes, paid substantial political dividends.

We complete this survey with a brief discussion of Soviet cultural policy toward Latin America and toward the United States.

As recent developments in Guatemala suggest, Latin America may offer a susceptible target for Soviet ideological and cultural efforts. Tons of excellently prepared propaganda and cultural material printed in Prague in Spanish for distribution in various South American countries were discovered in Guatemala after the downfall of the pro-Communist regime.[46] In 1954, twenty-six delegations of various kinds from the American republics visited the Soviet Union and six Soviet delegations went to Latin American countries.[47] In the early months of 1955, the Soviet press reported official functions in Moscow honoring "the noted Argentinian physician, José Maria Penn," and an "evening of Argentinian cinema," a visit by the Brazilian architect Oscar Niemeyer, and numerous other events indicating a keen interest in Soviet-Latin American cultural exchange.[48] Articles have been published on Mexican film art, stressing its high principles of "patriotism, peace, and humanitarianism," and expressing sympathy with the Mexican film industry in its struggle against the "cruel competition of Hollywood."[49]

Soviet gestures toward Chile in August 1954 offer a significant example of cultural policy in action. On August 11, the poet Pablo Nerude was awarded a Stalin Peace Prize. Ilya Ehrenburg delivered a speech at the ceremony in Santiago. He said, *inter alia*, that "We know how the Chilean people values its freedom and its independence, and we remember everything, from the days of O'Higgins and San Martín to the present." He praised the beauty of Chilean culture, and linked it with that of all of Latin America, stressing, by implication, the unity of culture and economic interest of Latin Americans, as opposed to their ties with the United States.

[46] Keith Monroe, "Guatemala: What the Reds Left Behind," *Harper's Magazine*, CCI (July 1955), p. 58.
[47] Evans, *op.cit.*, pp. 95-100. [48] *Pravda*, March 13, March 16, and April 28, 1955.
[49] *Sovetskaya kultura*, April 28, 1955.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nerude, who was cordially received on earlier, and subsequent, visits to Russia, replied that Pushkin and Mayakovski, together with modern Soviet writers, had shown him the "grandeur" of the Soviet Union. He felt it an honor to be a "rank-and-file fighter" for the "dignity" of Chile and of Latin America in general.

The timing of this event, when Chilean miners had gone on strike against American-financed companies, is interesting. The front-page publicity, the warmth and cultural awareness of the reporting, and the flattery to Chilean pride offered by the sending of such a prominent intellectual as Ehrenburg to a distant land are also significant.[50]

Behind current policies is a history of assiduous cultivation of the Latin American intelligentsia. Among the landmarks in this history was the organization in 1944 of the Instituto de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso, which publishes a well-produced literary-scientific monthly magazine entitled *Intercambio Cultural*. The issue for February 1955 contained articles on the Pulkovo observatory in Leningrad, on "Soviet books abroad," and stories by the Soviet authors Mikhail Sholokhov and Elena Doroshinskaya. The Soviet Ambassador to Mexico during World War II, Constantine Umanski, was exceptionally successful in launching an attractive cultural program.[51]

The United States, as the citadel of "world capitalism," presents special problems to Soviet cultural policy. Among the many motives of post-Stalin cultural policy toward this country, particular importance should probably be attributed to the following: reduction of American mistrust aroused by the vituperative propaganda of Stalin's last years, and the hope of gaining technological, scientific and, perhaps, commercial advantages. At the same time, though on a relatively subdued and in some ways covert level, the ultimate aim of ideologically and diplomatically isolating the United States from its friends and allies has not been abandoned.

Given this framework, it is understandable that post-Geneva reporting of foreign news in the Soviet press featured statements by Aneurin Bevan and other political leaders, suggesting that the way to preserve the "Geneva atmosphere" was to do away with NATO, as well as articles by *Pravda* correspondents in the United States asserting that "simple people" in America had not become hostile to Russia, despite the efforts of the American press to make them hate the Soviet Union.[52]

[50] *Pravda*, August 13 and September 3, 1954, the latter containing an article by Ehrenburg.

[51] See, for example, *New York Times*, January 27, 1955, and considerable material in McMurry and Lee, *op.cit.*

[52] *Pravda*, July 28, July 31, and August 1, 1955; *New York Times*, August 2, 1955.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the same time, attacks on individual American governmental leaders and politicians almost disappeared from Soviet newspapers. Major statements by President Eisenhower were published in full, and expressions of sympathy by Soviet leaders, as well as brief medical bulletins, appeared after Mr. Eisenhower's heart attack. Such practices are not entirely new. For example, during the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 the Soviet newspapers published one of Secretary of State Byrnes' speeches, after Mr. Byrnes had dared the Soviet government to publish it.

In the meantime, the newspaper of the Soviet Ministry of Culture continued, in the spring and summer of 1955, to present a bleak picture of American life and national character. In connection with a drive for the popularization of Russian military history, a long article paid tribute to the technical skill of an American film, "Test Pilot," but emphasized that it was part of the propaganda effort by which the government of the United States and other bourgeois governments prepared for "an unjust, aggressive, and criminal war."

This article was particularly interesting in its characterization of the "average American," as "sporting, coarsely masculine," and impregnated with "practicality and down-to-earth qualities." According to the article, these traits of character explained why a Pentagon recruiting film emphasized the high pay of airmen.[53]

In the months that have passed since the bulk of this article was written, cultural exchange has continued to play an increasing role in Soviet diplomacy, in spite of a certain cooling of Soviet-Western relations at the highest levels. Twenty per cent of the total space in *Pravda* for November 1955 was devoted to reporting and comments on travel by Soviet representatives abroad and foreigners in the Soviet Union. This figure is perhaps somewhat distorted, because of the great volume of space given to the Asian trip of Khrushchev and Bulganin. However, the corresponding figures for August and September, respectively, were 15 per cent and 14 per cent. In December 1955, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs consented to the distribution of fifty thousand copies a month of the United States official Russian-language magazine *Amerika*. In a press conference reported in *Soviet Culture* for December 4, 1955, Boris Polevoi, the head of the delegation of Soviet

[53] *Sovetskaya kultura*, May 31, 1955. Also interesting in connection with the current Soviet image of American morality and culture is a very long article by Charles White in the issue of July 9, 1955, entitled "The Path of a Negro Artist," reprinted from *Masses and Mainstream* (April 1955), pp. 33-4; on the other hand, *Pravda* for October 12, 1955, reported an "evening of American music" in honor of the visiting American, Carleton Smith.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

journalists that visited the United States in October and November, thanked the American hosts of the delegation for their hospitality and praised certain features of American civilization, especially in the field of technology and everyday conveniences, but complained that the delegation had been subjected to a shameful degree of surveillance and a great deal of rudeness.

The press conference given by the journalists, and statements made by Mr. Matskevich, head of the Soviet agricultural delegation, seem to fit into a pattern in which an attempt to export influence but at the same time to import useful techniques continues to be a major feature. Very little effort has been made in recent months to change the Soviet image of the United States, although the picture presented is not as grim as it was under Stalin. A considerable effort has been made to present to foreign countries a more favorable image of the Soviet Union than that which prevailed earlier.

This effort has probably met with some success, even in the United States. The performances of the violinist David Oistrakh and the pianist Emil Gilels in this country, for example, have received a very favorable press. As before, however, Soviet cultural propaganda in the last months of 1955 enjoyed its greatest success in the countries of Asia and the Middle East. Bulganin and Khrushchev were apparently able to convince many Indians of the sincerity of their slogan that "Russians and Indians are brothers." As a result of their visit, the Soviet Union, and perhaps the Communist Party of India, acquired prestige and gained respectability. Time will tell whether or not these gains were offset by the restraint which the new tactics imposed, at least temporarily, on the Indian Communist Party.

Post-Stalin cultural relations policy presents the governments of the Western powers, and in particular that of the United States, with complex and difficult problems. In all probability, the challenge of "peaceful competition," in which technical assistance and cultural exchange figure prominently, will gradually become increasingly urgent. As the Soviet Union becomes more powerful, and as it is able to present a more attractive face to the world, it will probably display, under increasingly relaxed but still carefully controlled conditions, more and more features of its achievements to a growing number of foreigners.

Whether we like it or not, we are engaged in a contest of communications. It cannot be met by attempting to seal ourselves off from subversive influences. The democracies, as exponents of the open society, should welcome all opportunities to increase the international traffic in ideas. In the long run, they can only gain by a gradual reduction in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the existing difficulties of international and intercultural communications.

The West can hold its own in the "uncommitted world" only by developing a positive program that can compete on its own merits with the best that the Russians and the Communist Chinese have to offer. Success in this competition will require further effort on the part of governments, opinion leaders, and scholars. We should press for reciprocity and for a genuine two-way traffic in ideas and influence, as well as for objectivity on both sides in reporting the results of cultural exchange.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET "NEW COURSE"*

By DAVID GRANICK

HOW new is the Soviet "new course"? It is just as difficult to answer this question as it applies to the internal Soviet economy as in its application to internal politics or to foreign affairs. Nor is this surprising, for it is probable that there is a close interrelationship between the various facets of Soviet policy.

However, it is clear that the economic segment that will be most affected by the new policy, if such a new policy does exist, is agriculture. Heavy industry, we are authoritatively told by Khrushchev, retains its absolute priority in the Soviet scheme of things.[1] The production of such industrial consumer goods as textiles, shoes, and foodstuffs—items basic to the general Russian standard of living—depends on agriculture. Construction of new housing continues to grow, but nothing overly dramatic is planned. Production of metal goods for consumers is scheduled to rise sharply in percentage terms, but the absolute quantities planned are still very small. Production of such items as washing machines, private cars, and television sets comprises the current material basis for the multi-decade struggle against "leveling" of real wages. These goods represent material rewards to the upper strata of Soviet society. They can scarcely expand beyond this role in the near future without becoming an unacceptable drain upon the expansion possibilities of heavy industry and military production.

The big change is planned for agriculture, the segment of the economy where perhaps half the labor force still works.[2] The hope here is to switch Russia from a predominantly grain-producing country to a land with mixed farming and a substantial livestock base. Such a change would revolutionize the diet of the Russian people and would make possible a major development in the manufacture of soft goods. This qualitative shift is to be accompanied by major quantitative increases in agricultural production.

* Presented as a paper before the American Historical Association on December 28, 1955.

[1] N. S. Khrushchev, Report of January 25, 1955, to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as *Current Digest*), VII, No. 6 (March 23, 1955), p. 3.

[2] W. W. Eason, "Population and Labor Force," in A. Bergson, ed., *Soviet Economic Growth*, Evanston, Ill., 1953, pp. 114-16; J. A. Kershaw, "Agricultural Output and Employment," in *ibid.*, p. 302.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our problem is that of determining to what extent this formal plan represents serious operational policy. For there is nothing in the history of Soviet economic planning to indicate a close correlation between "plan" and actual policy in the agricultural sector.[3] Both in theory and practice, Soviet planning has always been based upon the "fulfillment and overfulfillment" of priority targets—when necessary, at the expense of non-priority planned goals. Thus far in Soviet history, the price paid for fulfillment of heavy industry goals has been failure even to approach the planned objective in agriculture or in the production of manufactured consumer goods. The historical record of the absence of plan fulfillment in agriculture provides good reason for not taking seriously planned production statistics or even planned tendencies in this segment of the economy. If agriculture continues to be given last priority in the allocation of resources, if it remains the Peter to be robbed in order to pay the Paul of heavy industry, then the Soviet "new course" will look remarkably like the old one.

Before beginning a discussion of the "new" policy, it seems necessary to present some background on Soviet agriculture.

While social relations in Russian agriculture have been completely altered during the last forty years, production is probably not much higher than before the First World War.[4] Grain production has increased, but probably by less than the one-fourth growth in population.[5] Livestock numbers, after several major ups-and-downs, are at the original level.[6] Only the per capita production of technical crops such as cotton has risen significantly.[7]

Yet it would be a mistake to think of agricultural production as stagnant. Between 1945 and 1953, the number of cattle in the USSR rose by 25 per cent and the number of pigs by 700 per cent—thereby doing no more than restoring the prewar numbers.[8] The problem is not stagnation, but rather the need for going beyond previous levels. It is one thing to restore previous grain acreage and production; quite another to raise yields per acre or to expand cultivation into new arid land or into country with a short growing season. It is one thing to restore

[3] Cf. N. Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR*, Stanford, Calif., 1949, pp. 64-73.

[4] Cf. "Long-term Trends in European Agriculture," in U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, III, No. 2 (1951, 2nd quarter).

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[6] N. S. Khrushchev, Report of September 3, 1953, to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *Current Digest*, v, No. 39 (November 7, 1953), p. 25.

[7] "Long-term Trends in European Agriculture," *op.cit.*, p. 25; Jasny, *op.cit.*, pp. 562-69.

[8] Calculations from Khrushchev, Report of September 3, 1953, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

previous livestock numbers; it is another to expand the fodder base of the country so as to increase the amount of livestock which can be supported. This last point is illustrated by the 4 per cent decline in cattle numbers during 1952, when the pre-First World War level had barely been reached.[9]

The Soviet Union's failure to expand agricultural production stands sharply in contrast to its marked successes in heavy industry. But a comparison with the rest of Europe is also significant. For, while Russia has not been particularly successful in catching up to the general European agricultural standard, neither has it fallen further behind since 1913. In Europe as a whole, grain and cattle production shows little change from the 1913 level although the population has risen by one-fifth.[10] This fact of general European failure to raise agricultural production would be relevant to any consideration of explanations of Russian failure which find its cause in the innate inefficiency of collective farming.

In the writer's view, the basic element in the new Soviet policy in agriculture is the effort to increase agricultural yields sharply. The methods to be employed by the state apparatus can be considered under three headings; raising incentives for the collective farmers, improving the level of collective farm management, and decentralizing agricultural planning. It appears unlikely that substantial capital investments are to be put into the existing crop area in the near future.[11]

None of the above methods of improvement are new to Soviet agriculture. All have been given lip service since the creation of collective and state farming. The recent criticism of bureaucratic abuses made by top leaders is the oldest of Soviet old-hat. Yet it seems to the writer that there have been objective developments within the Soviet Union which make such an approach more feasible now than ever before in Soviet history. It is these developments and their significance for the success of the new policy which we shall now examine.

Official Soviet doctrine, almost since Revolutionary days, has stressed the importance of material incentives in order to achieve higher productivity and economic development.[12] But to realize such a policy has

[9] U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*, Geneva, 1955, table 38, p. 78.

[10] Cf. Ingvar Svennilson, *Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy*, U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 1954, table 7, p. 54.

[11] Cf. I. A. Benediktov, Speech at the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, *Current Digest*, VII, No. 6 (March 23, 1955), pp. 20-21.

[12] Cf. A. Bergson, *The Structure of Soviet Wages*, Cambridge, Mass., 1944, chs. XIII and XIV, especially pp. 203-4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been extremely difficult for a country engaged in an "Operation Bootstrap." Resources allocated to consumption have been insufficient to allow universal application of a policy of material incentives alongside the necessary maintenance of a basic minimum standard of living sufficient to sustain physical productivity in the least efficient workers. The result would seem to be that the policy of material incentives for good work has been made effective primarily in the non-agricultural segments of the economy, while agriculture has been left to shift with essentially "moral encouragement." This concentration is quite in line with the Soviet concept of "priority" segments of the economy.[13]

Two examples of what would be involved in material incentives in agriculture may be offered. In practice, and partially even in law, successful collective farms have seen themselves penalized by having their compulsory state deliveries—at virtually confiscatory prices—tied closely to their total production; thus much of any production increase has been absorbed in what amounts to "tax." This policy has meant an extraordinarily high income tax on collective farm income in a country where workers in all other segments of the economy pay very low income taxes. Although the effect on collective farmers' motivation has been what might be expected, the system has been maintained as a means of "fulfilling" the state plan for compulsory deliveries of farm products. Good farms make up the quotas which poorer farms cannot supply.[14] If this system is abandoned, and farms are given equal obligations for compulsory deliveries irrespective of their actual productivity, then the Soviet state must expect to pay the price of receiving lower compulsory deliveries—at least for a time. Soviet leaders have indicated that appropriate reforms are to be made, but it is clear that during 1954 local leaders were hesitant to pay the price involved.[15]

A second case is the employment of mechanics and equipment operators on machine tractor stations. Until recently, this personnel has been poorly paid in comparison with industrial workers and has mostly been hired seasonally from the ranks of the collective farmers. The result has been tremendous turnover, almost reminiscent of the early 1930's in construction and industry. Operators have had poor training and little work discipline, for, as Khrushchev said, "Today they drive

[13] Cf. D. Granick, *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR*, New York, 1954, pp. 77, 93-94.

[14] Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted September 7, 1953, *Current Digest*, v, No. 37 (October 24, 1953), pp. 3-4.

[15] Khrushchev, Report of January 25, 1955, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a tractor; tomorrow they return to the collective farms or depart for industry."[16]

Permanent work and higher pay scales are the solutions offered in the new policy. Perhaps these will work if actually applied, but there is no blinking the cost.

It seems to the writer that Soviet leaders are in a better position today than ever before actually to apply to agriculture their long-stated policy of material incentives. For one thing, per capita food supply seems to have roughly regained or topped the prewar peak.[17] The same is true of manufactured consumer goods. This should provide at least as good a foundation as was ever previously available for raising the real income of a substantial segment of the more efficient peasantry, without reducing to an unacceptable level the living standard of the rest. Soviet leaders have a greater material base with which to work, and can better afford to gamble a portion of it in the hope of high returns through increased farm productivity. This seems particularly true if it is the case that Soviet leaders consider the prospects of major war in the near future to be less likely than they appeared in 1937 and 1938. For, if immediate war prospects can be discounted, the desirability of an ever-larger emergency state stock of foodstuffs and consumer goods can be ignored.

A second and even more important reason why a policy of material incentives may now be followed is that the need for pushing labor out of the countryside and into the cities seems to have ended. The industrialization of the 1930's could have been carried out only with the aid of manpower brought from the farms, and the promotion of a massive voluntary recruitment policy required urban living standards to be substantially above rural ones. It seems likely, however, that the need for rural labor in the cities is now beginning to subside. Three justifications for this view can be indicated.

In the first place, the proportion of the population living in cities is constantly rising. During the five years 1950-1954, urban population increased by seventeen million while rural population fell off by almost two million.[18] The significance of this fact is that the cities are increasingly able to supply their own needs for a larger labor force with children born and brought up in the cities.

[16] Khrushchev, Report of September 3, 1953, *op.cit.*, pp. 33-34.

[17] U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1951*, Geneva, 1952, table 62, p. 135; *Economic Survey of Europe in 1953*, Geneva, 1954, p. 51; *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*, *op.cit.*, p. 64.

[18] Khrushchev, Report of January 25, 1955, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Secondly, it may well be that the scarce factor of the Soviet economy —capital investment—may best be economized by increasing capital intensity in industrial production and so reducing manpower needs in the cities. This is due to the fact that housing, public transport, and public utilities all must be expanded as urban population rises—for it is unlikely that any further reduction in per capita standards for these services would be allowed. A rising urban population thus entails substantial capital investments in city services.[19] An alternative approach to that of increasing the urban labor force is to proceed with a mechanization of auxiliary processes in industry. The handling of materials, inspection, and bookkeeping operations all absorb a tremendous proportion of urban labor that could be quickly released through mechanization. It would not be surprising to see an increasing effort made along these lines.

Finally, there are strong indications that city life is becoming increasingly appealing to Soviet citizens, quite apart from relative earnings in factory and farm. The amenities of life still have not reached the countryside, while the old village "way of life" is in any case evermore lost. It would seem that the needed rural workers will move to the cities even without the attraction of higher earnings.

The import of all this is that Soviet leaders may no longer need to fear the rise of farm earnings to the level of factory wages as a threat to the continuing industrialization program. With this fear weakened or gone entirely, a policy of significant material incentives to farmers may well be in the cards.

A second major method of raising farm productivity, in addition to that of offering material incentives, is to improve the level of farm management. At present, this level appears to be quite low. A critical barometer of efficiency is the degree of education attained by top management. In late 1953, only 23 per cent of the nation's 9,000 machine tractor stations were headed by men with higher education, and only 15 per cent had chief engineers with higher education. No more than 3 per cent of the 94,000 collective farms—each averaging 4,200 acres of arable land—were headed by chairmen with higher education.[20]

That this low educational level should be a serious handicap to efficient managerial work is not surprising. Soviet agriculture today is run on a large-unit basis. The director of a machine tractor station has

[19] G. Grossman, "Some Current Trends in Soviet Capital Formation," in *Capital Formation and Economic Growth*, A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, Princeton, N.J., 1956, pp. 188-91.

[20] Khrushchev, Report of September 3, 1953, *op.cit.*, pp. 34, 38; Resolution of the Central Committee, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over one hundred tractors and an appropriate amount of other equipment at his disposal.[21] An average collective farm chairman has a population of perhaps one thousand persons directly dependent for their livelihood on his direction.[22]

In the past, there was little that could be done about these educational deficiencies. The 1930's saw a crash program to raise educational standards for management in industry and transport, particularly in heavy industry. The 1940's saw the recreation of this managerial group. Agriculture, with last priority, had no claim on trained managerial resources.

The situation today is obviously quite different. Trained personnel are less scarce than ever before. Engineers, key employees for the operation and maintenance of machine tractor station equipment, can be rapidly transferred into agriculture. Such a transfer could go far to improve the sorry long-time record in machine maintenance. Moreover, while the shortage of graduates of agricultural colleges will clearly remain a serious problem for some time to come, more resources can be devoted to expanding advanced agricultural training.

The amalgamation of collective farms which occurred several years ago should ease the problem of improving collective farm management, while at the same time making its solution more urgent than ever. With the tripling of the size of collective farms,[23] a limited amount of first-rate executive talent can go much further than before.

The immediate Soviet approach to improving collective farm leadership is to organize brief and intensive training programs for proved urban administrators, and then to designate these city workers as chairmen of collective farms. If this program is carried out, and if only half of these administrators make good in their training and probationary periods, they will comprise one-sixth of the present number of collective farm chairmen.[24]

On the face of it, this seems an absurd program. Clearly these chairmen will be lacking in basic knowledge of farming. Yet if the deficiencies in farming management are to a large extent administrative, then skilled administrators may not do badly as farm chairmen. Here is an old question in public administration the world over: need a top administrator know the subject matter of his field? The Soviet answer

[21] Computed from Khrushchev, Report of September 3, 1953, *op.cit.*, pp. 11, 33.

[22] Economic Commission for Europe and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, *European Agriculture*, Geneva, 1954, p. 63.

[23] Khrushchev, Report of September 3, 1953, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

[24] Cf. *Pravda* editorial of April 5, 1955, *Current Digest*, VII, No. 14 (May 18, 1955), pp. 11-13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has traditionally been that this is unnecessary, but that he should promptly begin to learn once he gets on the job. Soviet leadership is here employing an approach it has long used throughout the Russian economy.

The third method recommended by Soviet leaders for improving farm efficiency is the decentralization of agricultural planning. Individual collective farms and machine tractor stations are to be given considerably more autonomy than in the past in determining what products and how much of each to produce and how to produce them. It is thus hoped to overcome such consequences of centralization as the insistence on the sowing of spring wheat in the south when local officials know that winter wheat provides better yields, and on winter wheat in parts of Siberia, the Urals, and Kazakhstan where the farmers on the spot prefer spring wheat.[25]

So far as the writer can tell, it appears that detailed centralized planning goes further in agriculture than it does in actual practice in industry generally. Less room seems left to local initiative in agriculture, and perhaps with good reason. In industry, plant management is by and large well trained, and the work force is given material incentives for higher and appropriate production; top Soviet leadership may reasonably believe that local initiative will be primarily directed toward attaining higher production and that it will be fairly efficient at this.[26] These preconditions for local autonomy have, as we have seen, usually been absent in agriculture.

To the extent that material incentives are actually provided for collective farmers, and that superior management is installed, it would seem that Soviet leaders could proceed with their policy of decentralizing agricultural administration. Doubtless in the beginning there will be disorganization, and quite possibly a fall-off in general production or at least in the production of particular commodities. But total production may now be sufficiently high for Soviet leaders to feel that this risk can be taken.

To sum up, the new policy in agriculture is designed to increase the yields on existing farmland. It aims at doing this principally through an incentive policy, a program of sharply improving the quality of farm management, and decentralization of planning procedures. In short, it aims at producing an agricultural system which, while still

[25] Decree of March 9, 1955, issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, *Current Digest*, VII, No. 7 (March 30, 1955), p. 16.

[26] Cf. Granick, *op.cit.*, chs. III and XIII.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

based on collective farms and state-owned machine tractor stations, will be viable and efficient for the first time. Soviet leaders hope to use the same basic methods that have proved successful in heavy industry.

This, in the writer's view, is the essence of the new Soviet policy in economic affairs. Now it may well be objected that this analysis leaves totally unmentioned the 18 per cent expansion in sown land which took place in 1954 and 1955.[27] This analysis ignores the fact that in 1955 capital investment in the older grainland areas was to be virtually neglected and almost all new agricultural equipment and state-financed investment were to be devoted to those eastern territories which are either arid or have a cold climate with a short growing season and are now being brought under the plow for the first time.[28] One may indeed question whether the essence of the new agricultural policy is not the extension of Soviet grainlands rather than improved yields.

It appears to the writer that this major extension of grainlands is best viewed as a gigantic hedge against failure of the new policy. Traditionally, under the Tsars as well as under Soviet rule, Russian agricultural production has expanded primarily through extension of croplands rather than through increased yields.[29] If the new policy should fail to increase yields, and if the marketed crop should even decline temporarily, the Soviet Union will have grain from the newly plowed lands with which to fill any gap. If livestock should increase in the main farming areas while fodder production does not rise, grain from the new areas may help maintain this livestock.

Although any responsible administrator welcomes feasible hedges against the failure of newly adopted policy, it is important to note that a hedge of the magnitude of the present extension of cropland may seriously jeopardize the policy of increasing yields. For, at present, virtually all agricultural investment seems to be going into the new lands rather than into support for the older areas, which are sorely deficient in basic farm equipment and buildings.

Other hedges against failure may have similar deleterious effects. Thus there has been great pressure for the mass switch to growing corn instead of other grain crops.[30] This may only repeat on a larger scale the substitution of central decisions for local initiative.

[27] A. G. Zverev, Report of December 26, 1955, to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, *Pravda*, December 27, 1955, p. 2.

[28] Benediktov, *op.cit.*, pp. 20-21.

[29] Cf. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954, op.cit.*, p. 76; U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, Geneva, 1953, p. 46; *European Agriculture, op.cit.*, p. 63.

[30] Khrushchev, Report of January 25, 1955, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The critical question, which it appears to the writer impossible to answer at present, is whether the system of "hedges" will engulf what has been described above as the new agricultural policy. The program of raising yields through permitting and creating the conditions for local autonomy may die on the vine in the face of the older policy of simply expanding croplands.[31]

The political implications of the "new course" are of critical importance. If the new course is actually followed, then the rural half of the Soviet population may begin to be truly integrated into the Soviet scheme of things. The Soviet labor force may cease to be divided into two halves, one working unwillingly, ineffectually, and without real incentive. Effects on over-all morale and on the internal stability of the regime can be enormous. Here indeed would be the "third revolution" of the Soviet period.

But since any "revolution" is unsettling, and is likely to be temporarily expensive in economic terms, stability in foreign relations may well be a precondition for an all-out effort along these lines. It is in this context, rather than in terms of a newly developed weakness of the Soviet economy, that the writer sees a powerful motivation for the current Soviet drive to relax international tensions. If this drive is unsuccessful, if the international situation becomes more tense, then the system of hedges can be expected to engulf the new course—and the third Soviet revolution may die stillborn.

[31] Welles Hangen of the *New York Times* interprets the January 1956 Directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan as a swing away from increasing acreage to improving yields (*New York Times*, January 16, 1956, p. 1). If this interpretation is correct, Soviet leadership would seem to be abandoning its emphasis on "hedges."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FIRST CAPITULATION
France and the Rhineland Crisis of 1936

By R. A. C. PARKER

ON March 7, 1936, German troops entered the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Germany thus violated Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Locarno of 1925. Remilitarization moved forward for about one hundred miles the areas of concentration for any German armed attack in the west and advanced the defensive line that could be held by the German army. It severely weakened France and, in consequence, all the other powers concerned to maintain the Paris peace settlements and to preserve the peace of Europe.

France offered no effective resistance. The purpose of this article is to cast light on the reasons for French inaction by examining the explanations produced by those who were ruling France at that time. Many of them have spoken. Albert Sarraut, the prime minister, Flandin, the foreign minister, Maurin, the minister for war, Paul-Boncour, the minister charged with relations with the League of Nations, and Gamelin, the head of the army, have all testified before the Commission, set up by the National Assembly in August 1946, to enquire into the events taking place in France from 1933 to 1945. Their statements have been published in annexes to reports from the Commission. In addition, Flandin, Gamelin, and Paul-Boncour have published their memoirs.[1]

It is virtually agreed that France was wrong not to reply forcibly to Hitler's coup of March 1936. It seems likely that March 1936 was the last time at which Hitler could have been stopped without a major conflict. And even if French action had led to a major conflict then, it seems plain that it would have been less disastrous for France and for Europe than the battle of 1940.[2] Accordingly, the examination of French memoirs is also a study in competitive self-exculpation. The military chiefs seek to lay the blame on the politicians, the politicians on the army, and both groups on the British.

The actual course of events in Paris is fairly clear, but only in outline. No doubt the eventual publication of diplomatic documents will

[1] P.-E. Flandin, *Politique française, 1919-1940*, Paris, 1947; M.-G. Gamelin, *Servir*, Paris, 1947; J. Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres*, Paris, 1945-1946.

[2] See, e.g., Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, p. 215.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tell us more; in the meantime, the memoirs and statements say little about the hour-to-hour sequence of conversation and decision among the military and civil rulers of France. They say a great deal, with some passion, about the decisions that were reached and why they were made, but little about how they were made. In this article I shall first describe briefly what happened in Paris, examine second the military reasons for the conduct of the French government, and third the reasons of foreign policy.

The news reached Paris in the morning of March 7. From 9:45 a.m. until midday a meeting of ministers took place at the Ministry of the Interior.[3] No decision seems to have been made except that Flandin should consult the representatives of the Locarno powers and that a start should be made with the precautionary military state of the *couverture*.[4] During the rest of the day Flandin spoke to the representatives of France's friends and allies. In the morning the British ambassador, Sir George Clerk, had called at the Quai d'Orsay and apparently he was received again, by Flandin, in the afternoon.[5] Meanwhile, the military chiefs were discussing the situation at the office of General Maurin, the minister of war, where Generals Gamelin, Georges, and Colson met Maurin at 3:00 p.m. At 5:00, Gamelin saw Léger, the secretary-general of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At 6:00, another meeting of ministers took place in Flandin's office. The military and political chiefs of the services were present. At this meeting, Gamelin secured approval for a series of measures toward completing the *couverture*.[6] But he did not get a decision to recall reserves. The meeting lasted for two hours, after which Flandin issued a long statement to the press. Its closing passages announced that Flandin had made contact with the other signatories of the Treaty of Locarno in order to effect a "common opposition to a unilateral repudiation of the treaties." It had been decided to appeal to the Council of the League in accordance with the Treaty of Locarno. But all this was not to "prejudice any other measures." This remark seemed to keep open the possibility that France might take the initiative in using force.[7]

Next morning, Sunday, March 8, Gamelin saw Maurin at 8:00 a.m.[8] Then, from 10:00 until lunch-time, a full formal Cabinet meeting (*Conseil des ministres*) took place, at the Elysée, under the presidency

[3] *Le Temps*, March 8, 1936.

[4] Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, p. 201 (the *couverture* was the last stage of armed readiness before general mobilization); A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, London, 1937, p. 267.

[5] *Le Temps*, March 8, 1936.

[6] Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 201-2.

[7] *Le Temps*, March 9, 1936.

[8] Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, p. 202.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of M. Lebrun. This was the time when a decision to act, if necessary alone, could most readily and appropriately have been made. It was not made and thus this meeting was a decisive turning-point. Until it took place, it seemed possible, even probable, that France would use force to push back the German advance; after it, each day and each hour that passed confirmed and made more and more irrevocable the failure to act. An official communiqué followed the council; it said that Flandin had given the latest information, that the German memorandum was judged to be unacceptable, and that the decisions to refer the issue to the League and to consult with the signatories of the Locarno pact had been approved. Representatives of the Locarno powers were to meet in Paris on Tuesday. And that was all.[9] As if to make it wholly clear that firm action had not been decided upon, the Ministry for War later issued a statement that the movements of troops ordered by the government referred only to soldiers needed to man the eastern fortifications. "It is added that there is no question at all at present of any movement whatever of troops in the interior of the country."[10]

In the evening of the same day, Sunday, March 8, Sarraut made a broadcast to the French people. The speech was firm and resolute. It included a celebrated phrase: "In the name of the French government, I declare that we intend to see maintained that essential guarantee of French and Belgian security, countersigned by the English and Italian governments, constituted by the Treaty of Locarno. We are not disposed to allow Strasbourg to come under the fire of German guns."[11] Flandin says that this speech was drafted in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He pointed out to Sarraut that it was a warlike address and drew his attention to the phrase quoted. Sarraut decided to retain it. Flandin says that Sarraut wished to galvanize the French into a full sense of the urgency of the danger from Germany; Sarraut himself declares that he also hoped the speech would act as a spur and a signal to the allies of France.[12] It did neither.

On the next day, Monday, March 9, Flandin received the ambassadors of Belgium and the USSR and the presidents of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Senate and Chamber.[13] Gamelin had summoned

[9] *Le Temps*, March 9, 1936. [10] *Ibid.*

[11] Broadcast printed in S. Heald, ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1936*, London, 1937, p. 51.

[12] Flandin, *op.cit.*, p. 201; Sarraut, in Assemblée Nationale, No. 2344: *Les Evénements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945. Témoinages et documents recueillis par la commission d'enquête parlementaire*, Paris, 1951 (hereafter cited as *Les Evénements*), III, p. 585.

[13] *Le Temps*, March 10, 1936.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the general officers who were Members of the *Conseil supérieur de la guerre*—the commanders of army groups and armies, together with their chiefs of staff—and expounded his views on the possibilities of action when they met at 9:00 a.m.[14]

At 10:30 in the morning of the 10th, representatives of the five Locarno powers met in Paris to examine the situation. Great Britain was represented by Mr. Eden, Lord Halifax, and Sir George Clerk, the British ambassador in Paris; France by Flandin and Paul-Boncour. It was announced that this meeting would be resumed on the 12th in London and that the Council of the League would meet there on the 13th. Gamelin reported on the position to the Army General Staff.[15] In the afternoon a declaration by the government was read to the Senate by Flandin and by Sarraut to the Chamber of Deputies. Most of the statement was argument, which was sound, to demonstrate that the German action was illegal. As for counteraction, the significant phrase was this: "We will put all our forces, material and moral, at the disposal of the League of Nations . . . on the one condition that we shall be accompanied in the fight for peace by those who clearly bound themselves to do so by the Rhineland pact."[16] This amounted to a declaration that France's action would depend on that of her allies: in practice, on Britain. It represented an open abdication by France of the right to decide on measures to ensure her safety and that of her Eastern European associates. After this speech Flandin spoke to Maurin and asked him to study a *prise de gages*, a taking of pledges, and spoke of Kehl or Saarbrück. In the evening Sarraut received the service chiefs, Gamelin, Déat, Pujo, Maurin, Durand-Viel, and Piétri, at his house. Gamelin was asked to submit a note on military possibilities.

This he did on the next day, the 11th, taking his note at 11:00 a.m. to Maurin, who signed it and passed it on to Sarraut. In the afternoon, a meeting of the smaller High Military Committee (*Haut comité militaire restreint*) took place. Maurin said that Sarraut had agreed that the measures envisaged should be prepared.[17] Flandin left Paris for London the same day.

The next day, March 12, there appeared in *Le Temps* a categorical denial, officially inspired, that France would accept as a solution of the crisis that the number of German soldiers in the zone should be limited and that no fortifications should be constructed there.[18] In fact,

[14] Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, p. 203; and General Tony Albord in *Les Evénements*, V, p. 1257.
[15] Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, p. 202.
[16] *Documents on International Affairs, 1936, op.cit.*, pp. 61-69.
[17] Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 204-8. [18] *Le Temps*, March 12, 1936.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this was precisely the arrangement that eventually emerged from the London talks. The proposals made by the Locarno powers on March 19 invited the German government to accept such provisions until a final settlement and, as for the final settlement, it was declared that the powers had agreed to press for a prohibition or limitation of fortifications in a zone to be determined—without any mention of a prospective permanent limitation of troops.[19] In the end, even the provisional arrangement was never enforced on the Germans, who moved troops into the Rhineland at will and fortified fast.

Furthermore, whatever Flandin claims, the London agreements did not provide the compensating advantage of making Great Britain more firmly obliged to act in enforcing a settlement on Germany than she had been before the crisis;[20] indeed, they included a specific phrase binding Britain to "come to the assistance of your Government, *in accordance with the Treaty of Locarno*, in respect of any measures which shall be jointly decided upon."[21] If anything, this weakened the effect of the provisions of Locarno: for the statement implied that British help would only follow for measures jointly agreed, while, on the other hand, it was arguable, at the least, that Locarno itself entitled the French to act independently and at once after a *casus foederis* and then to have the right to British help. It is evident, in any case, that every day that passed made it more difficult militarily and more embarrassing diplomatically for the French to act, alone or with others, against the Germans as they settled down in occupation of the Rhineland. Indeed, if Flandin's suggestion is correct that the governments that succeeded Sarraut's missed chances of profitable action, it is *a fortiori* true of Sarraut's government itself. The only gain secured by Flandin in London was the agreement of the British to "establish or continue the contact between the General Staffs of our two countries." This strengthened no commitment.

The chance of action was lost when the decision was made to act only with prior British assent and cooperation; Flandin's departure from Paris on March 11 signalized the abandonment by France of any

[19] *Documents on International Affairs, 1936, op.cit.*, pp. 127-33. A plan, embodied in these proposals, for an international force to occupy the western portion of the former demilitarized zone until a final settlement was reached, came to nothing. The Germans succeeded in enmeshing the whole question of the Rhineland and security in protracted negotiation, never concluded.

[20] Flandin, *op.cit.*, p. 210, and in *Les Evénements*, 1, p. 158, where he says that "A French government wishing to make use of the terms of the agreements of March 19 could have made Germany withdraw her troops and stop her fortifications and have obliged England to intervene at the side of France by virtue of the agreements."

[21] *Documents on International Affairs, 1936, op.cit.*, p. 133.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opportunity she had to force back the Germans. In a sense, this negative decision was never taken, action failed by default, there was no positive decision in favor of inaction. But one can say in retrospect that the crucial time was between the invasion and the departure of Flandin for London. After that, a decision to act would have been an increasingly drastic and difficult reversal of the policy of trusting to diplomacy, a reversal that would have required an ever larger output of determination. It is about this period from March 7 to March 11 that those who seek to justify their statesmanship are most sensitive. Why did they not act then?

Had France the right to act alone and on her own initiative? On this Paul-Boncour speaks most clearly. He declares that France could strike back alone under Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty of Locarno. The relevant articles may usefully be quoted. Articles 2 and 4 of Annex A to the Locarno pact were as follows:

> Article 2. Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.
>
> This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of:
>
> 1. The exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say, resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the previous paragraph or to a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary.
>
> 2. Action in pursuance of article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
>
> 3. Action as the result of a decision taken by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed against a State which was the first to attack.
>
> Article 4. (1) If one of the high contracting parties [Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy] alleges that a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.
>
> (2) As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.
>
> (3) In case of a flagrant violation of article 2 of the present treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party against whom

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations, which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the high contracting parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the parties which have engaged in hostilities.[22]

Paul-Boncour claims that France could thus act at once and inform her allies and the League afterward.[23] Sarraut subsequently took occasion to misinterpret and then to dispute Paul-Boncour's argument. Sarraut treated Paul-Boncour's remarks as meaning that the League and the Locarno powers should be ignored; but that was not the point. What Paul-Boncour was claiming was that France had the right to act on her own initiative and at the same time inform the Locarno powers and submit the dispute to the Council of the League. Sarraut admits that under these conditions France had indeed the right under the treaties to reply at once to German action.[24] This is hardly in doubt.[25] France was faced with the choice of using her right under Locarno to employ force on her own initiative or of appealing to the League and awaiting League action, or inaction.

France had the right to act; what was she in a position to do? What did the soldiers say could be done if the politicians ordered them to resist the Germans? The more they offered and the more readily they said they would do it, the more the politicians ought to have been encouraged to act, and the more therefore the politicians would be to blame for inaction and the less the soldiers. The controversy between Gamelin and the civilians turns on that issue. Maurin, the other soldier involved, seems less concerned with self-exculpation.[26] Gamelin claims that the

[22] C. A. Macartney, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, London, 1928, II, pp. 440-41. Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles set up the demilitarized zone.

[23] Paul-Boncour, *op.cit.*, III, pp. 31-32.

[24] *Les Evénements*, III, pp. 581 and 583; see also p. 668.

[25] Although Flandin (*op.cit.*, p. 198) precedes his statement that the League had to be seized of the dispute with the word *malheureusement*—as though that obligation imposed some inconvenience, which could only be delay, on French action.

[26] Gamelin (*op.cit.*, II, p. 203) seeks to give an impression of soldierly readiness for action. His remarks on the meeting of military members of the *Conseil supérieur de la guerre* of March 9 are limited to the statement that he told his commanders "to hold themselves ready to take their commands, since the *couverture* involved their moving into action to make secure the operation of their Army Corps of the vanguard." This sounds active and promising. On the other hand, a description of his statement by one who was present (General Tony Albord, in *Les Evénements*, V, p. 1257) shows Gamelin giving a depressed and depressing account of military possibilities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

army was ready and willing to strike if ordered to do so; the politicians say that the soldiers were not prepared to strike and were reluctant to receive orders to do so. Thus Gamelin (in a passage vigorously attacked by Sarraut) declares, as if to say that it had nothing to do with the army, that he leaves it to Sarraut to explain why the policy of firmness he seemed resolved on was put aside. Gamelin goes on to say that Sarraut told him that it was primarily because of the attitude of the Locarno powers and of French public opinion. The approach of elections, too, made it politically difficult to recall the reservists the army asked for. Gamelin thus puts the blame in part on the British and depicts Sarraut doing so also; in any case, the army was not responsible.[27] Again, before the Commission of Enquiry, Gamelin once more disclaimed all responsibility: "What happened then and under what conditions was the effort *we asked for* abstained from? I do not know, it was a matter for the government, not for the soldiers."[28] Sarraut denounces this approach. Sometimes he treats the attitude of the soldiers as the decisive fact that stopped action. Thus he says: "I had wanted, however, to consider isolated action . . . and when it was a question of doing it, I did not find, from the soldiers, the cooperation on which I might have counted."[29] And he always emphasizes the discouraging effect of the lack of zeal for action shown by the army.

What, then, did the army offer? One issue is this: did the army insist on general mobilization before any action at all could be undertaken? Maurin and Gamelin are accused of doing so—unjustly, as they show—but they offered remarkably little without full mobilization.

When Flandin describes what must be the council meeting of the 8th, he represents Maurin saying that to intervene militarily in the Rhineland the General Staff insisted on general mobilization. Paul-Boncour, describing the same council (which he wrongly places on Monday), agrees that Maurin insisted on mobilization before action. So does Sarraut.[30] Gamelin, who was not at the council, suggests that Maurin must have been misunderstood, since he never took up such a position in front of Gamelin himself.[31] Going further, he says, disingenuously to say the least, "It has been said that the soldiers had demanded general mobilization and that, naturally, the Government had recoiled in front of general mobilization. This affirmation is inexact; we never asked for general mobilization in 1936."[32] Maurin himself

[27] Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, p. 212.
[28] *Les Evénements*, II, p. 389.
[29] *Ibid.*, III, p. 668.
[30] Flandin, *op.cit.*, p. 119; Paul-Boncour, *op.cit.*, III, p. 33; *Les Evénements*, III, p. 621.
[31] Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, p. 203, n. 1. [32] *Les Evénements*, II, p. 388.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

told the Commission of Enquiry what his position had been. He declares: "I said that general mobilization must be prepared because we were putting our finger into the machine and that I did not know if the whole arm would not follow and that it was better to be prepared in good time rather than to try to reestablish later a situation which would have been compromised."[33] This was not to say that nothing could be done without general mobilization, but that any armed action would involve a risk of war, that therefore the possible ultimate need for general mobilization should be taken into account from the first and should be prepared for immediately. That agrees with the line evidently taken by Maurin and Gamelin on March 10 when, as Sarraut says,[34] "In front of spread-out maps General Maurin and General Gamelin expressed their opinion on the operations that might be envisaged." Gamelin prints the note[35] that he drafted as a summary of his arguments and that, Gamelin says, was signed by Maurin and handed by Maurin to Sarraut next morning.[36] In this note, after stating what would be possible on the basis of the *couverture renforcée* (involving the mobilization of over a million men), he continues that as full-scale war may come rapidly, it is necessary at the same time to be ready to order general mobilization as soon as it should be needed. Gamelin explains that a deep movement into the Rhineland in which the main body of the German army might soon be met would need the action of several armies—"that is to say, the total mobilization of our forces." Again, he goes on, a forward movement into enemy territory cannot go far without complete supply services—"that is to say, mobilization." It is clear that both Gamelin and Maurin felt that little could be done without general mobilization (we shall see what that little was). The French army, indeed, had made plans since 1919 on the assumption that no action would be required of it in Europe short of a full-scale war. In 1931 there were finally established four steps prior to general mobilization. These were (1) the *alerte*, which involved movement by means other than rail within each military region; (2) the *sûreté*, which completed the *alerte* by adding troops moving by rail; (3) the *couverture*, involving the recall of the *disponibles* (the classes of conscripts released from the colors but subject to recall without general mobilization being decreed), together with the calling-up of the

[33] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 908.

[34] *Ibid.*, III, p. 605. Sarraut puts the meeting on the 9th, but clearly refers to the same meeting.

[35] Gamelin, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 208-11.

[36] *Ibid.*, II, p. 208. Sarraut says he does not remember having received this document at the time—but he does not deny its authenticity (*Les Evénements*, III, p. 622).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

frontaliers—specialized troops for the manning of frontier defenses; and (4) the *couverture renforcée*, which meant the mobilization of 1,200,000 men. But such was the strategical doctrine governing existing French plans that even this substantial assemblage of force did not make offensive action readily possible. The *couverture* was simply designed as a measure of defense behind which general mobilization could go forward in safety; any action based on forces from the *couverture* would be liable to interfere with subsequent mobilization. To carry through serious actions while remaining prepared for the risk of full-scale war, complete general mobilization was therefore necessary. To be able to carry through major operations without mobilization required recasting the structure of the French army. As General Héring, who was in command at Strasbourg in March 1936, wrote about the events of that time: "The situation would have been entirely different if we had, in time of peace, disposed of an assault force (*force de choc*) of a hundred thousand or so men, ready to march at the first signal."[37] Such a force could not be improvised in a few days.

The emphasis placed by Maurin and Gamelin on the need for the war measure of full mobilization had a profoundly depressing effect on the civilian ministers. Maurin himself tells us that the immediate reaction in the Council of Ministers after he addressed them was a remark from Chautemps, "But no one here wants to make war," to which there was no dissent. Paul-Boncour says that to ask for general mobilization to chase the few detachments of troops Hitler had sent into the Rhineland was to terrorize the Council of Ministers and public opinion. Sarraut speaks of the excessive nature of Maurin's conclusion, general mobilization, "startling the majority of the Council after March 7, and causing them to protest."[38]

On the other hand, General Gamelin and General Maurin did in fact offer some military action without full mobilization on the basis of the *couverture renforcée*. This is best expressed in the note, already mentioned, drafted by Gamelin and approved by Maurin. The possibilities they exposed were pitifully small. As if in justification of the inadequacy of the army, which was due in part to its unsuitable organization, for which both generals were seriously responsible, Gamelin produced swollen figures of the German forces in the Rhineland. He declared them to be no less than the equivalent of twenty-one or twenty-two divisions (*valeur 21 à 22 divisions*). This formidable total was reached in this way:

[37] *Revue politique et parlementaire*, No. 561 (November 1946), p. 119.
[38] *Les Evénements*, IV, p. 908; III, p. 799; III, p. 621.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Army troops	30,000	*Wehrmacht*	*forming 6 or 7 divisions*
	30,000	*Landespolizei*	
	30,000	*Arbeitsdienst*	
	90,000		
Auxiliary troops	30,000	N.S.K.K.	forming the base of 15 divisions of *Grenzsicherung* assembled on the Franco-Belgian front
	25,000	S.S.	
	150,000	S.A.	
	205,000		
Total	295,000		

This is a questionable statement of forces. The *Landespolizei*, it is true, were armed and trained as infantry and, indeed, they were virtually part of the army proper. But the *Arbeitsdienst*, or Labor Corps, were not armed. It was genuinely a labor corps, though one subjected to military discipline and intended to provide toughened recruits, partially trained, for the army itself. Its military value lay mainly in its usefulness for construction work. Thus a good deal must be deducted from Gamelin's "Army troops." It is the forces of the *Grenzsicherung* (the Rhineland section of what was elsewhere called the *Grenzschutz*) that raise most doubts. The *Grenzsicherung* was a force designed to be raised, in the regions concerned, from the S.A., S.S., and N.S.K.K., in order to protect frontier regions during the time required for the field army to mobilize and concentrate. The members of the *Grenzschutz* spent two to four weeks in instruction battalions of the army proper. A report by the *Deuxième Bureau* of the French General Staff of November 22, 1934,[39] observes that the defensive mission of the *Grenzsicherung* did not mean that they would always adhere to a passive role, though they were not capable alone of large-scale operations. It said that these units were well supplied with automatic weapons but lacked artillery. The French intelligence service was thus taking this force seriously as early as 1934—no doubt this influenced Gamelin. On the other hand, there is the testimony of M. Dobler, who was French

[39] In Assemblée Nationale, No. 2344: *Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'enquêter sur les événements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945*, par M. Charles Serre, Paris, 1951, I, pp. 143-44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consul-general in Cologne from 1931 to 1938.[40] He says that in 1936 the N.S.K.K. were in uniform but not armed. Equally, the S.A. and the elite corps of the S.S. wore uniforms and engaged in military training, but apart from some members of the S.S., they were not normally armed. Possibly M. Dobler did not sufficiently distinguish between the nature and work of the S.S. and S.A. in the interior, near Cologne for instance, and that of its units closer to the French frontier.[41] In any event, it is certain that units of the *Grenzsicherung* were considerably inferior to properly constituted and equipped divisions of the regular German army or to the thirty excellent divisions of the French *couverture*.[42]

Gamelin offered two operations which could be begun eight days after they were ordered. One was out of the question and doubtfully relevant to the situation (which demanded striking at the Germans with the minimum force required to make them change their minds about remilitarization): it was an occupation of Luxembourg with the consent of that country and the assistance of Belgium. The other was a movement into German territory to occupy the left bank of the River Saar from Saarbrücken to Merzig. A glance at a map shows how timid this plan was. It was an advance to a maximum depth of about six miles on a front of twenty-four miles. The former demilitarized zone was bounded by a line *fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine.* Gamelin explained his scheme to the Commission of Enquiry:[43] "I said, 'We advance in combat order, we enter German territory and we see if the Germans welcome us with shots. Later, if they let us pass, we shall occupy whatever towns you wish. If the Germans shoot at us, battle is joined, and I demand therefore to begin this battle under the most

[40] *Les Evénements*, II, pp. 509-11. The above statements on the *Arbeitsdienst* are based on his testimony. The N.S.K.K. was a volunteer motorcycle corps.

[41] J. Benoist-Méchin, in *Histoire de l'armée allemande*, Paris, 1938, II, pp. 584-85 and 613, confirms M. Dobler's statements. Benoist-Méchin (p. 619) gives the total troops available to the German army by the end of 1936 as 1,510,000. In the autumn of 1935, the German army disposed of 800,000 troops. But many of these were insufficiently trained and the German army had no trained reserves. The French could have counted on the Polish and Czech armies to sway the balance further in their favor. A large-scale French attack, using the forces of the *couverture*, would therefore have promised success—and the fact that it would have made subsequent general mobilization more difficult would not have mattered. From the German side, General Jodl declared at Nuremberg: "We occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but only three battalions of that went into the territory west of the Rhine. . . . There could not be any question of aggressive intention. . . . Considering the situation we were in, the French covering army alone could have blown us to pieces" (*Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal*, Nuremberg, 1948, XV, p. 352).

[42] *Rapport fait . . .*, par M. Charles Serre, *op.cit.*, I, p. 39.

[43] *Les Evénements*, II, p. 389.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

logical conditions and so that we will find ourselves in an advantageous position.' " Thereafter, if the Germans resisted, he would need general mobilization.

It is easy to understand why Sarraut should declare: "The least I can say is that neither on the side of the Minister of War, General Maurin, nor on the side of his collaborators in the High Command did I find that élan, that tautening of the muscles, that combative feeling, that indescribable quality of energy and sturdiness which brings men to face to the front and go forward."[44] The army was unwilling to fight without mobilization and unenthusiastic about fighting under any circumstances. The remilitarization of the Rhineland seriously weakened the offensive capacity of the French army and one would expect its leaders to be anxious to reverse it. But the army chiefs were not concerned with the offensive capability of the French army. Yet the entire foreign policy of France since the peace settlement was based on France's capacity for attack. It is often said that a nation must have the army of its policy; this the French had not; the generals were determined that France instead should have the policy of its army. The army was constructed for the defense of France; French foreign policy rested on the maintenance of friendly states to the east of Germany: Poland and Czechoslovakia and, behind them, Rumania and Yugoslavia—these powers were to compensate for the potential French inferiority alone in face of Germany. To fulfill this role, they must be kept independent of Germany and in the last resort the French army must, by attacking Germany, prevent the Germans from being able to throw all their forces at France's friends in the east. This was the significance of the demilitarized zone: it was designed to facilitate offensive action by the French against Germany in case German aims should threaten the allies of France in Eastern Europe.

The French army did not think in these terms. It thought of France's eastern allies as potential diversionary forces in the rear of German armies attacking France; the reverse possibility was much less carefully pondered—that France might need to bring them succor to prevent their destruction. As Maurin himself said,[45] "Documents prepared by the General Staff are naturally a function of the sort of war envisaged. The plans which it establishes are limited to the assembly of the units charged with ensuring the defense of the country if the conditions foreseen for war put the army, at first, on the defensive." Hence, it was difficult for France to resist in March 1936; hence, too, French military planners were less disturbed than might have been expected by the

[44] *Ibid.*, III, p. 603. [45] *Ibid.*, V, p. 1264.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

loss of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. On March 15, 1935, the minister of war, Maurin, who was still in that post in March 1936, observed in the Chamber, "How can anyone believe that we should still think of the offensive when we have spent milliards to establish a fortified barrier? Shall we be mad enough to go forward, in front of this barrier, to I don't know what adventure?"[46] In fact, the French army risked no adventure and stayed quiet while, one by one, elements of the strength of France were lost: the demilitarized zone, the Czechoslovak army, the Polish army.

However, the French generals had produced some plans for action. Gamelin's occupation of the left bank of the Saar would have done something to strengthen France's hand in negotiation and might, indeed, have been sufficient to alarm the Germans into retreat; the army, if vigorously pressed by the politicians, might have produced a more ambitious plan of campaign; alternatively, general mobilization might have been undertaken, followed by operations on a larger scale, which might well have brought about a German withdrawal or might, it is true, have led to war—which at least would have been fought on more favorable terms for France than the battle of 1940. Why were no such risks taken? The government was naturally reluctant to bring about the upheaval involved in general mobilization and even more to impose the risk of war itself on a population still not fully aroused to the formidable character of the German threat. But the Cabinet chose finally not to try to provide the necessary lead, not to order action and attempt to galvanize the country.

Flandin describes himself telling the Council of Ministers that independent action would mean a serious difference with England.[47] Sarraut declares that "The failure of our co-associates was the major, principal, essential cause of the advantage of Hitler in this affair."[48] He is referring to the powers associated in the Locarno pact: Italy, Belgium, and Britain. From Italy and Belgium, it is certainly true, little support was to be expected or even hoped for—Belgium's attitude, in particular, seriously weakened France. The issue turns on the attitude of the other power involved, Great Britain.

What could France ask of Britain if she decided to act at once? She could ask for acquiescence, however reluctant, in French action; for full moral support for it; or for immediate or eventual material assistance. Any of these requests could have been made in complete conformity with the Locarno treaties—of this there can be no doubt, in

[46] Quoted in P. Reynaud, *Au coeur de la mêlée*, Paris, 1951, p. 156.
[47] Flandin, *op.cit.*, p. 205. [48] *Les Evénements*, III, p. 585.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spite of the above-mentioned arguments of Flandin and Sarraut. In order to uphold Sarraut's claim that the failure of France to act was the fault of Britain, it would have to be shown that Britain insisted that she would wash her hands of France if France went forward alone. Two questions arise: what did France ask of Britain and what was the British response? The evidence so far available seems to suggest that Flandin never put to the British government a request for British support for immediate independent French action. The British, therefore, can hardly be said to have vetoed such action: they were never faced with an urgent French statement that France would strike back.[49] On the other hand, it is clearly true that the British attitude was consistently discouraging and unlikely to give heart to French doubters.

Flandin tries to show that there was what he calls an "English interpretation" of the Treaty of Locarno which, he alleges, laid down that the treaty did not give France the right to act at once if the treaty were violated by Germany. That is to say, Flandin argues that the British not merely sought to dissuade the French from action, but claimed that such action would constitute a breach, from the French side, of the Treaty of Locarno. As evidence he quotes a reply from Sir Samuel Hoare to a question put by Laval in September 1935. Hoare declared that the British government did not feel that action under Article 16 of the League Charter of a sort applicable if an unprovoked act of aggression occurred should necessarily apply if a negative act of failing to observe a treaty took place. Flandin suggests that this implies that the British would not feel themselves bound to the French if the Germans failed to observe the provisions of Locarno. But clearly Hoare had said nothing of the sort; he was not dealing at all with the question of British obligations under Locarno but of those under the League Charter, and the treaties he had in mind were evidently those making up the peace settlement of Paris and not the Locarno treaties.[50]

Flandin is on stronger ground when he deals with the days of the crisis itself; it is easy for him to show that the British were anxious to dissuade the French from action. Sarraut, too, lays great emphasis on British reluctance. He quotes five diplomatic telegrams, four from Corbin, the French ambassador in London, to Flandin and one from Flandin to Corbin.[51] In the first telegram from Corbin to Flandin of March 7 (Sarraut does not give times of dispatch or receipt), Corbin reports a conversation that morning between Eden and himself in

[49] Sir Lewis Namier made this vital point in his penetrating essay on Flandin in *Europe in Decay*, London, 1950, p. 23.
[50] *Les Evénements*, I, p. 149.
[51] *Ibid.*, III, pp. 590-92.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which Eden made some "personal observations." The significant phrase shows Eden saying that because of the gravity of the circumstances it would be desirable that no action should be taken that would engage the future irremediably until consultations could take place, especially between France and Britain, but that he did not wish to prevent the French government from taking every measure it thought useful for its safety. On the next day, another telegram quoted Eden's remarks to the Italian and Belgian representatives in London: once again Eden had insisted on the need for remaining completely calm and waiting until the Locarno powers could deliberate before coming to any decision.

The telegram from Flandin quoted by Sarraut is probably the only documentary evidence, so far made public, to show what Flandin was saying to the British government in the first days of the crisis. It expresses the view that the British government appeared not to understand the gravity of the crisis or the effort needed from the Locarno powers. He insisted that France could not discuss the German return to the League, since that would involve, in practice, giving up the demilitarized zone. Flandin instructed Corbin urgently to point out to the British government the danger of allowing the debate to stray from its proper course (*laisser dériver le débat*) and of its reaching an issue the French were striving to avoid, an issue which would make illusory the pursuit of those objectives that most concerned the English government.[52] Without firmness on the central issue, unilateral repudiation of engagements, followed by their practical violation, nothing could be built on the German communication. Flandin went on to describe the deceitfulness and faithlessness of the German authorities and ended by asking Corbin to draw the attention of the British government to these points and to the necessity of showing the importance that the Locarno powers attached to the meeting of their representatives on the following Monday. The other two telegrams from the French embassy in London report successful requests to Eden that he should come to Paris as soon as possible for discussions by the Locarno powers before the meeting of the Council of the League.

The striking and significant point about these exchanges is this: except for the opening calls for patience from Eden, they turn entirely on the discussions of the crisis to take place among the Locarno powers. There is no mention on the French side even of the possibility of immediate independent French action. These documents were produced by

[52] Presumably this meant the question of the German return to the League and linked questions. While their troops moved forward, the Germans had produced a communication offering a German return to the League, new pacts, etc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sarraut to show how discouraging the British had been and, by contrast, how firm and energetic Flandin had been. If he could produce nothing more convincing than these telegrams, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that Flandin never pressed the British for their agreement that France should act alone. The British favored inaction, but these documents do not refute the view of Paul-Boncour that the insistent British demands that France should do nothing did not amount to a statement that the British would feel discharged of all obligations to France if France did act. Paul-Boncour suggests that the British attitude was as if they said to the French: "You have done well not to march. If you had, of course we could not have abandoned you."[53] The British did nothing to encourage France, but there was no danger of the "disappearance of the Franco-British entente."[54] In any case, apart from treaty obligations, it was certain that Britain could not stand idly by if France were in serious danger, whatever she thought of the actions of France that had led up to it. Sarraut and Flandin insist that France did not need military assistance from Britain.[55] So Flandin's failure to force Britain's hand must be ascribed either to weakness or to his having been unconvinced that France need resist. It seems clear that from the beginning of the crisis Flandin never asked for action except with the immediate, voluntary, and unstinted approval and cooperation of the British, which he knew he could not secure and which he now agrees was militarily unnecessary.

The French government, then, with the choice before them under Locarno of interpreting the German remilitarization as a "violation" of the treaty involving appeal to the Council of the League, or as a "flagrant violation," making an immediate riposte necessary, asked the British only for their support in resisting a "violation" and seem never to have put to the British the hypothesis of "flagrant violation." Before the crisis, indeed, Flandin had told Eden[56] that the French government would only put its forces "at the disposal of the League of Nations" to oppose a violation of the treaty by force.

Flandin says that his statement to Eden followed a discussion in the *Haut comité militaire*, at the request of the Cabinet, on what should be done if the Germans moved forward. He explains that the soldiers and service ministers declared that a riposte would be difficult and that subsequently the Council of Ministers had asked for the committee to meet again to reconsider their views and to start to work out plans for

[53] *Les Evénements*, III, p. 799.
[54] Flandin, *op.cit.*, p. 208.
[55] *Les Evénements*, III, p. 592; Flandin, *op.cit.*, pp. 202 and 208.
[56] Flandin, *op.cit.*, p. 197.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

action. Sarraut says that the Council of Ministers decided on February 27 that France should not resist Germany alone.[57] Flandin interprets this decision differently: he treats the reference to the League in the reply it was then agreed he should give Eden as merely a formula required by the treaty, so that the Council was not making any decision not to act. Certainly this decision of February 27 was not treated as final when the crisis came nine days later. The discussions preceding it were a sort of rehearsal of the final decision of March. But in any case the statement made to Eden did not seem to be a call for British support for independent French action.[58]

Flandin claims that he himself pressed, after the German invasion, for a forceful counterstroke.[59] It is surprising, then, that he produces every possible justification for inaction; unless he is immune to the need for self-justification and rather devotes himself to the defense of other men's ideas, he cannot have called for action as zealously as he now claims. And other evidence suggests that Flandin's attitude during the crisis was not calculated to encourage any forceful response to the German danger. Paul-Boncour shows him, at a meeting of ministers, accepting the objections of the service ministers against a French military reply: "I see . . . that one must not insist."[60] As Paul-Boncour goes on, Flandin was wrong, the prime minister would have welcomed a lead from the minister best qualified to speak. For Sarraut himself seems to have been anxious for firmness. But supported weakly by Flandin and with determination only by Mandel and Paul-Boncour, he had not the energy or force of character to prevail over the hesitations of most of the Cabinet and the feebleness of the soldiers.[61] It is hardly surprising that Flandin and Paul-Boncour, after arriving in London as representatives of the Sarraut government, were unable to induce in the British any measure of combativeness.

This position is characteristic of French foreign policy in the years of decline toward the catastrophe of 1940. Flandin in 1936 must be credited with full understanding of the consequences of failure to drive back the

[57] *Les Evénements*, III, p. 574.
[58] *Ibid.*, I, p. 144.
[59] Flandin, *op.cit.*, p. 199.
[60] Paul-Boncour, *op.cit.*, III, p. 35.
[61] Perhaps Sarraut alone could not have secured a decision for firmness; Sarraut and a less fainthearted Flandin together probably could. Jean Zay, in *Souvenirs et solitudes*, Paris, 1945, pp. 65-66, talking of these events, records his experience that "In a Council of Ministers . . . there is no example of a minister who has made up his mind failing to get accepted the solution he has chosen in a question within his competence. On the other hand, when the minister concerned does not make any proposal, there is no example of the Council deciding anything for itself. M. Flandin proposed nothing."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germans;[62] so, too, with Sarraut. But both of them, seeing the future clearly and understanding the action required to check Hitler, were too weak to impose the consequences of their conclusions on the British, who were determined to put into practice their remedies for a situation they entirely misunderstood. Later on, in the spring and summer of 1938, Daladier was unable to convince Chamberlain of the soundness of his own analysis of Hitler's purposes in Czechoslovakia. Those who guided British policy made many massive mistakes but were firm in following the path dictated by their conclusions; French ministers often saw accurately and thought clearly but they lacked the strength of will to impose their sound conclusions on the obstinate British or, as in 1936, on their own hesitant soldiers. The French tragedy, notably at the turning-point of March 1936, was the result not of a failure of vision or logic or understanding but of absence of will-power, determination, and courage.

[62] Sir Winston S. Churchill, in *The Second World War*, I: *The Gathering Storm*, London, 1948, p. 153, describes his anguished prophecies made at the time in London.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MR. TOYNBEE AND WORLD POLITICS

War and National Security

By KENNETH W. THOMPSON

THE problem of war and national security, at one time conceived of as the province of almost anyone but the peace-minded international relationist, has come increasingly to occupy scholars and researchers. Arnold J. Toynbee, whose major concern is the philosophy of history, preserves a lively interest in international politics and particularly in the problem of war, the principles of foreign policy, and the quest for an applicable body of theory concerning international society. With the publication of the last four volumes of his famed *A Study of History*, it may be appropriate to call attention to the other side of his work, especially as he brings to the discussion a clarity, simplicity, and concreteness refreshing by contrast with the pompous tautologies of much of modern scholarship. This article reviews Mr. Toynbee's contribution to knowledge on the first of the problems mentioned, namely, war and national security. It seeks to present his conception of the crisis in modern war, social factors underlying the transformation of warfare, and prevailing theories on the nature and inevitability of war.

In his scheme of civilizations, Mr. Toynbee characterizes military conflict as a grave social illness. He cries out as a prophet in the wilderness against this tragic and "suicidal impulse." At the same time, however, as a political historian and theorist, he accepts the endless procession of conflicts in the past as the data of history and the raw stuff of international relations. Indeed, he has been criticized by some for excessive excursions into problems of military history. He is concerned with the impact of armies on the economy and politics of civilizations. For example, he finds an important case study in the Roman peasantry who, once mobilized and uprooted from the soil, confronted their rulers with the unhappy choice of continued involvement in imperialistic adventures or the threat of internal uprisings. He inquires into the composition of successful military forces to discover whether freemen or slaves, lords or peasants, citizens or aliens make the best fighting men. The evidence he uncovers is inconclusive, for over against the citizen armies of modern France and the Anglo-Saxon countries must be placed the successes of the Parthian armies—composed of 50,000 effectives, of which only 400 were freemen—that in the last century B.C. checked

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mark Anthony, to say nothing of the famed military systems of the Spartan and Ottoman Empires. He attempts to classify and measure the incidence of warfare in recent centuries and concludes that when wars or acts of war lasted from ten to twenty years, as much as a century passed before another general war occurred. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries after the Spanish attempt to dominate the West, in the eighteenth century after the wars of Louis XIV, and in the nineteenth century at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, there followed periods of relative peace.[1] Indeed, from the Battle of Waterloo to the Battle of the Marne, the casualties in civil wars were heavier than in international wars. However, in the twentieth century, in place of a peaceful interval we have suffered a great double war for which precedents must be sought not in modern history but in the double wars of the Romans and the Carthaginians and the two struggles of the Peloponnesian War which wrecked Greek civilization.

There is a qualitative sense, moreover, in which war in the twentieth century is unique. In both spiritual and material terms, it is "total war." Distinctions between civilians and combatants which had been painfully worked out over nearly four centuries have been obliterated. Universal military conscription foreshadowed by the French *levée en masse* is the accepted basis upon which armies are formed. For the first time in history, total destruction is a possibility. Toynbee concludes: "Evils which hitherto have been merely disgraceful and grievous have now become intolerable and lethal."[2] The transformation of war in our century, therefore, has been qualitative in the attitude of participants, who seek victory through destroying the enemy rather than by avoiding costly battles, and quantitative in the magnitude and uninterrupted character of war itself. More tragic still, all this has taken place within decades instead of centuries, giving little time for adjustments to the change.

I. Origins of the Crisis in Warfare

A. War and Religion

On the general issue of the crisis in modern warfare, Mr. Toynbee asks, what are its causes and to what extent can the social, political, and intellectual forces that underlie it be identified? Contemporary history has been characterized in two of its three major periods by the union of war and religion. The first of these periods is the one which some historians designate as the era of the "Wars of Religion." It be-

[1] Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization*, New York, 1947, p. 33.
[2] Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, New York, 1948, p. 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gins with the breakup in the sixteenth century of the unity of Western Christendom. It extends from the Reformation to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which terminated the Thirty Years' War. In England, it lasted until 1660, or the restoration of the monarchy. The second period when war and religion were joined has sometimes been called the age of the "Wars of Nationality."[3] It had its origin in the successful attempt of the bourgeoisie to identify themselves with the state and to extend the French Revolution through the universal appeal of doctrines of popular government. This appeal was marked by the religious zeal embodied in the conviction that "the Revolution is a universal religion which it is France's mission to impose on humanity."[4] It has its replicas in the present-day political religions of world communism and universal democracy. The interval between these two periods, which roughly corresponds to the last half of the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century, is the one period in which the close tie between war and religion was temporarily severed. It corresponds to the "Age of Enlightenment" or of "Toleration."

During this third period, we can observe war being conducted as a kind of private game. Conflicts among rulers served as the primary "sport of kings" and the rules and the stakes of combat were defined and worked out in advance. Ordinarily the stakes were a piece of territory, an inheritance, or succession to a throne. Because it was important that such a game be kept in hand, the players and the publicists agreed that right and justice ought never to be mixed up with war. When men's actions are inflamed with passions, they can and do go on fighting until both sides are exhausted. A modern scholar explains the attitudes of eighteenth-century participants in this way: "One must go to war admitting that the cause of one's adversary is as just as one's own; one must take care to do nothing, even for the sake of victory, that may exasperate him, or close his mind to the voice of reason or his heart to the desire for peace; one must abstain from treacherous and cruel acts, for there is nothing that rouses an adversary to greater fury."[5]

But this respite in the crisis in warfare soon passed and the union between the fervor of religion and the grim business of war was reaffirmed. Fanaticism was evoked against an enemy who was not only a military foe but also a moral and religious miscreant. The "Wars of Nationality" were fought with the ferocity which is characteristic of fratricidal conflict alone. Armies in many cases lived off the country

[3] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, IV, London, 1939, pp. 142-43.
[4] Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la révolution française*, Paris, 1889, II, p. 109.
[5] Guglielmo Ferrero, *Peace and War*, tr. by Bertha Pritchard, London, 1933, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the duration of wars increased progressively.[6] Probably the clearest statement concerning the character of this kind of warfare is that of Burckhardt: "Of all struggles, the most appalling are the 'wars of religions,' more especially those between religions in which the thought of a future life predominates, or in which morality is in other ways completely bound up with the existing form of religion, or in which a religion has taken on a strong national coloring and a people is defending itself in its religion. Among civilized peoples they are most terrible of all. The means of offence and defence are unlimited, ordinary morality is suspended in the name of the 'higher purpose,' negotiation and mediation are abhorrent—people want all or nothing."[7]

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these forces were conspicuously augmented and intensified by vast technical and material changes. The century which followed was marked not by a deeper and more humane religious insight but rather by a negative cynicism carrying within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Fanaticism was weakened at the cost of religious faith. The principle of toleration gave Western society a breathing spell following the first great rout in its "Time of Troubles." But having achieved its negative goal, this period in history was inevitably replaced by a second epoch of fanaticism. It is a truism of human history that man will not tolerate a spiritual vacuum even in the form of toleration itself. And so for Mr. Toynbee it was both logically and historically predestined that this brief interlude should be followed by "Wars of Nationality." Logically, this was so because the spirit of man can never be restrained from choosing faith over cynicism. Historically, it was so because any civilization in its "Time of Troubles" invariably moves from "rout to rally to rout," or from one great setback to recovery to another more tragic relapse.

The period of moderate warfare in the eighteenth century did not disappear without leaving behind a few lingering traces of its influence. During the Napoleonic Wars, when hostilities were resumed in 1803 between France and England, Napoleon's internment of British citizens who were traveling in France had to be explained and justified as a reprisal for the seizure of two French merchantmen before war had begun. As late as 1904, such a measure was condemned as an "unheard-of action" of which public opinion could hardly be expected to approve. Only ten years later, enemy aliens were being interned as a matter of course by all belligerents.

[6] Toynbee, *A Study of History, op.cit.*, IV, pp. 143-46.
[7] Jacob Burckhardt, *Force and Freedom*, New York, 1943, pp. 134-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The transformation of war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries thus has two aspects. In relations with other nations, the state assumes a new role and posture. Princes and aristocratic governments may fight one another without excessive animosity; nations under arms must hate each other with a consuming passion and must know that their cause is righteous and that the threat they face arises from infamous and unparalleled aggression. The new weapons of propaganda and myths become as essential as guns and bayonets. Strife must be rationalized in terms of ideals and principles rather than territorial ambitions. The second aspect of the change in warfare is the transformation and transglorification of the state itself. For Augustine, the state was a necessary evil. For liberalism, the state is a "night watchman." In the twentieth century, the state becomes the embodiment of the nation and the instrumentality through which a political religion is mediated. This change has been more far-reaching than the profound differences brought about by industry and technology. Mr. Toynbee describes the change in this way: "Our modern Western nationalism has an ecclesiastical tinge; for, while in one aspect it is a reversion to the idolatrous self-worship of the tribe which was the only religion known to Man before the first of the 'higher religions' was discovered by an oppressed internal proletariat . . . [it] is a tribalism with a difference. The primitive religion has been deformed into an enormity through being power-driven with a mis-applied Christian driving-force."[8]

So the second cycle of religious wars is more dangerous than the first, since there is not only a union between religion as professed by the state and by the people, but there is an identity. The state is the religion and the religion the state. What we have observed in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Communist Russia was merely an exaggeration of "something that constitutes three-quarters of the religion of the Western world today. . . ."[9]

A recorder of Mr. Toynbee's theory of "Wars of Nationality" finds it difficult to forego this opportunity to observe that there are alternative explanations which can be offered for the fanatical character of these modern political religions. The one that we have described is exclusively a "spiritualist" interpretation. But the fervor and fanaticism of modern nationalism can also be accounted for on "materialist" grounds as the expression of projected unfulfilled needs and wishes of frustrated individuals in modern society. Having failed in their personal aspirations, they transfer their aims and goals to the nation and find their rewards

[8] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, v, London, 1939, pp. 160-61.
[9] Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization, op.cit.*, p. 89.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in its attainments. Mr. Toynbee significantly fails to mention this material wellspring of "political religions."

B. WAR AND ANARCHY

The crisis in modern warfare is the result of a second underlying characteristic of international society. One of the few areas of common ground shared by students of world politics and crusaders for world government is an agreement that collective security is infinitely more difficult to achieve in the absence of any supranational organization with effective powers of government. Thus it is not surprising that Mr. Toynbee should settle on the peculiar anarchic conditions of international politics as a fundamental factor in the intensification of modern warfare. Indeed, in his theory of history the absence of government in the relations among sovereign political units is one of the unmistakable signs that civilization has entered its "Time of Troubles." In the mid-twentieth century, moreover, the lesson from past civilizations that the absence of political unity is a portent of decay has been reinforced by the immediate peril of atomic destruction.

The parallel to our position in history which Mr. Toynbee finds most illuminating is that of the Greek city-states. These political units were the most spectacular innovations of their time. But with the emergence of new powers on the fringe of Greek civilization they became inadequate to provide for the defense of their own people. Side by side with these short-comings was their inadequacy in matching the extent and range of unity in the economic realm with some degree of political unity. When the separate states proved unwilling or unable to unite successfully, the impending unification was accomplished through a "knockout" blow by Alexander the Great.

In the same way that Greece failed to mitigate the anarchic character of relations between city-states, so, Mr. Toynbee fears, we in Western civilization may flounder and fail. But particularly since the Second World War, he has been of the opinion that sooner or later we must change or ameliorate the anarchy of our international relations. One of his most recent statements appears to foreshadow this conclusion: "I believe that with such weapons as we have now let loose in the world the world cannot go on very long in the condition in which politics have been in the West since the fall of the Roman Empire, a condition in which a great many local sovereign states are each going their own way and occasionally colliding with each other and fighting each other. It seems to me most unlikely that that condition of things, which we have come to take for granted, as if it were in the order of nature, can

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now go on. There have been times in the history of other civilizations when the old local sovereign states have been swept away by the establishment of a universal peace over the whole area of whatever the civilization might be, and it seems to me that we are on the eve of that political revolution in our world today."[10]

II. Social Forces and the Transformation of War

A. War and Industrialism

The changes in warfare which we have described had their origin principally in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The effect of the breakup of a unified Christianity was to dissolve the *Corpus Christianum* into numerous sects and states. Since quite commonly the religion of the ruler became the religion of the people, there was bitter and rancorous competition among contending religious groups for political recognition. Another change lay in the continued fragmentation of an already enfeebled political unity and the disappearance of older forms of control over these new sovereign states and principalities.

More profound and far-reaching, however, were the technological and political revolutions which took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first of these, the Industrial Revolution, is clearly the more tangible and spectacular. It has transformed the dimensions of social and political life as well as the scale of economic activities. It has permitted the unification of large groups of people and territories, as in Germany and Italy. But whereas it appeared in the beginning that the new economic forces might accommodate themselves to states the size of Great Britain and France, the standard has been revised to that of countries the size of the United States or the Soviet Union. Anything smaller may no longer be practical in terms of the scale of warfare or the scope of domestic economic activity. Whether the standard is that of the nineteenth or the twentieth century, the fact remains that war potential is commonly measured ". . . in terms of rifles and steamships and railways and armour-plate and mammoth guns and submarines and bombing-planes and tanks."[11] These are the products of industrial activity and thus it becomes apparent that a revolution in technology has promoted a parallel revolution in warfare.

The first clear evidence that so fundamental a change had occurred came with the American Civil War. There Generals Grant and Sherman implemented their strategy by the use of railways. Again with the

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 29. [11] Toynbee, *A Study of History, op.cit.*, IV, p. 143.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German campaign in Denmark, France, and Austria, General von Moltke and his followers introduced this same tactic on the Continent, where especially in 1866 it played a key role. For the first time it was possible to convert the entire material wealth of a country into war matériel and to mobilize the necessary men and machines to achieve this purpose. If there was a will to use them, material resources for warfare infinitely more destructive than in the past were now available. But industrialism in itself was passive and neutral. Indeed, the genius of industrialism was its ecumenical character. If it had moved forward under its own inner logic, industrialism would have embraced the world, for the ultimate minimum effective unit for the industrial system is nothing less than the globe. Instead it has been restricted to the dimensions of the nation-state, and the 1870 model at that. Industrialism has supplied the material explosive of modern "total" warfare, but a second new force has been needed to touch off the fuse. This has been democracy itself. In fact, ". . . the force which put the lethal 'drive' into War was not material but was spiritual; and in our own modern case . . . where the material force of Industrialism and the spiritual force of Democracy have both been engaged . . . Democracy has been the dominant factor."[12]

B. WAR AND DEMOCRACY

In effect, the most dynamic of the forces which have transformed modern warfare is democracy. In several of his writings, Mr. Toynbee repeats the same anxious proposition he set forth in 1939: "In A.D. 1790 the French National Assembly was warned by the prophetic voice of Mirabeau that a representative parliamentary body was likely to prove more bellicose than a monarch. In A.D. 1792, less than ten years after the statesmanlike peace settlement of 1783, the menacing accents of a Democracy conscripted for War were heard by Goethe's sensitive ears in the cannonade at Valmy; and the *levée en masse* of a Revolutionary France swept away the eighteenth-century régime in Germany. . . ."[13]

The anxiety herein reflected presents an interesting contrast to the optimism of statesmen like Woodrow Wilson and the dominant view in Western society following World War I. It was widely believed that if democratic governments could be set up throughout the world, international peace and order would take care of themselves. Yet republics like Venice, Rome, and Athens and parliamentary states like England have often been at least as bellicose as autocratic governments. Any careful student of history knows that there are even certain problems

[12] *Ibid.* [13] *Ibid.*, pp. 150-51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of diplomacy which are more acute in democratic foreign policy. One of these is surely the problem of war. Mr. Toynbee seems inclined to follow Mirabeau, who stated: "Voyez les peuples libres; c'est par des guerres plus ambitieuses, plus barbares qu'ils se sont toujours distingués. Voyez les assemblées politiques; c'est toujours sous le charme de la passion qu'elles on décrété la guerre."[14]

The two fundamental changes in war for which democracy is responsible are the transformation of the political decision-making process upon which war is based and the intensification of the nature of war itself. An eighteenth-century despot would have been more likely to risk war in 1936-1937, under conditions that were more favorable than they subsequently became, than were the democratic governments of France and England. Carefully calculated policies based on sound political principles are far more difficult to expound and execute in a democracy. Even when they have been arrived at, the problem of their acceptance remains. Secondly, in warfare the need to maintain public support for military strategy put an end to tactics designed to avoid costly engagements. Now the emphasis is upon total engagements and decisive results; temperate and indecisive struggles can hardly characterize this form of warfare.

C. THE CRISIS: WAR AS UNIVERSAL DESTRUCTION

The four changes which modern warfare has undergone have presented mankind with a problem of unparalleled urgency. As early as 1931, Mr. Toynbee expressed a profound concern that ". . . even if Western Society were so fortunate as to survive this war, it could hardly look forward to surviving another war under the new conditions."[15] He noted with sympathy an even earlier statement by Mr. Stanley Baldwin to the effect that ". . . one more war in the West and the civilization of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome."[16] If a nation were so fortunate as to avert political destruction in World War II, it could hardly avoid the subsequent crumbling of the delicate and complicated fabric of its economy.

The crisis in war which has deepened over four centuries takes on the character of an epic tragedy following World War II. In *A Study of History*, Mr. Toynbee has demonstrated by the examples of some twenty-odd civilizations how war in each instance dealt the society its death-blow. But in the same way, each passing civilization has been succeeded by a new one. In 1948, for the first time, Mr. Toynbee ex-

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 150, n. 4.
[15] *Survey of International Affairs, 1931*, London, 1932, p. 10. [16] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pressed doubt that this process of historical recurrence could be depended upon to continue: "The failure to solve the problem of war has been the death of most civilizations that have died since civilizations first came into existence, but hitherto mankind has always survived to make new civilizations out of the ruins. We are now faced with a situation in which the whole enterprise of civilization may come to a stop if we cannot solve the problem of war; and that degree of urgency . . . is, I think, something new."[17]

III. Theories on the Nature of War

The passage quoted above accurately reflects Mr. Toynbee's deepening conviction that something must be done about the problem of war. His theory of history and of the morphology of societies is not primarily responsible for this growing apprehensiveness. Up to now, although war has been the scourge of society, there has been one saving feature. Civilization has shambled along from one failure to another, from the destruction of one of its specimens to the birth of another, but it has not destroyed itself. Now the prospect of general destruction looms up and calls for a new state of mind on the part of any scholar who loves humanity. It is most illuminating to compare Mr. Toynbee's outlook in the 1930's with a statement made in 1948. Shortly after the ratification of the Pact of Paris and following some of the early efforts at collective security by the League of Nations, he observed: ". . . at this stage we can only be sure that in our Western World, war will now be abolished sooner or later by one means or another. If it is not abolished in the near future by the method of pacific adjustment, then it is certain to be abolished—and this in a future which may not be much more remote—by the alternative method of 'the knock-out blow,' in which a war—or a series of wars—of attrition will end in the decisive and definitive victory of one single Power through the annihilation of all the rest."[18] Following this, Mr. Toynbee had occasion through a second general war to observe the astounding progress in weapons of destruction. The specter of these new instruments of absolute destruction has haunted many observers and would appear to motivate Mr. Toynbee's statement of 1948: "We are thus confronted with a challenge that our

[17] Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization, op.cit.*, p. 19.

[18] Toynbee, *A Study of History, op.cit.*, IV, pp. 153-54. This is evidently the type of statement from which some of Toynbee's American protégés like William H. McNeill derive their view that Western civilization can confidently face a Third World War, from which the United States will probably emerge as a universal state. However, it is a mistake to equate Toynbee's thinking with that of his lesser followers, as does *The Times* (London) in its review of McNeill's latest book.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

predecessors never had to face: We have to abolish War . . . and abolish . . . [it] now under pain, if we flinch or fail, of seeing . . . a victory over man which, this time, would be conclusive and definitive."[19]

Mr. Toynbee's statement of the nature of the problem, therefore, is no different from that of countless men of letters and philosophers who have sought to awaken mankind to its peril. It is one thing, however, to describe a problem; it is another to comprehend its true nature so profoundly that one is able to proffer wise counsel. In dealing with the problem of war, most writers have assumed that the task was merely to banish war, perhaps by legal fiat. A less alluring but widely held view has been that peace, if one found it, would not be the absence of all conflict but the ability to cope with, limit, and contain it. The two views derive from two theories of war that merit inquiry and examination.

Perhaps it is more accurate to say that three distinct theories about the nature of war have been articulated in Western civilization. To an increasing degree, contemporary scholars identify these views as the romanticist, idealist, and realist theories. All three are introduced in Mr. Toynbee's writings but only the last two can be considered in any way representative of his philosophy. In *A Study of History* he quotes from the famous letter of December 11, 1880, from von Moltke to Bluntschi: "Perpetual Peace is a dream—and not even a beautiful dream—and War is an integral part (*ein Glied*) of God's ordering of the Universe. . . . In War, Man's noblest virtues come into play. . . ."[20] This would appear to be the view of Bernhardi, Nietzsche, and Spengler.[21] But it is the German Romanticists who are most brazen in their emphasis upon the intrinsic value of war. Thus their most outspoken protagonist, Heinrich von Treitschke, asserted: ". . . all movement and all growth would disappear with war, and . . . only the exhausted, spiritless, degenerate periods of history have toyed with the idea."[22] The final word from this group of theorists is: "War . . . will endure to the end of history, as long as there . . . [are] States."[23] The laws of

[19] Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial, op.cit.*, p. 25.

[20] Toynbee, *A Study of History, op.cit.*, IV, p. 643.

[21] The last-named conceives of man as a beast of prey which "lives by attacking and killing and destroying." Oswald Spengler, *Man and Technics*, New York, 1932, p. 28. J. F. C. Fuller wrote: "If honour be worth safeguarding, war sooner or later becomes inevitable, for in this world, there are always to be found dishonourable men, and if war does not bring a nation against these, then must vice live triumphant." Fuller, *The Reformation of War*, New York, 1923, p. 282.

[22] Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics*, tr. by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille, London, 1916, I, p. 68.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 65. To a degree, the Communist theory of war is romanticist in character. It maintains that war is inevitable under the capitalist system and encourages revolu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society and the fundamental nature of man make it inevitable that war will continue without any foreseeable prospect of its eradication. Mr. Toynbee sums up his reaction to the ideas of von Treitschke and Fuller by observing: "Some people say that war is inseparable from Human Nature. . . . I think the historical parallels show that this view is mistaken."[24]

The dominant theory of war, however, particularly in contemporary Western society, has maintained that war is not inevitable, but can be eliminated through the achievement of a new and better form of international relations. This has sometimes been called the idealistic or rationalistic theory of war. Its origin goes back to the Period of Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We may say that reason and science constitute the foundation upon which this utopian edifice is built and morality and democracy provide its façade. War is conceived of as an anachronism which international organization, social conditioning, and increased contacts among peoples of different nations will eliminate. Power politics and autocratic government are singled out as the primary causes of war. A handful of leaders or a nation or two which persist in disrupting international harmony are all that stand in the way of a peaceful world.

There are at least four expressions of this philosophy manifested in Mr. Toynbee's earlier thinking. The first is the idealist view, which seeks to eliminate war by substituting organization for politics. The spokesman whose words carried greatest inspiration and weight in this connection was undoubtedly President Woodrow Wilson. He envisioned and declared that in the new age, "National purposes have fallen more and more into the background and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place."[25] More recently this view has been persuasively argued by numerous scholars and publicists, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world. Typical is the statement: "It was not the Kaiser who made the war of 1914, but the system of power politics. . . ."[26] Mr. Toynbee has never been misled into accepting to this extent the glittering generalities of utopianism in international politics. Still, in the early 1930's, he stated: ". . . indeed, the proposition

tionary wars and wars for national liberation. What is missing, however, is the idealization of war that we have observed above.

[24] Toynbee, "Parallels to Current International Problems," *International Affairs*, x (July 1931), p. 479.

[25] Woodrow Wilson, "Fourth Liberty Loan" (address opening the campaign for Fourth Liberty Loan, delivered in New York City, September 27, 1918), in *War and Peace: Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers*, ed. by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, New York, 1927, I, p. 259.

[26] Leonard Woolf, *The War for Peace*, London, 1940, p. 53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that if there were no 'Great Powers' in the world there would be no danger to the peace of the world was a thesis which could hardly have been contested, in 1932, by any impartial student of public affairs."[27] Earlier he had written that nationalism "is the one thing . . . that can and does produce the calamity of war."[28] When the Nye Committee in this country and the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments of the League of Nations were making their inquiries into the activities of the munitions industry, Mr. Toynbee observed, ". . . the information which was made public cast a sinister light upon the policy and proceedings of armaments firms and their agents."[29]

These evil aspects which were the result of the general character of power politics and were aggravated by the immoral conduct of certain "devils" in politics—whether munitions-makers or great power diplomats—were being mitigated, if not eliminated, by the new international organizations. Just five years before the outbreak of the general war, Mr. Toynbee optimistically reported that the new machinery for dealing promptly with international emergencies had diminished the prospect of minor crises spreading into general conflagrations. He noted: ". . . it becomes evident that, in the short span of twenty years, a great and encouraging advance had been made towards safeguarding Mankind against the *old* danger of being plunged into war . . ." [italics added].[30]

Secondly, the idealist theory of war is a manifestation of a particular type of rationalist viewpoint which has sometimes served as a primary intellectual assumption of the modern mind. The philosopher of history Buckle expressed this view in the assertion: ". . . it must happen, that as the intellectual acquisitions of a people increase, their love of war will diminish. . . ."[31] There is a natural ratio between peace and reason which preordains that wherever intellectual classes are weak, the military influence will be strong. This is the reason that Russia in the mid-nineteenth century embarked on such ventures as the Crimean War. He concludes: "Russia is a warlike country, not because the inhabitants are immoral, but because they are unintellectual." It is not strange that Buckle, writing in the nineteenth century at a time when Europe was enjoying a period of general peace, should have confused and equated the political condition of peace with the underlying in-

[27] *Survey of International Affairs, 1932*, London, 1933, p. 184.
[28] Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, London, 1915, p. 10.
[29] *Survey of International Affairs, 1935*, London, 1936, I, pp. 48-49, n. 2.
[30] *Ibid., 1934*, London, 1935, p. 353.
[31] Henry T. Buckle, *Introduction to the History of Civilization in England*, New York, 1925, p. 111.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tellectual assumptions of the age. It is more surprising that Mr. Toynbee, writing in 1915, should for similar reasons have conceived of war as belonging to an earlier age. "War as a constructive national activity is for us essentially a thing of the past: between our warlike ancestors and ourselves there is a great gulf fixed, the Industrial Revolution, which has put us into a new environment."[32]

A corollary to the rationalist philosophy is the belief in the existence of a natural harmony of interests between all nations and peoples. What is true in Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* and Adam Smith's economic cosmos is said to be no less characteristic of the idealist cosmos of international affairs. This harmony of interests may be temporarily obscured by the specific actions of some arch-troublemaker or by the atavism of power politics in general. Informed by this view, Mr. Toynbee, writing in 1935, found that ". . . this supreme British interest was also the supreme interest of the whole World, inasmuch as international law and order were in the true interests of the whole of Mankind and all the parochial states among which the living generation was partitioned. . . ."[33]

A third illustration of the idealist philosophy of international relations is the still popular belief that war can be decisively banished through contacts between nations and by programs of cultural understanding. A shrinking globe which facilitates trade and travel will gradually eliminate the seeds of ignorance and contempt from which wars grow. On a small scale, this has been true of England and France, as Buckle attempted to show. English conceptions of French morals and French notions of the Englishman's scorn of letters have altered: ". . . the progress of improvement, by bringing the two countries into close and intimate contact, has dissipated those foolish prejudices, and taught each people to admire, and, what is still more important, to respect each other. And the greater the contact, the greater the respect."[34] In 1915 Mr. Toynbee expressed the opinion that peace could be achieved not through "mechanical means" but only by converting public opinion throughout Europe from "National Competition" to "National Cooperation."

Easily the most popular of idealist conceptions of war is that which believes there are no inherent instincts making for war. Modern psychology, anthropology, and biology have sought to show either that war is inevitable owing to inherent human characteristics, or, more fre-

[32] Toynbee, *Nationality and the War, op.cit.*, p. 27.
[33] *Survey of International Affairs, 1935, op.cit.*, II, pp. 45-46.
[34] Buckle, *op.cit.*, p. 125.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quently, that in the absence of any such basic instincts it is not inevitable. A few students have come to the conclusion that war is inevitable and that "It would serve no useful purpose to endeavor to define principles to eliminate causes of war, for war is inherent in human nature. . . ."[35] The majority view, however, is reflected in the answers given to a questionnaire sent to 528 members of the American Psychological Association. To the question, "Do you as a psychologist hold that there are present in human nature ineradicable, instinctive factors that make war inevitable?" 346 answered, "No"; 10, "Yes"; 150 did not reply; and 22 were ambiguous in their answers.[36] Most psychologists would probably agree with Mr. Julian Huxley's thesis that there are no specific human instincts which one can designate as "war instincts."[37]

Only three kinds of animals practice war at all in the sense of organized conflict between groups of the same species. These are man and two kinds of social insects—certain bees and some ants. The motive force and driving power in these two cases are quite different. Among the insects, wars are based on a mechanical and instinctive foundation. In a particular kind of warfare, the tactics on both sides are identical in every respect. War among humans, however, lacks this mechanical and automatic character and numbers are not invariably the final arbiter. Rather, the real basis of wars is the impulse of "pugnacity," which merges with other impulses and attitudes such as patriotism whenever it is evoked by external conditions. It should be possible to create new and different external conditions to enable this instinct to find other outlets and express itself in more peaceful ways. Without examining the political means by which its goals can be attained or approached, this school of modern psychology finds its new conditions for peaceful relations in a world government and world system of law.

There is another form of idealism embodied in certain anthropological research, such as the work of Malinowski, who finds no evidence of any biological impulse toward war. Instead he shows that ". . . aggression is a derived impulse. It arises from the thwarting of one or the other of the basic psychological drives. . . ."[38] Changing cultural conditions are capable of ameliorating aggression and eliminat-

[35] Arthur B. Keith, *The Causes of the War*, London, 1940, p. ix.

[36] John M. Fletcher, "The Verdict of Psychologists on War Instincts," *Scientific Monthly*, xxxv (August 1932), pp. 142-45.

[37] Julian Huxley, "Is War Instinctive and Inevitable?" *New York Times Magazine*, February 10, 1946, p. 7.

[38] Bronislaw Malinowski, "War—Past, Present, and Future," in J. D. Clarkson and T. C. Cochran, *War as a Social Institution*, New York, 1941, p. 23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing war. The conflicting interests which are at the root of aggressive wars can be reduced and redirected by social engineering. One of the earliest suggestions in this field was that of William James. He recommended, as a "moral equivalent of war," the conscription of young men into a kind of glorified Civilian Conservation Corps where they would give vent to their aggressions in a struggle against nature rather than against alien nations.[39] The more contemporary views of means by which aggressions and frustrations might be channeled have often been no less impractical and utopian than this original proposal.

In the 1920's there were numerous indications that Mr. Toynbee was influenced by these anthropological and social-psychological views. He made it his business to criticize the popular confusion of "the species of war with the genus violence. . . ." He observed: ". . . sociological research . . . indicated that War was a specific and peculiar exercise of violence, in which that indefinite impulse was organized in a corporate form. . . . this institutional form of violence . . . had not existed in the primitive condition of society in which Mankind had spent all but the last six thousand years of its inconceivably long duration. . . ."[40] Mr. Toynbee recognized the popular argument to the effect that among those primitive societies which have survived, war is still very much in evidence. He anticipated and answered this objection by showing that no primitive society remains which is immune from the cultural influence of advanced civilizations. Thus the remaining primitive societies in their final stages have been infected by the civilized world with the virus of an illness they have not always known. At least in the 1920's, therefore, Mr. Toynbee found the anthropological approach sound and reliable and made use of it in building his own idealist outlook.

The third theory of war is formulated in terms fundamentally different from those of either romanticist or idealist philosophies. The realist approach gives neither a negative nor an affirmative answer to the question, "Is war inevitable?" Instead it starts with the assumption that international politics can be understood only as a perpetual and unceasing struggle for power. The normal condition of modern international society, and indeed of all human relations, is one in which rivalry, conflict, and strife coexist with good will, amity, and cooperation—perhaps until the end of history. This assumption is of greatest importance in determining the techniques of international relations. If

[39] William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," *International Conciliation*, No. 224 (1926), p. 496.

[40] Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1928*, London, 1929, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one assumes that harmony and cooperation are the sole norm in relations between nations, then a state can pursue policies based on humanitarian and moral principles. If, on the other hand, one recognizes the existence of constant rivalry and competition, then a state can base its policy upon the national interest and follow a program aiming at temporary adjustments and arrangements which will prevent any antagonist from succeeding in dominating all the others. Under the realist theory of war, the goals and policies pursued must be more tentative, immediate, and practical in character.

Only since World War II has there been any unmistakable evidence that Mr. Toynbee has been tending toward this last theory of war. It is particularly revealing, in this connection, to contrast his indignant rejection in 1936 of a suggestion that a few years' postponement of war might mean that the conflict would never come and a statement in 1948: ". . . I do not think that in our present circumstances playing for time is a wrong or unreasonable thing for us to try to do. . . . Russia and the United States . . . [need] time to get used to each other. . . . Anything that would enable us to buy time seems worth thinking about."[41]

I believe it is not unfair to Mr. Toynbee to say that his position has become increasingly realistic since World War II. He has proposed a negotiated settlement between East and West based on spheres of influence, the traditional realist technique of postponing a general conflict.[42] He has seen that shifts in the European balance of power have been as important in causing open hostilities as the moral factors which he previously emphasized. The United Nations has been examined within the framework of power politics and characterized as the boldest step toward world government that is possible at the present time. European Union, as the creation of a "third force," is viewed in proper perspective as a significant experiment in regional organization but of minor importance for the world balance of power.

International politics, if it can be reduced to a single formula, can be considered in terms of the security-power dilemma. Nations seek security, achieve it through power, and avert conflict only through some rough-and-ready demarcation of the respective spheres in which they have dominant interests. In Africa and the Near East, wars have been prevented for many years through such arrangements and the student of power politics who deals realistically with the present crisis can provide no alluring formula or spectacular solution to replace them. In one final and important respect, Mr. Toynbee demonstrates his ad-

[41] Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization, op.cit.*, pp. 45-46.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 44ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

herence to a realist point of view. He looks toward the establishment of a world government sometime in the future. In contrast, however, to the pure consensus and cooperation theories of world government, Mr. Toynbee expects that when such an organization comes into being, one of its characteristics will be the important role played by some great power. Specifically, he observes: "I believe that without the metal support inside the reinforced concrete you cannot hold the concrete together. So I think, whatever form of world government we may arrive at . . . there will be in it an element of the ascendancy of one great power."[43]

Thus, in his approach to the problem of war, Mr. Toynbee has come to hold fast to the imperatives of national security. Today he ranges himself with modern international relationists who grapple with the troublesome and baffling problems of power and security. The history of the evolution of his thought is a history of our times. It speaks for his moral and intellectual integrity that, as he has been faced with new problems, his conception of politics and war has not been hobbled or shackled by a "foolish consistency."

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STRUGGLE AGAINST POWER

Notes on Indian Political Behavior

By MYRON WEINER

INDIA'S experiment with democratic institutions is still only an experiment. Although India adopted a parliamentary system when she achieved independence in 1947 and has thus far been able to maintain her democratic institutions with much more success than some other newly independent Asian nations, no observer can have complete confidence in their stability. Indians have had to adjust from the role of natives in a country occupied by an imperialist power to that of citizens in a democracy, and the adjustment has not been easy. Traditional attitudes have a way of persisting and are not always readily accommodated to a parliamentary system of government.

This article will examine several pre-independence attitudes that persist in India today as obstacles to the growth of stable democratic institutions and will conclude with a brief discussion of the extent to which some of these attitudes have been weakened. Such traditional attitudes are not the only elements which affect India's democratic prospects and current political behavior; nevertheless, they are essential factors which are frequently overlooked. They center on the problems of political power, civil disobedience, and the use of violence.

At the core of any democratic system is an acceptance of certain basic attitudes toward law, authority, political power, violence, and the like which in the long run may have a greater influence than the formal legal structure in shaping the development of the political system. In the absence of agreement on these attitudes, the legal structure becomes a façade behind which the system really operates; the gap between law and practice grows wide and democracy flourishes in name only. For an example we have only to look at prewar Japan, where a semblance of parliamentary government existed although government was actually authoritarian.

In attempting, therefore, to discover the prospects for the success of democratic institutions in India, it is important not only to understand the country's rate of economic development, the political strength of the ruling party, and the kind of constitutional structure that has evolved; one must also understand those traditional attitudes which affect current political behavior, and their impact upon the democratic system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I. Political Calculations and the Renunciation of Power

One prerequisite for a viable democratic system is the existence of a willingness on the part of political groups to make political calculations. That is to say, political parties must be concerned with their electoral prospects and must be willing to make compromises and join or work with other groups in order to increase their own strength. A viable democratic system has little room for party sectarianism. In India, as in nearly all the other nations of South and Southeast Asia which recently won independence, there has been a marked unwillingness on the part of political parties and interest groups to make compromises and merge with one another. As a result, there are in India today some fifty political parties with seats in either Parliament or the state assemblies.

The phenomenon of party splintering is a rather complicated one and cannot be dealt with exhaustively here. Needless to say, it is a phenomenon which may have a profound effect on the growth of stable government. One reason for such splintering is the absence of a basic consensus on the nature of the state. A number of India's fifty parties are Hindu communal parties that reject the secular order. Others are provincial and linguistic parties that have strong allegiances to local caste or language groups. Still others, like the Communist and Marxist left parties, reject the democratic parliamentary framework.

But even among political parties which agree on basic values, political splintering is widespread in India. Underlying this fragmentation is a lack of concern on the part of the political leaders and their followers for the electoral consequences of their actions. When the Socialists broke from the Congress Party in 1948 and when a group of Gandhians broke from it in 1951, the rank and file of both these groups cared little about the effect of their actions on their electoral prospects. Similarly, when the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu organization of young people, decided to form a political party, its members were more concerned with maintaining their individuality than with finding some existing party in which they could work effectively. Again, when a few of the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh, the two largest Hindu communal parties, tried to arrange a merger, the rank and file and the other party leaders were more interested in maintaining their own organizations than in increasing their political effectiveness.

An Indian Aneurin Bevan would hardly have fought for long to maintain his position within his party. He would most likely have resigned the moment there was talk of expulsion: he would have con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demned the party, its leaders, and its program and proceeded with his own followers to form a new party. He might have given some thought to his electoral chances, but that would have been a secondary consideration. And if he considered his electoral prospects at all, his assessment probably would have been unrealistic.

Why do political consequences or calculations (in the sense of taking electoral prospects into account) play such a small part in the splits that have occurred in Indian political parties? To some extent, this absence of political calculations can be traced to the ambivalent feeling of many Indian politicians and of the party rank and file toward political power as an objective. Perhaps this appears to be a contradiction in terms, since political parties are by nature instruments for achieving power. But it is possible for a political party to exist, to have an ideology, to make demands upon the government, to organize demonstrations and strikes, and yet to be unwilling to assume the responsibility of running a government, and to feel at heart that there is something "dirty" and unpleasant about the whole business of politics.

How widespread such anti-political power feelings are can be easily illustrated. For instance, there are the many members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in the Jan Sangh Party[1] who believe that their objective of changing Indian society and revitalizing Hinduism will come about not through the attainment of political power but through propaganda and example. There are sections of the Praja Socialist Party which view the entire political process skeptically. Many of the party members are Gandhians who want to devote their lives to constructive work in the villages or to *bhoodan* work (voluntary land-collecting) and hope thereby to bring about a change in society without governmental intervention. There are Socialist followers of the late M. N. Roy who advocate a society in which there are no political parties and where change would be brought about by activity in villages and factories. And then there are those Socialists who, without being articulate ideological anarchists, nevertheless feel general contempt for the political process and for political power itself. Similarly, anti-power feelings can even be found in the Marxist left parties, many of whose members have abandoned politics to become *sannyasis* (monks) at the famous Aurobindo *ashram* in Pondicherry.

These anti-power feelings, which exist in nearly every opposition

[1] Jan Sangh is the largest Hindu communal party and the fourth largest party in India. The other three are the Congress Party, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Communist Party of India.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party in India,[2] are in large part the product of certain traditional values. Traditionally, high status in India has not been associated with political power. Status was traditionally a function of one's position in a caste hierarchy in which the *Brahman* priest rather than the *Kshatriya*, or ruler-warrior, was at the top.[3] Special status was, however, accorded to those persons, almost irrespective of their caste position, who strove for *moksha* (salvation), an ideal achieved through renunciation, sacrifice and, above all, detachment from this world. The key notion is "detachment." One should not have any desire for wealth or power, nor any strong attachments to friends, or one's wife, or children. There may be love, but it must be for all creatures or for God, and for no one more than others.[4] One must be detached from all worldly desires.[5]

"Renunciation," "sacrifice," and "detachment" are not the ideals by which all men live; only a few can choose this path. For the rest, each man must live in accordance with the duty assigned to him by his caste. In the West, too, the religious life of withdrawal has been confined to a relative few; what makes this notion noteworthy in India is, first, the number of people who leave established positions to devote themselves to the search for salvation; and second, the fact that these ideals are still widely accepted in modern India and have considerable impact even on the lives of those who do not withdraw.

It is also interesting to note that Hindu tradition, while it accords high status to the *Kshatriya* ruler, holds it important that others should not strive for positions of authority. Each man must accept his own *dharma* (duty) and perform his duty well. Better to perform one's own duty poorly, say the scriptures, than to perform someone else's duty well. Authority is acceptable, but to struggle for a position of authority is not.

As an aside, it might be mentioned here that the Indian tradition of asceticism (which is an extension of the notion of detachment) has posed a dilemma for Gandhian constructive workers who, while they

[2] The one exception being the Communist Party, perhaps the most Westernized of all the Indian parties and one which is completely concerned with the objective of winning power.

[3] D. Mackenzie Brown, *The White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi*, Berkeley, Calif., 1953, p. 17.

[4] See, for example, M. K. Gandhi, *Gandhi's Autobiography—The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, Washington, D.C., 1948, pp. 31-32, in which Gandhi says, "He who would be friends with God must remain alone, or make the whole world his friends."

[5] A disciple of Gandhi wrote that a central teaching of the *Bhagavad Gita* which played a major part in Gandhi's thinking was the ideal of *nishkamakarma* (action without the desire for result). Gopinath Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1946, p. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

live an ascetic life themselves, advocate the betterment of the villagers' lot. How can one accept the goal of a higher standard of living, but continue to believe in the principles of asceticism? One possible reconciliation—perhaps an unconscious one—seems to be for the Gandhian constructive worker to help the villager without encouraging him to want to improve his lot. Perhaps this is why some of the Gandhian constructive projects have possessed overtones of paternalism in spite of the Gandhian principle of teaching the villagers to help themselves.

The ascetic ideal does, however, have the beneficial effect of discouraging conspicuous displays of wealth. By emphasizing asceticism and village constructive work, Gandhi made one of his great contributions to Indian political and social development: he helped to narrow the gap between the educated classes and the villagers, a gap which in other countries has been much wider and has constituted a major obstacle to economic development and social welfare.

Under British rule, Indian feelings toward government were ambivalent. On the one hand, politics grew in importance as the state took on more functions. But on the other hand, cooperation with the alien British rulers became anathema as the nationalist movement grew. Indians who accepted office were looked upon with some opprobrium. Even after 1936 when the Congress Party agreed to assume office in a number of provinces, virtually the entire leftist section of the party denounced the move. And while one section of the Congress Party talked of the uses to which an Indian national government could be put when independence came, another section under Gandhi continued to emphasize the need to change society by non-governmental activities. With this in mind, Gandhi created a large number of village constructive work organizations. Gandhi's own attitude toward power is illustrated by the story of his reply to a proposal by some of his friends that he become the first Governor-General of India after the achievement of independence. Gandhi is reported to have said that were he to accept office for even one minute, he would negate all of the principles for which he stood.

Today, even with a nationalist government, there are widespread feelings against the "scramble for ministerial posts," especially among those in opposition. Many Indian intellectuals are prone to feel a certain contempt for those in political office, and to question their motives. These feelings, however, are not so widespread within the Congress Party, since most of those who felt this way, including many Gandhian constructive workers, have left the party. For those who have remained in it, a government post now confers considerable prestige. But this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feeling is not generally shared by those outside the Congress Party. Any mention of a "deal" which would result in the award of ministerial posts is likely to be looked upon not as shrewd politics but as dirty politics. This no doubt motivated part of the criticism of the Socialists —which was voiced by many of the Socialists themselves—when the Praja Socialist Party accepted power in the southern state of Travancore-Cochin and formed a minority government with the support of the Congress Party.

These anti-political power feelings not only influence Indian attitudes toward government, but also affect attitudes toward leadership. Politically active Indians, particularly those in the non-Marxist parties, prefer their leaders to be detached even from formal power within their own organizations. The leaders, too, prefer to be outside the formal structure. Gandhi, for example, was not even a dues-paying member of the Congress Party. The leader of the Praja Socialist Party, Jayaprakash Narayan, no longer holds any office in the party. The founder-leader of the Hindu communal party, Ram Rajya Parishad, is Swami Karapatri, a religious leader who is not a member of the party he leads. Golwakar (usually called "Guruji," or "Reverend Teacher") is the recognized leader of the RSS and the ideological leader of Jan Sangh, but he holds no position in the latter. Savarkar is the accepted leader of the Hindu Mahasabha but likewise has no official position. All of these men have reputations for "sacrifice" and "detachment," and by virtue of their very lack of political attachments are effective in settling the factional disputes that constantly plague every Indian party.

II. Struggle for Power

In a society whose members have been wielding political power for only a short time, one can expect few rules about the just and unjust ways of using power. In India, this situation is compounded by the absence in tradition of any notion of a universal system of ethics. There are no Ten Commandments: each man has his own *dharma*, and if he wants to achieve a better position in his next life, he must act in accordance with his prescribed role. Each *dharma* prescribes its own ethical rules. While on the one hand, for example, there is a tradition of non-violence among some sects of Hinduism, on the other hand, in the *Bhagavad Gita*, one of the most famous and popular religious texts, Krishna tells the warrior Arjuna that he must kill because it is his duty to do so. Another famous work, the *Arthasastra*, describes the ways of winning, keeping, and using power in a manner which outdoes Machiavelli's *Prince* in its apparent disregard for moral principles. But

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these seemingly non-religious attitudes are nonetheless part of the religious tradition. The ethical rules for the behavior of a *Kshatriya* ruler are different from those of a *Brahman* priest, just as their *dharma* differs.

When power does become a goal in a society in which an ideal is the renunciation of power, and where no system of ethical rules has developed concerning its uses, it is frequently sought in chaotic fashion and used in "unethical" ways (in the conventional Western sense of the word). This may help to explain why in the 1952 elections nearly six thousand independents contested seats for the various state legislatures —averaging nearly two independent candidates per seat—and why the Congress Party was flooded with office-seekers shortly after independence. This may also help to explain why before the 1952 elections state governments were frequently handicapped by politicians who used their government posts to make money and aid relatives and friends, and why corruption and nepotism have often been practiced openly and in rather crude ways.

The struggle *against* power therefore has its converse in the struggle *for* power. Each reinforces the other. The views of the anti-power personality, especially, are reinforced by observation of the behavior of those who struggle for power. Lack of familiarity with democratic rules breeds irresponsibility and, in turn, irresponsibility breeds a greater contempt for the democratic system.

III. Law and Civil Disobedience

In pre-independence India, civil disobedience, or what Gandhi called *satyagraha* (truth force), was a major weapon against the British rulers. So long as this refusal to obey government law was directed against an alien ruler, law-breaking was accepted as a weapon by virtually all politically active Indians. But the British emphasis on the rule of law had a profound effect on Indian intellectuals, especially those who entered the legal profession. Gandhi himself was a lawyer and although he urged civil disobedience against the British, he emphasized respect for the law. Civil disobedience was frequently, although not always, directed against administrative rulings rather than the law, and it was often paralleled by legal action in the courts by Indian barristers. But whatever Gandhi's intentions, the over-all effect of *satyagraha* could only be a receptivity to the violation of law on the part of the Indian masses. So long as law was the product of an alien rule, British attempts at making law legitimate through reference to democratic notions could hardly be convincing to most Indians.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But with the achievement of freedom, the use of *satyagraha* came into question. Does organized law-breaking, even when it is non-violent, have a place in a democratic society? The Socialists, who during the past few years have accepted many of Gandhi's principles, conducted *satyagrahas* on several occasions in Uttar Pradesh, Bombay, and elsewhere against what they considered to be injustices on the part of the government. Eviction of tenants and high taxes—especially high land or irrigation taxes—have frequently been the targets of Socialist civil disobedience movements. While Gandhians have criticized the misuse of *satyagraha*, in principle they continue to support it. *Harijan*, the official Gandhian weekly, published a note by its late editor, K. G. Mashruwala, in defense of *satyagraha*: "Satyagraha—insistence on truth—does not depend upon the form of Government. . . . Even if it needs to take the form of individual or organized non-violent civil resistance of an unjust law or order, or of non-cooperation with a general or particular evil, or of a resort to fast, a *satyagrahi* [one who takes part in a *satyagraha*] cannot avoid it even in a democracy. . . . it has to be taken after attempts of bringing about conversion through arguments and discussion and other legal remedies have failed. . . . in a well-governed democracy, there should be few occasions for resorting to it. But it cannot be entirely ruled out in a proper case."

The same issue of *Harijan* published a reply by Pandit Pant, then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and now Home Minister in Nehru's cabinet: ". . . in matters of conscience—on spiritual issues—one is always entitled to offer Satyagraha. But, for a democratic set-up, I had always stressed the importance of settling political differences by argument and persuasion. . . . If Satyagraha is to be resorted to or threatened every time there is a difference of opinion, then public opinion does not receive the respect that is due to it. . . . It would, no doubt, be a matter of conscience if one were forced to offer Satyagraha in a case where the issues are clear, and the Government's stand is patently untenable, and where before any recourse to Satyagraha the pros and cons have been examined in an impersonal, detached and dispassionate manner, and all other remedies have been exhausted. He who decides on Satyagraha should have a clear conscience and an open mind: his judgment should be detached and his decision should be unbiased. But in the midst of political partisanship, how many are there who can, or will, act in this manner? Democracy would lose much of its significance if, in the name of Satyagraha, everyone were to take it as his unfettered right to incite the masses, as much as possible, against the system of Government

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

established by the people's elected representatives in a democratic State, in order to belittle and resist the law of the land in a concerted manner. . . ."[6]

In spite of the protests of the Indian government and of most Congress Party leaders, *satyagraha* has been applied on a number of occasions by several political parties since independence. The *satyagraha* in Andhra, culminating in the fast-unto-death by a Telugu leader, was a major factor in the government's decision to sanction the formation of the state of Andhra out of the Telugu-speaking areas of Madras.

Non-violent law-breaking likewise played a large part in the Jammu and Kashmir agitation in early 1953. The major Hindu communal organizations, the Jamma Praja Parishad, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, and Ram Rajya Parishad joined together to agitate for "full and unqualified" accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha were particularly active in Delhi, where they organized demonstrations in defiance of police orders. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, the Jan Sangh leader, defied the government by entering Kashmir without the necessary government permit. He was subsequently arrested, as were a large number of leaders and party members who took part in the *satyagraha.*

Civil disobedience movements have occurred throughout India since independence, and the Indian government has in virtually every instance used the power of the state to suppress them. In spite of the fact that India is no longer subject to foreign rule, most organizations outside the government or the Congress Party still believe that *satyagraha* is a legitimate technique for achieving one's objectives. Their feeling is that when they fail to achieve their objectives through regular channels—petitions, elections, delegations to the government, and the other devices for exerting influence within a democratic society—non-legal devices ought to be employed. Those who think this way do not accept the notion of the sanctity of law which underlies the power of most Western democratic governments, where legal rules legitimize the authority of government.

In India, political power has not yet been made legitimate. The justification for power by reference to *dharma*, whatever role it once may have played, ceased to be a justification with the arrival of the British. Instead, the British introduced the concept of "justice under law."

[6] This and the preceding quotation are taken from *Indian Press Digests*, Berkeley, Calif., Bureau of International Relations of the Department of Political Science, University of California, II, No. 1 (October 1953), p. 81; reprinted from *Harijan*, September 20, 1952, pp. 253-55.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although this idea made considerable inroads on Indian thinking during the nineteenth century, so long as the national government was under foreign rule, the bulk of the nationalist movement—as we have already noted—saw no "justice under law." Thus at the time of independence, India was not, to use Max Weber's term, a society based on "rational-legal authority," that is, a society in which authority is made legitimate by reference to law. Opposition party members and apparently large numbers of peasants and workers do not yet feel the restraints of law. Injustice, whether it be by act of government or of landlords, is greeted by a readiness to violate law or contract.[7]

IV. Learning the Rules

It is not surprising to find that Asian countries, having suddenly adopted political structures of a Western type, are struggling to accommodate their traditions to the new institutions. As this article has indicated, despite India's success thus far with democratic institutions, there still persist traditional attitudes which do not always facilitate adjustments. India's problem is the same as that of many other Asian countries: how to adapt traditional attitudes to a rational-legal democratic political system.

There are, however, a number of elements at work in India that tend to ease her adjustment to democracy and make the prospects for her political future more hopeful than those of many other Asian countries.

First of all, the intensity and duration of the Western impact have been greater in India than in nearly any other Asian country. Traditional Indian attitudes and institutions have been profoundly affected. A large, Westernized university system has been established, and Eng-

[7] Although Gandhi personally rejected the use of government to achieve the kind of society he envisaged, he did contribute a device for channeling resentment against government. While he was apparently prepared, *under any kind of government* (even in a democracy), to violate laws he considered unjust, violations were to be accomplished in a non-violent way. In a society such as India, where there are few self-restraints to prevent violation of law and where the population is becoming increasingly aware of the existence of "injustice," the choice is not merely between abiding by or violating law, but is frequently between non-violent and violent law-breaking. Gandhi's contribution was a special set of non-violent, albeit non-democratic, rules by which laws could be violated. The degree of violence might be far greater in India today had not Gandhi provided such a set of rules. As Lois Murphy noted in a recent study (Chapter 4 in Gardner Murphy, *In the Minds of Men*, New York, 1953), in a society in which there is a tradition of little violence and where consequently there are no rules that put some restraint on its employment (rules such as "Fight like a man," "Don't hit below the belt," and other canons of "fair play" and "sportsmanship"), when violence is committed, it may be even more extreme and cruel than in a society where its use is customary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lish has become the language of the educated community. The administrative and military services, among the most efficient in Asia, are Westernized. The number of lawyers inculcated with Western legal notions is very large, probably considerably larger than one finds, for instance, in Japan. Furthermore, even before 1947, many Indians had gained considerable experience in the state legislatures and in high government posts.

It is not possible here to analyze exhaustively the extensive impact which the West has had on India and the remarkable modifications which have been made not only in social and political practices, but in religious and political theory as well. What is important to note, however, is that Hinduism has shown a remarkable capacity to assimilate and integrate Western notions. In large part, traditions are being modified rather than supplanted.

Secondly, those traditional attitudes which are not consistent with democratic rules are beginning to break down as Indian politicians and the party rank and file grow accustomed to a parliamentary system. It takes time to learn new rules, and only since the 1952 elections have most Indians begun to feel that they are living under a new political system. For example, minor parties are increasingly recognizing the necessity to make compromises and merge with other parties to augment their strength.

In the 1952 elections, the splintering of the opposition allowed the Congress Party to win a clear majority of the seats in Parliament with only 45 per cent of the popular vote. But the absence of proportional representation, and the presence of a system in which a plurality vote means victory, may eventually force some of the smaller groups either to merge or to resort to extra-legal, extra-parliamentary devices to avoid extinction. In the long run, the successful operation of the parliamentary system is likely to bring about a change in Indian attitudes toward political power, especially as government successfully meets the needs of the community. Likewise, if the gap between expectations and fulfillment is narrowed, and if discontented groups discover that they can achieve results through the regular channels of a parliamentary system, there is likely to be a decrease in civil disobedience. Even now, although civil disobedience is practiced, there is considerable criticism of it and those who have violated the law have found it necessary to explain publicly why in a parliamentary system they must resort to civil disobedience.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The essential point is that the sheer survival and operation of stable democratic government in India are in themselves perhaps the major factors that will contribute toward the breakdown of traditional obstacles to the democratic system and toward persuading opposition groups to accept the system. Political stability is a function of many complex factors, but underlying them all is the simple matter of survival for a substantial period of time. "Nothing succeeds like success" still makes a good political axiom. If the present democratic institutions of India continue to function effectively, if law and order are maintained and stable government continues in the various states as well as in the central government, faith in the system is likely to grow. If Indians come to recognize that their aspirations can be fulfilled within the democratic system, then they are likely to operate within the rules.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

FRANCE'S CHRONIC CRISIS

Its Cause and Cure

By GORDON WRIGHT

Herbert Luethy, *France Against Herself*, translated by Eric Mosbacher, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1955, 476 pp. $6.50.

Ronald Matthews, *The Death of the Fourth Republic*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1954, 311 pp. $5.00.

Philip Williams, *Politics in Post-War France: Parties and the Constitution in the Fourth Republic*, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1954, 500 pp. $7.00.

I

DIAGNOSING the French malaise has come to be one of the commonest intellectual exercises of our time. Almost every visiting journalist or scholar has a try at it sooner or later; and a growing number of Frenchmen as well have been engaged recently in profound national introspection. In part, this wholesale probing grows out of the disillusionment which quickly replaced the dreams and hopes of the liberation era. In part, it is the product of that intellectual atmosphere—skeptical, critical, and free—of which the French have always been so proud. But in part also it reflects a deepening comprehension of the character of modern France, and of the substructure on which the Fourth Republic rests.

France has been in some sort of crisis for a good long time now; indeed, it is easy to fall into a kind of Orwellian double-speak and to conclude that crisis is normalcy there. But until lately, the nature of this endemic crisis has been as much obscured as clarified by most of the writing about it. Perhaps that is because so many books on French politics have been either theoretical or mechanical in spirit, stressing disembodied ideas on the one hand or the machinery of government on the other. What marks the current crop of books is their attempt to get at the factors underlying both ideologies and political mechanisms. These factors, mainly psychological and sociological in nature, are exceptionally complex and slippery. Within limits, they would seem to lend themselves well to the techniques of the behavioral sciences; and it may be that the practitioners of these new black arts will eventually

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

add much to our understanding of contemporary France. But the initial steps toward this deeper understanding have been taken not by behavioral scientists but by men in the older humanistic and historical tradition: men who possess no tools more elaborate than a broad-ranging and well-stocked mind, a perceptive eye, a trenchant pen, and that elusive trait which the humanists, in their appallingly unscientific jargon, sometimes call "insight" or "intuition."

The authors of the three books under review all belong in this older tradition; but their works vary widely in spirit, scope, and depth. Ronald Matthews, a British journalist in Paris during the entire postwar decade, retells the story of that decade as he saw it, and attempts to show why the passionate hopes of the liberation so quickly turned to dust and ashes. Philip Williams, a young Oxford lecturer on politics, describes in minute detail the cumbersome political machinery and party structure of the Fourth Republic, and seeks to explain the dynamics of the system. Herbert Luethy, a Swiss historian turned journalist, sets himself the most difficult task of all: to catch and convey in words the nature of a collective personality—*la personne France*. His remarkably broad-gauged study, based on an extensive knowledge of France's past and on ten years of total immersion in France's present, does more than any other recent book to explain those psychological and sociological factors which underlie French attitudes and shape French political behavior.

II

There is an appealing simplicity about Ronald Matthews' view of the French crisis. Immediately after the liberation in 1944, he believes, there was a unique opportunity for national regeneration—for the creation of a *république pure et dure*, built on foundations of social justice and operated by selfless patriots. That chance was bungled, he contends; and the men responsible for the failure were motivated either by outright malice, by narrow bigotry, or by sheer ignorance. The malice he attributes to the Communist high command, which was determined to forestall any fundamental reforms within a democratic framework. The bigotry he charges to those Socialist militants who sabotaged their leaders' attempt to bury the old clerical issue and to build a French labor party as broad and strong as Britain's. The ignorance he imputes to De Gaulle and his Finance Minister René Pleven, whose limited grasp of economics led them to reject the painful measures which the nation's health demanded. Over against these villains or dupes Matthews sets the heroic figures of Léon Blum and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pierre Mendès-France: two potential saviors who could have led the way to a new France if only their counsel had been accepted by the Socialists and by De Gaulle.

In those first few months after the liberation of Paris, Matthews believes, the destiny of the Fourth Republic was irretrievably fixed; and the subsequent decade has been merely a gloomy unfolding of inevitable consequences produced by the disastrous errors of 1944-1945. "All the cards in the hand of [France's] post-liberation destiny had been dealt by April 1945; it only remained for time to play them." This thesis is neither entirely novel nor entirely wrong; in less emphatic form, the same idea appears in most books about postwar France. Indeed, a kind of legend has grown up about the climactic post-liberation showdown on economic policy in De Gaulle's office, with Mendès-France and Pleven as the two protagonists. The legend suggests a tableau of France at a fork in the road, hesitating, listening to the harsh voice of truth, and then committing herself to the fatal downward slope. Perhaps it is time to reexamine the facts behind the legend; to ask whether the French leaders were entirely free to choose in 1944, and whether a different choice would really have produced such spectacular results as its proponents imply. Certainly the Mendès-France plan was more far-sighted than that of Pleven, and certainly the Belgian currency conversion of 1944 proves that such an experiment could succeed—in Belgium, at least. But the legend jumps the long gap from these facts to the assumption that the Mendès program of austerity and controls could have been installed and made to work effectively in post-liberation France. France is not Belgium; and Frenchmen have never been Englishmen either, even in those abnormal months of 1944-1945. One may reasonably regret that a program of rigid economic controls was not tried at the very outset; but one cannot reasonably assume that in a nation with France's psychological and sociological pattern, such a program would have fulfilled the hopes of its sponsors. At most, it might have been the first step on the long road toward rejuvenation; and the failure to take that first step did not mean that the road was forever closed.

As for the failure of Frenchmen to create a great new labor party, there is also reason to be skeptical about Matthews' conviction that a unique opportunity was missed, and that only the ramshackle barrier of Socialist bigotry stood in the way. That such bigotry existed is undeniable; but it existed on the Catholic side too, as the more broad-minded Christian Democrats were soon to discover. Besides, most of those Christian Democrats were busy laying the groundwork for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MRP in 1944, thus ruling out a single labor party. Even a close and durable coalition between Socialists and MRP was a doubtful prospect in a country where the clerical issue has such deep emotional roots, and where the Communists and conservatives find it so easy to use the issue for electoral blackmail. It is hard to believe in retrospect that a fundamentally different pattern of parties could have emerged in 1944, even if the Socialists had listened to Blum or if De Gaulle had chosen to descend from Olympus into active politics.

On the whole, then, it seems improper to trace the origins of the French malaise exclusively, or even primarily, to the lost opportunities and the errors of the liberation period. Not all the cards had been dealt by 1945; French leaders and voters still had important choices to make in the subsequent decade, and are likely to go on facing such choices in the future. As for the degree of freedom of choice which Frenchmen enjoyed in the liberation era, it was probably not very much greater than it is now. Even in a time of upheaval, an old and complex society cannot easily escape the limitations imposed by its national heritage of ideas and institutions, its ways of thinking and its pattern of life.

III

When one turns to the record of the past ten years, and to the framework of ideas and institutions created by French history, one will find in Philip Williams an admirably thorough and perceptive guide. Williams' view of the Fourth Republic's achievements and prospects is, relatively at least, a sympathetic and hopeful one. Like Matthews, he regrets the wasted opportunities of the liberation era, but he is more inclined to believe that the chance of fundamental reform was slender and fleeting. Furthermore, he rejects the common view that no changes at all were achieved by the founders of the Fourth Republic, and the corollary thesis that the regime quickly degenerated into a shoddy replica of the Third Republic. Instead, he sees the new system as midway between the Third and an ideal Fourth Republic. It is "the product of a half-completed revolution"—a revolution that had to be checked in mid-career, partly because the Communists might otherwise have expropriated it. As for the Republic's record since 1946, Williams is one of the rare foreign observers who is prepared to say at least a few unfashionably kind words. If it is true that cabinets have been just as unstable as in prewar days, he suggests that at least they have tried to tackle some of the problems which their predecessors had shelved. Indeed, one reason for their short duration is this effort to come to grips with serious issues; and if this is so, then recent instability can be re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

garded as "a healthier sign than the evasions and abdications of the 1930's." Williams even expresses the heretical view that French politicians often give the voters better leadership than the latter deserve.

This is not to suggest that Williams is a disciple of either Dr. Pangloss or Pollyanna. His primary purpose is to explain how the political system operates, and why; and his analysis is hardheaded, critical, and thought-provoking. "The faults in the political structure of France," he asserts at the outset, "are the result of her historical and geographical background. No country can rid itself of its past." The central problem created by that past is the deep, enduring division of the electorate into several hostile segments, with the different lines of division cutting across each other rather than coinciding. As a result, a clear, coherent majority of voters has rarely existed on any positive issue; the only such majority has been negative in outlook. Therefore it is better to avoid illusions; "strong and stable democratic government . . . is an unattainable objective in France." It is equally futile to denounce the founders of the Fourth Republic and to tinker with the mechanics of government, for the fault lies in "a structure of opinion which can only be changed over a period of many years." Some reforms would be worth trying—notably in parliamentary procedure and the electoral system—but their effect on the deeper problem would be slight.

History and social structure, Williams argues, intertwine to produce the fragmentation of French opinion. Before the political and ideological issues of 1789 had worked themselves out and produced a wide consensus, a second revolution—economic and social in this case—forced a new set of issues upon the French. The conflict between these two revolutions only increased French disagreement over the proper purposes of the state. And within the state, two kinds of politics came to operate side by side: the one centering around traditional ideological issues, the other reflecting the tensions of the modern class struggle. Traditional politics kept its grip in those regions and those segments of society which François Goguel has labeled "static France"; class-struggle politics became dominant in "dynamic France." The stresses between them have grown worse as the dynamic has pushed back the static sector; for the nation's economic center of gravity has now shifted to dynamic France, while the political center of gravity still resides in static France. The dynamic sector "breeds extremists" of left or right, whose impatient demands for change frighten the traditionalists; while the static sector breeds standpatters, whose stolid resistance further infuriates the proponents of reform.

Williams points to no well-marked path of escape from this dilemma.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Broadly speaking, his sympathies (like those of both Matthews and Luethy) might be called *Mendèsiste*. He accepts the idea that a stronger governmental authority is essential in order to challenge pressure groups and special interests, and in order to carry through that redistribution of the national income which he regards as a necessary first step toward ending the chronic crisis. Only through such a redistribution, he suggests, can Communist power in France be reduced, and the way opened for the emergence of a truly dynamic majority in politics. But Williams appears to be reconciled to a gradual rather than a dramatically sudden change. Perhaps he would accept François Goguel's recent prognosis[1] that the continuing expansion of dynamic France at the expense of the static sector may eventually undermine the political power of the standpatters, and may enable the dynamic elements (if they can agree among themselves) to impose a positive social and economic program. This evolutionary process will doubtless be slow—as slow as the static element can make it through its grip on political power. The trend, nevertheless, is undeniable, and not even the most regressive laws are likely to check it entirely. Since the end of the war, the number of marginal farms has again begun to decline steadily, and more recently a similar downturn in the number of small shops has set in. If no major crisis interrupts this natural process, perhaps the Poujade movement will be seen in retrospect as a last spontaneous reflex of static France against its impending fate.

IV

Of all recent interpreters of contemporary France, Herbert Luethy seems destined to have the widest and deepest impact on the opinions of our generation. Many Americans are getting their first serious introduction to the nature of France through the sparkling pages of *France Against Herself*, or through bits and pieces abstracted from it in popular articles and television commentaries. It is fortunate, therefore, that Luethy is not only a lucid and witty observer, but a well-informed and penetrating one as well. Strange to say, the most disparaging comments on Luethy's book have come from Alexander Werth, himself the most remarkable and influential foreign observer of France in the 1930's. Epithets like "absurd distortion," "silly polemics," and "generally muddled thinking" lead up to Werth's devastating conclusion that "what Mr. Luethy lacks is a proper gift of historical analysis, and above all a

[1] See Goguel's chapter on politics in André Siegfried, *et al.*, *Aspects de la société française*, Paris, 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

detailed knowledge of the actual facts."[2] This reviewer can only conclude that Werth, hampered by his ideological blinders, has somehow pulled the wrong weapon out of his critic's arsenal. What he thought was a meat-axe turned out to be a boomerang.

It is nevertheless true that Luethy's book may also have some boomerang qualities. There is a curious paradox in the fact that so remarkable a work may end by producing or confirming as many misconceptions as it dispels. Already there are signs that Luethy's more colorful epigrams and more arresting examples are obscuring the less dramatic passages which give the book proper balance. More serious still, his barbed irony and multiple paradoxes tend to produce in some readers a sense of frustrated bewilderment or impatient irritation at so contradictory and unreasonable a nation. It is true that irony and paradox are probably essential for any sophisticated analysis of France's complexities; and Luethy is a master of the art. Yet such a technique requires something more than a sophisticated author; it requires sophisticated readers as well. Here is a case where a literary device, appropriately chosen and consummately used, may lead in two opposite directions: toward deeper understanding, or toward heightened misunderstanding.

It is not easy to summarize Luethy's diagnosis of either the cause or the cure of the French malaise—or, for that matter, of the nature of the crisis itself. Sometimes he seems to find the trouble in matters of mind and morale—in a loss of national self-confidence or a retreat into "crabbed and narrow cultural chauvinism." In other passages the weaknesses seem to be structural in nature, and to be traceable primarily to social and economic factors. No simple, two-dimensional crisis can be expected in a nation which in outward appearance is "a confusing and unintelligible jumble of contradictions," but is in fact a many-faceted society which has managed somehow to fuse all of these contradictions. Beneath the apparent disorder, says Luethy, is concealed an extremely durable order—durable, indeed, to the point of petrifaction. Here lies the real difficulty: France has become an inseparable combination of instability and ossification. No nation has undergone more revolutions and *coups d'état*, yet no nation has really changed less. The result is a state of "sclerosis" and "ossified equilibrium," a "guild economy vegetating in a well-protected hothouse"; and within such a rigid framework, the apparent changes of recent years have amounted only to "transformation in stagnation." What Goguel calls "dynamic France" does exist, but this "alien body has been isolated and made innocuous"; it is merely "an isolated enclave of modernism inside old France."

[2] *The Nation*, CLXXXI (July 23, 1955), pp. 78-79.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Almost no man, group, or class in France escapes Luethy's caustic pen; but some of his severest strictures are aimed at what he labels "the France of M. Gingembre." This is Goguel's "static France" called by another name, and painted in far more lurid colors—too lurid, I think, to be quite true to life. "Gingembre's France" includes well over half the population: notably the small producers, middlemen, retailers, and independent peasants. This horde of "parasites" is "busily engaged in 'skimming the cream' of the French social product," thanks to the favorable prejudices of the politicians and their own voting strength. They have been able to barricade themselves behind an impenetrable thicket of protective laws, and to shift every possible burden to the wage- and salary-earners. Yet few of them are either prosperous or happy, for they too "languish and decay in a nation that is growing poorer and poorer." Their selfish fears have perpetuated a "national economy of self-contrived stagnation," as far removed from true capitalism as it is from socialism; a political system which has degenerated into "an orgy of economic pressure groups"; a society where "the revolt of all against all quietly smoulders everywhere."

Luethy's diagnosis bears a striking resemblance to the arguments of the Mendès-France brain trust. Like them, he holds that "France has everything needed to be a country of unlimited possibilities" and that "in the last resort it is something absurdly trivial which stands between France and her own health"; but then he asks despairingly, "How can stagnation overcome itself?" His conclusion, unlike that of the *Mendèsistes*, is that Western European integration must come first if the problems of France are not to remain insoluble. Even that distinction fades, however, in Luethy's epilogue, which was written for the English edition in 1954 soon after Mendès came to power. This concluding chapter contains a new note of cautious hope, and seems to accept Mendès' position that domestic economic reforms can and should precede real integration.

Yet it is clear from Luethy's whole argument that he considers the French crisis too profound to be cured in a hurry or by a single leader—even by a quasi-charismatic leader with an un-French grasp of economics. He is probably less optimistic about France's future than Philip Williams, but he too puts his modicum of hope in a continuing evolutionary and educational process. "The final balance sheet [of France today]," he concludes, "is full of contradictions." Much useful effort has been expended since the war, even though with disappointing results; and "certainly 'in the long run' all this must eventually have its effect in daily tiny corrections and molecular movements." More im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portant still, the real nature of the problem is working its way into the consciousness of a growing number of Frenchmen—even those Frenchmen whose symbol is M. Gingembre. This mental evolution (which Luethy underestimates somewhat) will eventually be speeded by the impact of the new postwar population trend. "Here we have an organic process going on, which cannot be accelerated by any artificial means; it requires patience, patience with France, patience till the rock is hauled over the crest, and peace—for, if the rock once more rolls down into the abyss, it will be difficult indeed for anyone to move it again."

Many readers of *France Against Herself* are likely to conclude impatiently that the time for patience is past, and that there has been too much of it already. They may even feel that Luethy himself sometimes lacks the quality which he extols, and that in his mind, hope is really overbalanced by despair. Such conclusions would doubtless reinforce that mood of revulsion against the French muddle which is leading so many Americans to proclaim that "what France needs is a new revolution" or to ask why the French don't take a lesson from the Germans. When a nation's crisis is so deep-rooted, so intimately intertwined with that nation's whole psychological and sociological heritage, any attempt to examine it unsparingly runs the risk of producing black discouragement. Yet the first step toward recovery from any ailment must always be such an unsparing diagnosis, understood and accepted by the patient's friends as well as by the patient himself. If this is true, then the appearance of books so vigorous and perceptive as those of Williams and Luethy—and the growing willingness of Frenchmen to ponder their lessons—may contribute positively to a gradual cure for France's chronic crisis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLD POLITICS

By HOWARD S. ELLIS

The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy: Its Concepts, Strategy, and Limits, Report of a Study Group Sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the National Planning Association, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1955, 414 pp. $6.00.

THIS is a book of commanding significance, in part because of the group from which it emanates,[1] but even more because of the logic of its positions and its virtual uniqueness in presenting a rationale and a consistent scheme of American foreign economic policy. The work is about equally divided into parts dealing with Diagnosis and with Prescription. With the exception of one particular weakness with which I shall deal, the Diagnosis moves upon a high level of acuteness and sagacity; but the chief claim of the book to eminence lies in its policy recommendations. Both parts are the product of the meeting of a number of minds (distinguished theorists and seasoned practitioners); but, fortunately for the reader, the text seems to be the product of a single and highly skilled author.

The foundation of the book is the clear-eyed recognition that the survival of the Free World depends upon the United States—upon the contributions which it can make to the economic health and political strength and cohesion of its natural allies in the world of Western culture and to rational lines of economic development in the underdeveloped world. Abandoning the universalism of the Bretton Woods phase of American foreign policy, the book maintains that henceforth, or so long as the Soviet threat endures, the salvation of the Free World depends upon the exploitation of the cultural bonds of Western nations and upon the strengthening and extension of their economic and political cooperation. The economic progress and political welfare of

[1] The study group was composed of William Y. Elliott, Chairman (Harvard University), Frank Altschul (New York), Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (Washington, D.C.), Courtney Brown (Columbia), H. van B. Cleveland (Committee for Economic Development), Theodore Geiger (National Planning Association), Harry D. Gideonse (President, Brooklyn College), Edward S. Mason (Harvard), and Don K. Price (Associate Director, Ford Foundation). In addition, the committee was advised by a number of persons including, among the economists, Gerhard Colm, Klaus Knorr, Max F. Millikan, Frank A. Southard, and Jacob Viner.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asiatic, African, and Latin American peoples are of vital concern to the United States; but ideological and cultural differences at present prevent these peoples from being the natural allies of the West. Mutually fruitful economic cooperation with them is possible; but they cannot be included homogeneously in the operating political and economic international institutions of the Free World without danger of shipwreck.

The Diagnosis of problems facing American foreign policy finds that Britain and many Western European countries are not at present "capable of satisfying their requirements for defense, for self-support and for growth, and of simultaneously meeting rising consumption claims" (p. 52); and much the same holds for many underdeveloped areas upon which the West depends for essential primary products. In considerable measure, this basic lack of economic health can be traced to the disintegration of the nineteenth-century economic system.

One cause of this disintegration has been the rise of newly organized farmers' and labor groups and their demand, the more strong the greater the dependence of their country on foreign trade, for protection by the national state. During the present century, protectionist sentiment in Britain and others of the old industrial centers has been made intense by the rapid rise of German, Japanese, and American industry. The rise of new industrial and financing centers and the depression of the 1930's have undermined not only the ability of Britain to manage the world's monetary system but also any presently available method of securing world-wide currency convertibility. Even more seriously, the passing of the nineteenth-century system of political security resting on a "balance of power" and the British navy has produced a nearly universal ideal of national military strength. The security and calculability of international economic relations have been ravaged within the present century by two world wars, a great depression, and by the cold war. In addition, the national independence of former colonial territories causes them to pursue with ideological zeal the goals of industrialization and autarchy. Finally, national states, in order to enforce domestic regulation and control, have strong interests against international integration.

In recognizing change and prescribing new policy, *The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy* faces the new world more bravely than any written analysis I know. It points out clearly that Western Europe, with its poor endowment of natural resources and heavy populations, can achieve economic health only through expanding exports and increasing imports of raw materials at favorable terms

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of trade. Unless these countries improve in economic health, they will be increasingly vulnerable to Communist subversion and neutralism, threatening the Western Alliance and isolating the United States. Western Europe (and the same is true of Japan) has suffered from the disintegration of the former international trading system in three basic ways: (1) foreign trade and investment have been restricted and made less secure and calculable; (2) primary production, chiefly agricultural production, in the non-Soviet world has failed to keep abreast of manufacture; (3) the competitive superiority of American industry has persisted since World War I and shows no signs of future abatement.

This general diagnosis is complemented for Western Europe by separate studies—condensed but penetrating—of the economies of the United Kingdom, France, Western Germany, and Italy; and, for the underdeveloped areas, by an extended but more general treatment. Throughout, the analysis achieves a most effective articulation of economic and political factors, as the title of the book presages, indeed of all social factors—psychological, sociological, religious, etc.—relevant to the theme. Thus, in the case of the United Kingdom, stress is laid upon the preference of British management for stability to boldness in technological innovation, and upon a weakening of the Victorian values of individualism and enterprise. For France, a great incubus upon the economy is the predilection for small-scale traditional agriculture and for small independent retail shops; but no less disastrous is the ideal of the eighteenth-century *rentier* which accounts for much restrictionism and protectionism. In Germany, greater tolerance of inequality, the political weakness of organized labor, and a greater propensity to save are elements among others leading to a favorable prognosis. In Italy, class hostilities, anti-clericalism, and Marxist indoctrination play unfavorable roles, though the basic difficulties of overpopulation and scarcity of natural resources antedate these ideological troubles. Regarding the underdeveloped areas, the diagnosis of the present volume runs so much parallel to that offered by the reviewer and the co-author of a recent book that their only possible sentiment could be satisfaction in view of the more authoritative character of the present group of economists and men of affairs.

The successful marriage of economics and politics is perhaps impaired in one instance, the analysis of the "dollar problem." The present treatment seems to me to commit three serious errors: first, to define the so-called "structural dollar problem" so vaguely that it becomes inoperable and so inclusive as to elevate it to improper perspective; second, to display more confidence than is warranted by our present

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state of knowledge that the problem is "structural" and not, for many countries, at least, chiefly "financial"; and thirdly, to suggest policy which is in general inconsistent with the main trend of the group's recommendations. Each of these I shall attempt to comment upon, though perforce with brevity.

Everyone would agree with one definition of the dollar problem, here designated as the financial concept, as a " 'shortage' of means of payment for dollar goods and services in relation to demand for them" (p. 87), though probably the words "at a given rate of exchange" should be added to complete the intended meaning. Doubts arise with regard to the second definition pertaining to the "structural dollar problem" as "persistently unsatisfactory trading relations with the United States and Canada—unsatisfactory because trade between the two groups of countries does not expand fast enough to allow Western Europe and Japan an adequate rate of economic growth" (*ibid.*). The definition is objectionable in the first place because it implies, indeed says, that an inadequate volume of inter-group trade (dollar vs. non-dollar countries) bears the chief responsibility for inadequate economic growth in Western Europe. In view of the many sociological, political, and economic factors adduced in the text as conditioning the *domestic* and foreign trade expansion of these countries, it seems inconceivable that growth could be envisaged as a function of foreign trade alone. If factors other than foreign trade govern growth, is it implied that a "structural dollar problem" exists so long as the increase of dollar trade (or supply of dollars by unilateral transfer from the United States) does not *compensate for* the insufficient contribution of domestic factors to economic growth? Definitions are, of course, merely definitions; but the implication of this one may easily be to put on the doorstep of the balance-of-payments responsibilities which ought rather to be placed upon real and financial domestic factors.

Another difficulty with this concept of the "structural dollar problem" lies in defining *what* growth rate is "adequate" without resort to the question-begging answer, "Enough to eliminate the dollar shortage." Economists have indeed ventured to supply formulae for "correct" (i.e., full-employment) growth of investment for a given national economy. More is involved here, since the dollar shortage, if caused by differential growth rates, involves the question of "correct" relative rates of growth among economies. Does the definition imply that the structural dollar shortage is only to be overcome if Western European growth rates approach or exceed that of the United States?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

And if such rates are achieved, are absolute levels of efficiency irrelevant to the supposed "structural dollar problem"?

Growth rates as among various countries have in times past differed vastly without giving rise to a dollar or to a pound sterling problem. Why? The query seems to turn the focus upon the efficacy of the adjustment mechanism in international balances of payments. It would be in the context of the adjustment mechanism that I could see a justification with respect to the *dollar* problem (a quite distinct matter from low or slowly rising per capita *income*) for distinguishing structural causes; they would refer to price, wage, and other rigidities which impair adjustment and which are not amenable to fiscal and monetary remedies.

Whether this distinction or the one proposed by the study group is made, the question remains whether it has yet been demonstrated that chronic imbalance in balance-of-payments positions persists despite the application of appropriate fiscal and monetary measures. The study group itself frequently alludes to the lack of such policies as causes of imbalance. Thus, in the case of the United Kingdom, the full employment ideal is said to have led to an easy money policy and lack of concern with external equilibrium (p. 105). Lack of confidence in the franc is assigned a basic role in the difficulties of France (p. 115), etc. Furthermore, a good many of the other adverse factors, such as the lack of domestic capital for investment in the United Kingdom, as well as the pressure of consumption claims in the early prewar years and the revival of personal savings later on, and the high level of personal savings in Germany and in Italy (pp. 100, 101, 120, 127) do not seem far removed from monetary policies. The fact seems to be that as inflations in Western Europe have been mastered and exchange rates have been brought into more realistic alignment, the dollar problem has been greatly alleviated. It is still possible, of course, to assert that structural difficulties make this improvement temporary. But the great confidence of the group that this is proven fact scarcely seems warrantable.

Although a direct logical connection does not seem apparent, the heavy commitment of the study to "structural" causes of the dollar shortage may be responsible for two policy positions which scarcely seem defensible. One is the frequent iteration that financial measures, such as devaluation or disinflation, cannot cure structural weaknesses, without a parallel recognition that direct controls (quotas, rationing, exchange controls, etc.) do not cure fundamental economic weaknesses either. Thus a latent bias in favor of direct controls is allowed to creep

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in without justification. It is furthermore inconsistent with the generally liberal orientation of this book.

Another policy position appears in the assertion made several times (pp. 50, 92-93) that financial remedies for the dollar shortage are "politically impossible." A book which in general so profitably adheres to "political economy" should explain why. Direct controls, such as quotas, and even exchange controls do not avoid the reduction of imports and real income which is involved in devaluation and deflation (or restraint of inflation). Why then are the latter "politically impossible"? It is of course possible that the use of orthodox finance uncomplemented by appropriate domestic fiscal measures would involve unwelcome breaches in a policy of "fair shares"; but why need it be thus uncomplemented? American foreign economic policy in the Cordell Hull tradition has moved on solid ground in holding that foreign trade should not be saddled with interferences (particularly restrictive interventions) when the same objectives could be reached through appropriate domestic policies without restriction of trade.

The present criticism of the study group's position does not imply complete confidence that a structural dollar problem does not exist, at least if this is reinterpreted to mean a possible incapacity of the international adjustment mechanism to cope with the differential growth in productivity of American and foreign economies (and one not inherent in the growth of the economies themselves). But it is imperative for American foreign policy to insist that fiscal and monetary remedies short of actual deflation and unemployment be fully exploited by our European allies, before resorting to the unorthodox remedy of tolerating anti-dollar discrimination in international trade. In the first place, we should make sure that we are not simply underwriting foreign inflations—inflations through trade-union action, easy money policies, or fiscal ineptitude. In the second place, if anti-dollar discrimination is left to foreign countries, they must depend on import limitation. Limitation of American imports by Europeans runs the danger of perpetuating their domestic high-cost production and inefficiency. To avoid this restrictive action on trade, the United States itself might expand its imports by the devices of unilateral tariff reductions or of engaging in more inflation than other countries. Of these two devices, the second is of questionable merit for the health of our domestic economy; and the first, desirable in any event, does not necessitate the regional organizations advocated by the report.

Anti-dollar discrimination imposes costs on the American economy and thus represents one form of extending foreign aid. Does the dollar

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gap reliably report the location and extent of need for American aid? If a very poor country, such as Italy, pursued rigorous policies of orthodox finance and exchange-rate equilibrium and measures designed to secure a maximum of price and wage flexibility, it might achieve the smallest dollar gap and thus make the least claim upon American help. The dollar problem in any event would appear to be a very fallible index of need for outside assistance. But even if it were not, the further question arises as to why that aid should be extended through anti-dollar discrimination, which levies the costs of foreign aid, in its first impact at least, upon American exporters. Surely the study group's case for American assistance to our European allies is sufficiently strong to warrant a general budgetary charge of impressive size if necessary.

The Prescription portion of the book falls into four parts: a set of recommendations regarding American policies toward Europe and the Western community, another regarding American national policies themselves, a third concerned with our policies toward underdeveloped areas, and a fourth with the ideological aspect of our foreign policy. Throughout, the main emphasis is laid upon abandoning the "universalism of the Bretton Woods" era in favor of regionalism. In part, this rests upon so sound a foundation that it cannot be overemphasized; in part—fortunately not too great—it rests upon an unnecessary and occasionally erroneous orientation toward a structural dollar problem as defined earlier in the book.

To augment the economic and political strength of the Western community through American policies regarding *other* countries, the study group recommends efforts to strengthen (1) the British Commonwealth and the Sterling Area; (2) the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union; and (3) the movement toward European political and economic union.

The United States, it is felt, should encourage greater economic coordination within the Commonwealth, in part to ease somewhat the burdens upon the United Kingdom entailed by the Sterling Area system. The study group believes that a permanent Commonwealth economic organization should be created, with which the United States should be in some way associated. We should strive to prevent undue discrimination against European and Japanese exports in Commonwealth markets; Britain should be able to expand its industrial exports to the Commonwealth; and other members should expand their primary production for export to Britain and the United States. The discrimination against dollar products involved in the Sterling Area and in Imperial Preference should be accepted. American partici-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pation in a Commonwealth economic organization would be valuable in view of the fact that the chief source of capital for the Dominions and British colonies will continue to be the United States, not Britain.

The OEEC and EPU should be perpetuated as going regional organizations, having proved their value in reducing the amount of trade subject to quota, increasing currency reserves and stability, etc. For these organizations, the International Monetary Fund, still imbued with the universalism of Bretton Woods, can be no effective substitute. There are ways of strengthening the OEEC and EPU; and American participation might be made closer by extending them to an Atlantic Trade and Payments Committee, with the United States and Canada as full members.

The study group especially emphasizes the intra-European and international organizations thus far reviewed because it regards the formation of a supranational European union as problematical in the near future. Nevertheless the group holds that the integration of the European market has the prerequisites for very great economic gains. There is sufficient diversity of resources; the region is large enough to provide a substantial internal market; the dependence of each country on "foreign" markets and sources of supply would be lessened; and export capacity would be improved.

Since these probable economic gains of European integration would become even more probable and greater with the establishment of a still larger "region," it is well to interrupt this enumeration of the Prescriptions in order to look more closely into the regionalism upon which they are based. The "political economy" of the study group has led it to recommend quite disparate political and economic regions. The historical and cultural affinity of certain countries has led it to recognize and defend for political and military purposes a "Western Community," composed roughly of non-Soviet nations outside the category of the economically underdeveloped. But economically the study group runs a papal line of demarcation through the Western Community on the basis of the dollar problem.

If it were established beyond reasonable doubt that structural rather than financial factors account for the greater part of the present dollar difficulties, that even the part (perhaps large) accountable to financial factors cannot be remedied by financial remedies because it is "politically impossible," that anti-dollar discrimination is an appropriate fiscal method of levying the costs of foreign aid, and that the dollar gap points to the magnitude of appropriate aid (aggregatively or by countries), then the rationale of this economic regionalism would be clear.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even so, it would be worth a thought as to whether regionalism of this sort might not be self-intensifying by protecting the non-dollar world from the competition of American and Canadian fields and factories. But if these elements are not as definitively established as the study group believes, would there not be greater merit in the more orthodox position that an important *raison d'être* of the less inclusive regions is to increase the prospects of viability for more inclusive regions? This, together with more emphasis upon the full exploitation of fiscal and monetary remedies, would strengthen the case for transitional American support of the Commonwealth, Sterling Area, OEEC-EPU, and the like. And this reformulation of policy is still a far cry from the economic universalism of Bretton Woods, applied to Iron Curtain and underdeveloped regions equally with the West.

The Prescriptions for the United States itself run along familiar lines: unilateral tariff reduction (which is *real* free-trade orthodoxy), reduction of tariffs, abolishing peril-point and escape-clause loopholes, maintaining adequate demand in the economy as a whole, facilitating adjustment to larger imports, broadening offshore procurement, etc. But there are fresh viewpoints throughout, such as the plausible suggestions that our tariff bargaining position be turned from securing foreign tariff concessions toward securing *any* economic policy furthering the strength of the Western Community, and that our tariff reductions may have a greater value as a morale builder abroad than in expanding European exports *to us*. The report is orthodox in stressing the potentially demoralizing effect of straight grants as a method of foreign aid; but more attention might have been given to the fact that alternative means of aid, such as subsidizing agricultural exports and tolerating anti-dollar discrimination, are also subject to this drawback.

With respect to underdeveloped areas, the study group lays a new and powerful emphasis upon policies conducive to *mutual economic advantage*, steering an intelligent course between the mawkish and unrealistic sentiment that the richer countries owe to the poorer ones enough grants or loans to put them on an equal footing, and the equally irrational position that the high-income nations have nothing to gain, if not indeed something to lose, by development overseas. The main lines of policy should be designed to increase and regularize the flow of capital from the industrial countries and to promote conditions in the receiving economies favorable to such a flow; and, as against this *quid*, the *pro quo* that the United States should "help to stabilize international demand, and to induce the underdeveloped countries to expand their primary production at an adequate rate" (p. 327).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The detailed justification and implementation of these policies represent one of the many solid accomplishments of the study group's "political economy."

In the final chapter, "Beyond Political Economy," the book reaches its most inspiring level, for here it is made explicit that the tough-minded analysis and tough-bargaining policy throughout its pages are devoted not only to "the primordial motivation of security," but to a utopian vision of universal justice under the law and personal freedom throughout the world. Mere "defense" is a fatal error: the Western Community requires a sense of cosmic mission. And this mission is not chiefly to promise to the countries which are less developed economically and politically a larger mess of pottage than Communism can supply, but to offer them the prospect of material improvement under a system of free institutions. These conclusions alone would be ample warrant for the efforts of this distinguished group of scholars and practitioners. May their wise words travel afar!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC ADJUSTMENT IN MODERN JAPAN

By ROBERT E. WARD

Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1953, 472 pp. $6.50.

Delmer M. Brown, *Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1955, 336 pp. $5.00.

I

THE West in general has become unhappily familiar in recent years with at least the grosser and more spectacular consequences of the so-called "revolution in Asia." Viewed from the American standpoint, the great majority of these have been distinctly disquieting, while a few can only be described as calamitous. Moreover, most objective attempts at forecasting the area's prospects offer small hope of significant amelioration in the foreseeable future. It would appear that the myriad problems of mutual understanding and adjustment which are attendant upon Asia's reemergence as a positive force on the world scene and upon "the meeting of East and West" on these new terms are too fundamental, too long-neglected, and too far-ramifying to admit of any facile or speedy solutions.

Under such circumstances, it is a source of minor consolation to observe that an increasing number of our newer generation of Asian specialists are striving to analyze and elucidate certain of the basic problems which confront us in Asia today. The area has too long been the province of practitioners of the "mysterious and exotic East" approach or of unfocused "scholarship" devoid of any recognizable significance or application, contemporary or otherwise. The two works presently under review represent a break with such older traditions. Both are concerned with major problems of urgent current importance: in Dr. Scalapino's case, the reasons for which an effective political party system and, therewith, a democratic society failed to develop in prewar Japan; in Dr. Brown's, the manner in which the force of modern nationalism has developed in Japan. Both studies view Japan as merely a specific example of social forces and processes generally, although differentially, operative in late-developing states. Both are historically oriented and seek to elucidate their respective problems in terms of an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

essentially developmental analysis. Furthermore, both studies are obviously products of their authors' profound preference for the gradual emergence of "open" democratic rather than "closed" totalitarian societies in Asia and their equally deep concern that in a cold-war context our own national policies toward Asian states should be based upon an accurate understanding of the historic forces shaping their development and so calculated as to maximize their democratic potential. In this sense, both may be said to be focused upon problems of democratic adjustment in modern Japan.

II

Dr. Scalapino seeks to explain the non-emergence of a democratic political order in prewar Japan through an analysis of the failure of the political party system. He justifies this seemingly negative emphasis on the grounds that "often the failures of the past provide the greatest insights into the real nature of a society." The issue is then posed in terms of the hypothesis that the democratic failure at point is essentially a product of historical timing. The ensuing development sets high standards for later writers on the subject.

The analysis is fascinating. To begin with, the author briefly recalls to mind the peculiar historical and cultural circumstances of nascent capitalism, dawning individualism, a developing middle class, the industrial revolution, and the long, slow process of organic development which characterized the emergence of liberal, representative, and democratic political institutions in Western society. Against this, he posits the basic characteristics of Japanese society during the Tokugawa period—which continued, it must be remembered, down to 1867, a bare eighty-nine years ago. These have but to be enumerated to establish the breadth of the gap separating Restoration Japan from the West: a theory of government by unqualified divine right, a firm belief in the inequality of men, a personal and alegal conception of political institutions, an attentuated and relatively dependent and powerless middle class, and a premodern level of industrialization. It was from cultural foundations of this sort that Japanese political parties emerged in the 1870's and '80's. During their formative and most critical years they were then subjected to a series of influences calculated to set them on other than democratic paths of development. In a philosophic sense, the cultural inheritance and tactical circumstances of early party leaders were such as to preclude any genuine or adequate emphasis upon individualism and human rights as fundamental political principles. Beyond this, few of them were able to face squarely the implications

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a legal system based upon Imperial absolutism. In an institutional sense, the early parties were, after 1890, condemned to carry on their struggles within the framework of a constitution which had been ably devised, without their participation, for the specific purpose of minimizing the role played by all extra-oligarchic elements in the government of Japan. Such handicaps, perhaps critical in themselves, were then compounded by a variety of further factors. The early party movement was in no sense a mass movement; it stood for a severely restricted type of "upper-class democracy" with narrowly defined class goals. It was bedeviled by flagrant opportunism and a chronic absence of principle on the part of its leaders, and was continuously and adversely affected by such deep-seated indigenous forces as the family system and the pattern of loyalty, ethics, and political behavior which arise therefrom, sectionalism based on feudal heritage, and the persistence of a crisis psychology anent issues of national security. One political consequence of all this was, as the late Ozaki Yukio so well put it, that "Here in the Orient we have had political factions but no political party."

This then is the unpromising basis from which modern political parties arose in Japan. The ensuing record of development down to their dissolution in 1940—while evidencing a series of important shifts in their leadership, programs, and power—adds small comfort when judged by modern standards of democratic performance. Additional chapters of the book vividly portray the several main lines of stability and change on the party scene. A completely intractable propensity for factionalism, based upon the social superiority of personal and family to programmatic allegiances, was a constant throughout these years. The total institutional structure of Japan also continued to have a strongly adverse effect upon party structure and practice. Moreover, the distribution of political power, reinforced by the constitutional and basic legal system, was such as to preclude the parties from attaining a dominant position in their own right. The best they could hope for was a series of essentially undignified and unsatisfactory deals with the true leaders of the state—*genrō*, oligarchs, bureaucrats, court officials, military and business leaders. Such arrangements were normally most unstable and meant in practice that the parties sold their parliamentary support in exchange for access to a scattering of public offices of marginal importance, for a limited patronage power, for local public works contracts and, too often, for outright bribes. A prime consequence of such relationships was the increasing tendency on the part of the major parties to turn away from the people and the pretense of representing their interests in favor of a closer and more open identifica-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion with prominent oligarchs and bureaucrats. This process had gone so far by the 1920's as to deprive the brief but loudly heralded period of so-called "party rule" from 1924 to 1932 of much of its potential democratic significance.

In a series of topical chapters of rare interest, Dr. Scalapino then surveys the relationships between Japanese capitalism and the party movement, the larger significance of the weakness of leftwing political organizations in Japan, and the final triumph of military and ultranationalist elements after 1932. The first of these—although somewhat overdrawn in terms of Professor Lockwood's recent research—is of especial value, since it demonstrates clearly how difficult it is for democratically oriented political parties to emerge in societies which have not experienced what might be described as an "organic" sort of industrial revolution, accompanied by a slow Western-type development of capitalist and middle-class political institutions, attitudes, and behavior patterns. The author sums up his views on this problem in the following words: "In Japan capitalism created great social and economic problems, without building any solid liberal foundations in its society. It could produce neither spectacular improvements in mass living standards, nor a dynamic new political philosophy. Consequently, it operated under the threat of a revolutionary attack, with few of the circumstances present which would encourage democratic tactics or moderation. In its failures as well as in its strengths, Japanese capitalism was of too little service to the democratic cause" (p. 293).

Considerations of this sort lead the author, through comparisons of the Japanese and German national experiences, to the conclusion that it is the factor of timing which offers "a central explanation for the failure of democracy in both." Where Germany is concerned, he feels that ". . . certain areas which had shared the broadest traditions of the West lagged behind in this new phase [i.e., the change from feudalism to the modern capitalist state]. Where the lag was appreciable, it could produce very substantial differences in the political forms of modern industrial-centered societies. Essentially, these variations all reflected the rational interests of commercial-industrial classes. In short, the industrial revolution was conducive to more than one political expression, depending upon the timing and intensity of its development. In the case of many late arrivals, the doctrines of economic and political liberalism were not the most logical expression of industrialism. Thus many aspects of the preindustrial heritage were little changed, not only because of the speed of the transition but also because the newly emerging forces did not present a strong challenge" (p. 397).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With Japan, the case is essentially similar. "Western-style democracy," he says, "is the product of an earlier evolution which cannot possibly be duplicated in the modern world. The natural evolution of the same forces which molded eighteenth and nineteenth century England and the United States will not produce parallel results in the twentieth century" (p. 398). Thus arises the need for new techniques and ideas, if democracy is to achieve any real status or meaning in Japan or in Asia in general.

It is quite impossible to do even approximate justice to the many merits of so complex and well-articulated a work as this in the compass of a brief article. The reviewer would note first, however, the satisfaction which derives from reading a study in the field of comparative politics which displays a constant awareness of where it is going and why it is going there. It is so often the case that books in this field meander diffusely through their more or less arbitrarily allotted span of years and dreary institutional changes, displaying the while a truly astonishing absence of any sense of problem or mission. Their conclusions are apt to fall more in the category of happy accidents or products of sheer exhaustion than to mark the accomplishment of a systematically set and sought goal. It is the greater pleasure, therefore, to herald a happy departure from this honored tradition and to note that Mr. Scalapino's book is continuously given structure, coherence, and meaning in terms of a systematically developed series of hypotheses. If it does not definitively solve its problem, the book does offer the most cogent and persuasively documented theorizing which has yet become available in this particular field of Japanese studies.

There are, of course, pitfalls attendant upon an approach of this sort, and Mr. Scalapino has not successfully evaded them all. While not disagreeing with the judgment that democracy failed in prewar Japan, the present reviewer cannot help but wonder if "success" versus "failure" is the most fruitful way to put the question. As social scientists, our research and results are inevitably affected by the terms we use in the original structuring of our inquiry. Perhaps these particular terms are not sufficiently reflective of what might be termed the "grey scale" of social events. In a practical and institutional sense, democracy in Japan undoubtedly failed, but it did not fail absolutely. Throughout its brief career there have been individuals, episodes, and institutions—many of them mentioned by Mr. Scalapino—which represent minor but persistent victories for the democratic approach. These have always left a residue in Japan of significant social and political dimensions, albeit far smaller than we or the recent Occupation authorities would like

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to see. A more meaningful question, viewed from the standpoint of the continuing and current problem of democratization in Japan, might, therefore, be threefold: not only why did democracy fail during this "first attempt," but also how completely did it fail, and what residues remain as a foundation for present action? One suspects that a reworking of substantially similar materials geared to a question such as "To what extent has political power been deconcentrated or diffused in modern Japan?" might well yield a significantly different perspective on the total course and meaning of post-Restoration politics.

In somewhat the same vein the reviewer occasionally found himself wondering if the study makes adequate allowance for the negative and essentially sloppy manner in which "democratic progress" frequently occurs. This has often been the case in Japan, where one has frequently witnessed the spectacle of anti-democratic leaders or groups driven by the dynamics of political competition to cultivate popular support momentarily through the proffer of concessions of a democratic sort. Once these have been made, the utter insincerity of the motives involved is of small import. The history of the suffrage in Japan or the early party record in general bears lavish testimony to this. Democratic progress in general seems to have been a piecemeal, halting, and time-consuming phenomenon and, granted the basic premise that it is operable in Asian societies, it is useful on occasion to ask whether or not the Japanese record in this respect has really been as abysmal as most current judgments would claim, especially given 1867 or 1890 as a significant date of departure.

These are matters of emphasis and qualification, however, treatment of which it is perhaps unfair to expect within the covers of any single volume. They should in no wise be permitted to obscure the principal fact that one is dealing here with a book that sets new standards of conception, style, and scholarship for students of Asian politics.

III

Dr. Brown's study of nationalism in Japan is precisely what its subtitle modestly proclaims it to be, an introductory historical analysis. It is the result of a highly competent assembling of data, selected with reference to a broad definition of the nature and elements of nationalism, chronologically ordered and subjected to a brief, preliminary form of analysis. It is well written and informative, and contains a number of extremely interesting suggestions about the nature and dynamics of Japanese society which one can only hope the author intends to develop more explicitly in future publications.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The study opens with a brief section devoted to the nature of nationalism, which the author considers to be "basically a type of group loyalty," distinguished from other species of similar loyalties by the size of the group involved. Certain so-called "elements"—distinct geographical area, a common racial descent, language, religion, and government, etc.—while not individually indispensable, facilitate and intensify the emergence of nationalist sentiment. In a modern sense, however, they do so only in favorable environmental circumstances, e.g., political and religious centralization and the existence of a modern network of mass social communications. Having established these concepts as a frame of reference, Dr. Brown launches into a chronological survey of the emergence and manifestations of Japanese nationalism from the ancient and semi-mythical Yamato period of Japanese history to neutralist developments following the recent Korean Incident. He believes that nationalist sentiment in the modern mass sense did not develop in Japan until the 1887-1895 period and that, since then, Japanese nationalism has passed through some six distinguishable stages in terms of its prime stimuli and consequences. Of particular interest is the notion that Japanese nationalism has known periods where the energies which it elicits were focused inwardly on a domestic strengthening of the nation rather than outwardly on foreign threats or prospects of overseas aggrandizement. These periods of a "people's nationalism"—e.g., 1919-1931, or the period following Japan's defeat in 1945—represented a gearing of the forces of nationalism to more common concerns such as improved living standards, etc. Noteworthy, too, is the author's description of the gradual reemergence of nationalist sentiment in postwar Japan, beginning with the fear occasioned by the Korean Incident and, impelled by anxieties inseparable from the "cold war" situation, tending now to take the form of a variety of drives for "real" national independence. Dr. Brown detects a present danger in such developments, which he sums up in the following terms: "It is therefore of vital concern to all those who support the ideals of freedom and peace to see to it that Japan's new nationalism does not merge with the Communist advance and does not revert once more to the old emotional ultra-nationalism that was based on fear and that was whipped up to fanatical heights by a government bent on the achievement of state goals by the use of force against foreign enemies" (p. 278).

Despite its numerous merits, one lays down this book with a sense of unsatisfied curiosity. In part, this is caused by the fairly primitive status of our knowledge of nationalism as a socio-political force. We seem able to come to grips with it only at the highest and most elusive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

levels of abstraction. Dr. Brown's efforts to apply systematically his own definition of nationalism well exemplify this general problem. That definition is simply so vague and all-inclusive that it supplies him with no very practicable standards of relevance where his data are concerned. The result is that what purports to be a specific survey of Japanese nationalism is frequently indistinguishable from a more traditionally focused—or, to be frank, unfocused—general historical survey of Japanese political history and foreign relations. Perhaps this is unavoidably the nature of the beast, but, before reconciling ourselves to such a conclusion, fresh attempts to supply a more operationally precise and practicable definition are certainly indicated. In the present case, the vagueness attendant upon our lack of such a definition occasionally left the reviewer in some doubt as to whether particular developments in Japan were not more the product of the relative absence than the presence of the force of nationalism.

Again one wishes that the work had made more systematic attempts to come to grips with the analysis of its excellent data. Despite the brief summaries appended to each chapter, there is no real attempt to determine what this whole sweep of developments means. In this sense the book lacks focus and falls short of its potential. One hopes, therefore, that the author plans to supplement this introductory study with further work which will provide a deeper insight into this fascinating but elusive subject of Asian nationalism.

IV

The authors of both of these works suggest that the case of Japan is not *sui generis*, but that important lessons may be learned with respect to the probable course of democracy and nationalism in many other "late-developing" Asian states from an analysis of the Japanese experience. They make this point in such brief and tentative terms, however, that further comment on this fundamental proposition seems desirable. Without in any way undervaluing the many uniquenesses of Japanese culture so prized by traditional scholarship, the present reviewer feels that we should not allow these to obscure the prototypical aspects for Asia of Japan's national experience with the total process of modernization along Western-set lines. Japan was the first of the "Eastern" nations to undergo this experience on a massive scale, and so far has been the only one to achieve substantial equality with Western performance in many of the categories involved. There is a largely unremarked sphere of basic commonalty between Japanese experience with this process and that of the more recently emerging states of Asia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Its facets are too numerous for description at this time, but at least three of them require brief notice.

The first arises from the fact that the over-all outlines and major goals of the modernization process that all of Asia is undergoing—which includes political change—have been set by Western thought and Western experience, which is to say by cultural aliens of another creed and color. The adaptive process is further compromised by the unfortunate nature of the political, social, and economic relations which have traditionally prevailed between Western states and peoples and the nations of Asia. This factor precludes on a variety of grounds any even approximately total assimilation of Western institutions and standards.

A second factor of major import is found in the variant guises assumed by the Industrial Revolution and its social consequents in the West and in the East—the point which Dr. Scalapino so ably documents. It seems undeniably true that the twin facts of compacted timing and altered context have set a widely different role for the Industrial Revolution in Asia. The negative consequences of this are in some ways of greater current significance than the positive, e.g., the nondevelopment of an independent middle class, the absence of individualism in both its philosophic and political modes, and the attendant failure of democratic institutions or viewpoints to strike durable holds in these alien cultures.

A third basic element might be described as the necessity of oligarchs in contemporary Asian societies. Here, too, the factor of relative timing is significantly involved. In the West the total stream of development was such that a sizable and steadily increasing segment of the society—possessed of at least minimal qualifications in terms of education, experience, and shared goals—became available at the critical moments to assume an appropriate role in the wielding of political power. In this sense there existed an operational conformity between political goals and political instruments. It is this which is critically lacking in most of contemporary Asia. The masses are in no wise prepared—frequently even in terms of aspiration—to assume minimal democratic responsibilities. Hence springs the need and the inevitability for some time to come of oligarchs—and oligarchs who usually comprise at the outset a very tiny, unrepresentative, and sadly divided section of the population.

In these three spheres of fundamental importance, Japan has shared the experience of the later-emerging states of Asia. This is not to say that the course of their future development will faithfully mirror that of Japan, but it does argue for the essential wisdom of careful compara-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive analysis to determine what are the generalized lessons of Japan's experience, especially where the adaptation of democratic government to Asian societies is concerned. The case is far from established as yet, but the present reviewer would venture to suggest that, wistful thinking aside, the outlines of certain broad conclusions are beginning to become apparent, based in part on Japan's experience.

First, that given the nature and persistent strength of the traditional cultures, Western standards of democratic performance are not apt to take firm hold anywhere in Asia in the near future. The West has been far too optimistic, too unhistoric, in its expectations in this connection. Relative to present and probable conditions elsewhere in Asia, Japan's experience with democratization since 1867 may have been almost uniquely favorable, rather than the opposite as is usually held. The adjustment of age-old institutions and views to Western democratic practice is bound to be slow, piecemeal, and partial, and is not to be measured in terms of short-run crises in Western or world politics, no matter how unhappy the consequences.

Secondly, that despite the probable persistence of oligarchic rule in Asian societies, the total modernization process may well have built into it a secular tropism toward a significant expansion and diversification of the circle of oligarchs itself. In the Japanese case, this seemed to occur despite the contrary desires and efforts of the original oligarchs. The dynamics of the political process in a modernizing society seem to be such that at successive points partial concessions to and absorption of new economic, social, and political elements by the original power-holders are highly probable. Whether ultimately this process will become so broadened and generalized as to be tantamount to either present Western democratic ideals or practices is most debatable. The political consequences of the slow but building pressure for improved mass standards of living through governmentally planned and guided shortcuts may well preclude such a development.

Thirdly, if some such lessons are suggested by Japan's experience, might it not be wise for the United States to think through the consequences of such developments for its foreign policy? Where Asia at least is concerned, there is no "free world" of democratic persuasion, even often in aspiration, nor is one apt to emerge in the meaningful future. Might we not spare ourselves considerable moral anguish, and perhaps even increase the efficiency of our official functioning on the Asian scene, if we were simply to accept this premise as a point of departure?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LATIN AMERICA

Responsibility or Freedom?

By HOWARD F. CLINE

Angel del Rio, ed., *Responsible Freedom in the Americas*, Columbia University, Bicentennial Conference Series, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955, 554 pp. $7.50.

I

TO celebrate its two-hundredth anniversary, Columbia University convoked a series of Bicentennial Conferences to explore a weighty topic: "Man's right to knowledge and the free use thereof." From successive gatherings of pundits, specialists, and academics of various persuasions who were brought to New York to air their views on several phases of the theme have emerged six volumes, of which the one under review is the last and the most recent. Earlier volumes discussed the metropolis in modern life; federalism; economic welfare; education, health, and social policies; and the unity of knowledge.

The present symposium, dealing with responsible freedom in the Americas, contains forty-five separate contributions, and six summaries of floor discussions stimulated by them. In addition, there is an Editor's Preface, an Introduction by Alberto Lleras Camargo, who was chiefly responsible for organizing the Conference for Columbia University, and a Closing Address by Richard Powell, explaining how this Conference and its product fitted into the Bicentennial Series. Like Latin America itself, the contributions are more remarkable for their diverse nature than for any real unity. They do provide a useful touchstone to many current Latin American attitudes in several fields.

The Latin American meeting, of which this fat book is at least a partial record, was held on October 25-30, 1954, in New York. Some one hundred and fifty persons attended, among whom were the forty-five North and Latin Americans invited to prepare papers touching on assigned segments of a large problem: "The deficiency of freedom in the Americas and the obstacles to its full development." In addition, the selected authors were requested to present in their formal papers their views on "possible solutions to this problem, in particular with respect to freedom to acquire knowledge." Throughout a whole week, a large group of participants heard, in English, French, Portuguese, or Spanish, brief verbal summaries of the prepared papers. The total topic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was divided into six main themes: elementary, primary, and secondary education; university education; communication of ideas and knowledge; religion; government in education; and creative arts. This volume is similarly subdivided.

Purposely the University sought, especially among its Latin American guests, those disassociated from ruling government circles. In general, the Latin Americans were distinguished public figures and men of letters; they included a large number of political exiles, numbering among them six ex-presidents; there were two Nobel Prize winners. With but few exceptions, the North Americans were university or government specialists in one or another restricted phase of inter-American affairs. In very broad terms, the Latin Americans who participated were "generalists," able and willing to discuss nearly any topic, viewed by the cosmic eye; the North Americans tended to stick pretty closely to their professional or academic lasts. These different approaches are reflected in the papers brought together to form the volume under discussion.

The meeting and its concrete manifestation in published form have been variously described. Dr. Lleras borrowed a phrase from the Catholic ritual and categorized the Conference as "An examination of the American conscience." Again, it was called "A forum for the discussion of one of the most difficult problems of co-existence, a very delicate matter in the hemisphere at this moment, as in every other part of the world." Some of its participants irreverently tagged it the "Wind Tunnel."

II

Basically, there are two ranges of material of interest in this volume. One is the substantive material contained in the prepared papers; the other is the variety of attitudes reflected in the commentaries and the discussions based on them. The essays themselves vary greatly in length, approach, and presentation. Several are academic, with all possible academic apparatus. Others are frankly ideological or political, sometimes with little visible connection between their content and their title or assigned topic. As is so often the case with composite volumes of this sort, there is an unevenness in quality, immediate importance, and lasting value among the contributions making up the six Parts. Taken together, however, they do provide much current information difficult to come by elsewhere. Probably more significant, they are useful barometric readings on current climates of opinion in and about Latin America, concrete examples of the difficulties of arriving at any widely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

acceptable generalizations about contemporary Latin America, even among leaders of thought in that area or specialists in this country who are primarily concerned with it.

To review each essay in particular, or even each general Part in detail, is both unwise and impossible. Taking Part One as characteristic of the range and trend of views displayed in the remaining five Parts, perhaps we may get some feel of the texture and structure of ideas adumbrated throughout.

Part One ostensibly deals with responsible freedom in elementary, primary, and secondary education in Latin America. To discuss its deficiencies and possible ways of removing barriers to its fuller flowering, four United States figures and five Latin Americans addressed themselves to selected phases. Frank Tannenbaum, Charles Wagley, Nathan L. Whetten, and Alexander Marchant presented factual analyses of rural education in Latin America, the racial, class, and sociological obstacles familiar to North American investigators, and the peculiarities of these factors in Brazil.

The five papers from Latin American hands, treating presumably the same general topics, could scarcely be more unlike. Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador, described in great detail two experiments in education carried out in his country, the regeneration of one Indian community and the lessons it taught, and the workings of the American School in Quito, which effectively brings into harmony Ecuadorians and North Americans and which is producing students who are "well-trained, bilingual, self-confident, with an optimistic outlook on life, tolerant and understanding and better equipped to become valuable citizens of the Americas. . . ." In contrast to the moderate, "case history" approach of Galo Plaza, Fernando Diez de Medina, an ebullient Bolivian, launched an extremist barrage; it finally worked around to the point that the basic reason that humanism in Latin America has made so little progress is the barrier created by economic penetration of Latin America by the United States. Señor Diez de Medina thought that the first step to correct an imbalance of development must be for North America to "begin by understanding, respecting, making concessions to the idealistic, romantic, generous spirit of the South and Central American nations who are demanding economic liberation and social justice because they are tired of being the helpless victims of financial rapaciousness" (p. 54).

Justo Pastor Benítez, a Paraguayan diplomat and educator, laid before the group some personal reflections on the importance of secondary school teaching. His paper is full of generalizations like the following:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Despite the principle of the unity of the human species, of the ability of all races to acquire culture, of the ecumenical nature of culture, and of the universal streams of thought, each country should adopt the plans which best suit it" (p. 81). If anything, even more general was the approach of a Salvadorian writer and painter, Salvador Salazar Arrue, who posed large questions which he felt pre-university education should set itself to answer: "1. What is Man? 2. What is the Physical Universe (Cosmos) in which Man dwells? 3. By what process of evolution did the human species emerge from the womb of Nature so that Man could become the conscious, creative being he is? 4. Having acquired certain knowledge of the Cosmos and human nature, what is the best type of society for the progressive auto-evolution of Man?" (pp. 96-97). Gabriela Mistral, Chilean poetess and Nobel Prize winner in literature (1945), spoke on "Image and Word in Education." Although her paper began as an attack on xenophobia, it concluded by discussing "the Image" as an important educational tool which should be more widely used. Context indicates that "the Image" means movies, television, and other standard audio-visual aids.

These, then, are highlights of Part One. The same pattern tends to run through the following subsections, successively treating university education, communication of ideas, religion, government in education, and the creative arts.

Many of the same premises and conclusions which emerged in the treatment of lower education reappeared in Part Two, "University Education." Here four Latin American contributions were numbered among the nine. The tone and findings of this group in general were factual and moderate, the level of each paper being remarkably high. Perhaps the most noteworthy of them all was the frank and able discussion of "Academic Freedom and Scientific Research in Latin America" prepared by Bernardo A. Houssay, himself an outstanding Argentine biologist who won the Nobel Prize in 1947.

Dr. Houssay's essay examines many matters of interest—the role of science in education, as well as the present state of science and its future in Latin America. His conclusion that, despite some contributions by individuals and scattered laboratories and schools, Latin Americans "still lag in research and teaching, in spite of the deceptive and exaggerated self-praise of each country" is lamentable but not especially novel. However, his cool and dispassionate analysis of the negative elements making for the very slow advance in development is remarkable. He lays the blame on "ignorance, vanity, technical defects, intellectual defects, moral defects, and character and personality defects"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Latin American intellectuals themselves. In a fashion that no North American would dare to copy, he proceeds to document his charges, so that the final verdict can never be in doubt, although the indictment is as scathing a one as currently appears in print. It should be added immediately that the papers by Jorge Basadre and by Jaime Benítez outline how in the universities of Peru and of Puerto Rico specific steps have and are being taken to diminish the "defects" which Dr. Houssay surgically exposes as general phenomena in Latin America.

In the broad realm spanned by Part Three, "Communicating Ideas and Knowledge," the rhetorical content is rather high. Apart from a series of North American technical papers on libraries, archives, and the like, the statements are highly political in tone. Amid volleys of verbiage about press, radio, television, exchange of persons, and so forth, fortunately there is a large body of organized data indicating that interplay between the Americas on intellectual planes is not only possible, but proceeds quietly and usefully in many unpublicized areas.

Part Four, "Religion," merely refights the Reformation, localized in this instance to the Western Hemisphere. The prepared papers are largely hostile in tone to Catholicism, resulting in much more heat than light.

"The Government in Education," Part Five, tends to reiterate many of the views expressed earlier in the particular Parts dealing with Education. It is unique in that no North American expressed any views in prepared essay form. The six papers of this section reflect more than elsewhere the subjective interests of those who prepared them.

The final group of papers (Part Six) deals with the creative arts. Possibly the most lasting of several highly literate and interesting papers in this group is a brief historical analysis of "Factors in Intercultural Influences" presented by Dr. Carleton Sprague Smith.

III

From the tape-recorded commentaries and discussions from the floor that followed short summaries of their papers by the forty-five authors, Angel del Rio, the editor of the volume, selected and attempted to synthesize the major points raised and mooted at the Conference. One important feature that neither he nor others connected with this volume or meeting mention is that much of the floor discussion was aimed not at the group present but at outside constituencies. A number of the exiled Latin Americans felt it necessary to strengthen their domestic position by speaking over the shoulders of the audience to representatives of the metropolitan press, especially the *New York Times*. There-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fore, as the meeting progressed, clashes and speeches became more rather than less extremist; instead of a meeting of minds on important and controversial topics, the distinction between Latins and North Americans and their diverse approaches and views progressively sharpened. Something of this circumstance is reflected in the excerpts and summaries of the discussions which in each Part follow the prepared papers.

It would be difficult in brief space to reduce further the numerous shades of opinion and disparate attitudes expressed in the six summaries of these very free, sometimes violent, discussions. Perhaps it would be an oversimplification to state that North Americans stressed the concept of "responsibility" while Latin Americans stressed "freedom" as the important word in the title of the Conference. The name of Senator McCarthy came more often to Latin lips than it did to North American; there was an overt and covert feeling that the United States should take increased responsibility for raising the social and economic level of Latin America, no matter what it might cost the North American taxpayer. The latent feelings of Latin Americans distrustful of United States actions were given full literate expression in a reasonably impromptu speech made by Eduardo Santos, former President of Colombia and editor of *El Tiempo* of Bogotá; in it he generally deplored present United States policies in Latin America and reaffirmed the need for a Marshall Plan, as had former U.S. Ambassador Claude Bowers, who spoke before him.

The obvious difficulties of getting a useful interchange of ideas through discussion itself became a matter of concern, increasingly reflected in the discussion and commentaries. The Latin American group as a whole felt that they had been placed in an unenviable position. The Conference seemed by implication to devote itself exclusively to discussing their ills, while they felt that there were serious problems in the United States which might equally call for probing. Such basic resentment at being a "pathological case" played a share in widening the gap between the two points of view.

In an attempt to bridge the growing rift, the Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico extended an invitation for a conference there to discuss and study the problems of North America. He felt that the unilateral character of the meeting at Columbia University was not due to any imperialist purpose on the part of the United States, but rather to its desire to emphasize the problems and differences that exist in the lands of South America and to express its eagerness to give assistance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

"It is easier," wrote the Director of the Bicentennial in the closing pages of this volume, "to state the purposes with which this Conference was brought together than to estimate the degree to which these laudable purposes have been attained." He went on to say that the focus of attention on Latin America formed part of the deliberate general plan of the Bicentennial to stimulate thinking in *other* countries; the many shortcomings of the United States had already been discussed at an earlier Bicentennial Conference. Dr. Lleras, who organized the meeting and was responsible for soliciting the papers making up this volume, felt that "The Conference was a flattering success for its organizers, and for those who attended it." These statements raise the fundamental issue of the lasting significance both of the meeting and of the volume which emerged from it.

With very few exceptions, the papers by the North Americans could have appeared at nearly any academic or cultural meeting. They were prepared by specialists on relatively narrow topics of their specialization. Some of them will have lasting scholarly value as statements of problems or achievements to date of their publication. Others are at best popularizations of technical materials which will appear elsewhere in extended form.

The significance of the Latin American contributions is entirely dependent on subjective views. At a minimum, the appearance of some twenty-four papers in English by Latin American thinkers provides the interested non-specialist with a fair sample of the production of the Latin American intellectual world and perhaps some insight into the Latin American mind, which language barriers may have closed to him. He will note the persistence of the *philosophe* tradition and other characteristics long familiar to those customarily dealing with similar Latin American *pensador* groups.

The often extremist charges and statements by the Latin Americans need not offer special cause for concern, although they certainly afford no grounds for complacency. Many of the views are as old as relations between the United States and Latin America, and often are based on false, distorted, or fragmentary information about the United States and its policies. The fact that in mid-twentieth century some of the old stereotypes still take on life only points up the fact that, as many in the volume say, more and better mutual education is requisite.

The numerous complaints, polite or crude, on the part of the Latin Americans in this volume are an accurate reflection of a deep anxiety

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and a widespread resentment. Following World War II, responsibilities of the United States became world-wide and its interests global; previously this hemisphere had almost monopolized its attention in the foreign policy field. Really for the first time, Latin America has had stiff competition for the attention of the United States, and has occasionally lost out. In short, a great deal of the considerable body of hostile statement in this volume is the product of a minor crisis in Latin American and United States relations. Some important features of this continuing crisis have been sketched by Professor Arthur P. Whitaker in his recent *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* (Cornell, 1954).

The contribution by Latin Americans was not all complaint or indictment. A reassuring factor—and a basis for temperately optimistic forecasts—is the equally significant consideration that, unaffected by the heat lightning of polemic, the reports of achievements and progress which can be extracted from scattered paragraphs throughout the book do show that responsibility and freedom are possible and compatible in many parts of the Americas.

In final judgment, it would seem that despite the efforts of the many and dedicated persons who helped put this volume together, it does not give us a very clear idea of responsible freedom in the Americas. Somehow the total effect of the collection of often excellent individual essays seems less than the sum of its parts. Even taking this consideration into account, the volume as a whole is a document which those who desire to know something of the current ferment in Latin America will want to keep at hand for several years to come.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL LABOR PROBLEMS

By ADOLF STURMTHAL

E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr., *The Fate of the French Non-Communist Left* (Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science), Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, 1955, 79 pp. 95 cents.

Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur M. Ross, eds., *Industrial Conflict*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954, 551 pp. $6.00.

Lewis L. Lorwin, *The International Labor Movement: History, Policies, Outlook*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953, 366 pp. $5.00.

Val R. Lorwin, *The French Labor Movement*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954, 346 pp. $6.00.

John P. Windmuller, *American Labor and the International Labor Movement, 1940 to 1953* (Cornell International Industrial and Labor Relations Reports), Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University, 1954, 243 pp. $3.00.

I

THIS group of publications covers a wide range of subjects: two of them deal with French labor problems, one with the international organizations of labor, another with the role of American trade unions in these international organizations. The voluminous study edited by Kornhauser, Dubin, and Ross is a symposium consisting of some forty-odd contributions by almost as many authors dealing with strikes and —to a considerably lesser extent—other forms of industrial conflict, primarily in the United States. Four of the essays, however, and a number of references in some of the others are devoted to foreign societies.

The two works by Lewis Lorwin and John Windmuller supplement each other in some respects, at least for the period covered in the Windmuller study, 1940 to 1953. Lorwin's book, however, has a far wider time span and wider horizons. After a few brief introductory chapters dealing with the origins of the international labor movement, it covers in some detail the years from 1918 to 1929, and then with great care the developments between 1930 and roughly 1953. While the history of the movement up to 1929 was the subject of Lewis Lorwin's well-known and excellent previous book, *Labor and Internationalism* (New York, 1929), this volume represents new research into the events of more than two decades.

As a source of information, *The International Labor Movement* is unique and invaluable. Nowhere else, except by going back to original source material, can the American student obtain the wealth of in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formation collected in this volume. However, a few comments on Lorwin's treatment may be made here. The author seems reluctant in a number of instances to analyze official policy statements. Thus he simply records the joint anti-depression program of the International Federation of Trade Unions and the Labor and Socialist International (pp. 167-68), whose serious internal inconsistencies were illustrative of those that paralyzed the British Labour government during the crisis. The two organizations advocated at the same time public works and balanced budgets, stable exchange rates and anti-deflationary policies, apparently without realizing that these policies were mutually exclusive. Similarly, the story of De Brouckère's negotiations on behalf of the Labor and Socialist International with Maurice Thorez as the representative of the Communist International would gain in significance if the reader understood that De Brouckère's position in 1937 was a complete reversal of previous Socialist doctrines. In 1937, as Lorwin reports (p. 185), De Brouckère maintained that agreements between the two Internationals, aiming at cooperation against the Nazi danger, could not bind the individual Socialist parties, but that the latter were free at any time to negotiate with the Communists. This reservation was necessary from De Brouckère's point of view because the British Labour Party steadfastly refused even to meet with the British Communists, while in France a Socialist-Communist alliance had been concluded. In the 1920's, on the other hand, when the British Independent Labour Party proposed Socialist-Communist negotiations to arrive at a United Front, the Labor and Socialist International took the official position that no individual party was free to come to terms with the Communists until the two Internationals had agreed. The change in policy from one decade to the next expressed the consistent inability of the Socialists to agree on a common attitude toward the Communists.

In spite of these points, Lewis Lorwin's is an indispensable book for students of international labor, written intelligently and with deep insight into the mainsprings of the movement and some of the fundamental issues confronting it.

The relationship existing since 1940 between the national trade unions of the United States and the various international labor organizations forms the subject of Professor Windmuller's study. So far as I know, this is the first attempt—with the possible exception of parts of Austin Van der Slice's study—to report objectively on the activities of the trade unions of a particular country within that area which Windmuller describes as "labor's foreign affairs," as distinguished from labor's influence on American foreign affairs. This distinction gives the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

book sharp focus, but it has the disadvantage of cutting off connections that are indispensable for a full understanding of American labor's action within the international "house of labor." Thus the conflict between the AFL and the international organization of the non-Communist unions (ICFTU) appears far more as a struggle for power than as a division over policy issues.

Within its self-imposed limits, Windmuller's study has considerable value. It is, in the first place, an exceedingly careful record of the main events (and of a great many minor ones) in that part of American labor's international diplomacy which the author has set out to study.[1] Second, the book contains a number of interesting observations which illuminate significant problems of international cooperation in general. Third and most important, this is a truthful book in a field in which the temptation to gloss "diplomatically" over inconsistencies, discrepancies between word and deed, etc., is rather intense. Although Professor Windmuller refrains from dotting his "I's" and crossing his "T's," a careful reader will find that the author is guiding him safely right to the conclusion.

II

Professors Godfrey and Val Lorwin are concerned with some aspects of the eternal puzzle that France presents to the American observer, and sometimes even to itself. Godfrey deals mainly with the failure of the non-Communist left—the Socialists; why does he exclude the left wing of the MRP?—to develop into an effective alternative to the Communists. Lorwin's more thorough work looks at the entire French labor movement from almost every conceivable angle. Godfrey, though not explicitly advocating a policy for strengthening the democratic forces in French labor, follows a line of reasoning that places this issue right in the center of his study. The fundamental requirement, as he sees it, is for the Socialists to reexamine their ideas and methods in the light of economic and social developments in twentieth-century France, which are said to have produced "a class of non-proletarian workers." While there has been a leveling-off in the growth of the numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, the service industries—especially

[1] Among the very few minor errors I have discovered is the dubious description of the Popular Front government in France as a "united front" (p. 37, n. 1), a term that has a specific meaning in labor history; the consistent misspelling of Vicente Lombardo Toledano's first name (e.g., pp. 64, 142, 185); and the incorrect reference to the reconstituted Second International as the Labor and Socialist International (p. 11). The latter name was given to the organization formed by the merger of the Second International and the Viennese Union in 1923.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commerce in general and retail trade in particular—have shown a remarkable development. To adjust to this phenomenon means that proletarian socialism must be dropped in favor of what Marx would have called a petty-bourgeois reform movement. Other observers making a different diagnosis of French ills might feel that the failure of the Socialists consists in their inability to compete with the Communists in convincing the French people of the fundamental nature of the social change that the Socialists intend to bring about. Indeed, on Mr. Godfrey's own showing, the program of "accommodation," though possibly a better vote-getter in the short run, may in the longer run prove pitifully inadequate as a cure for the real ills of the country.

Val Lorwin is far too cautious to engage in speculation on the proper policy for France and French labor. He has reached a sound skepticism toward that American parlor game which consists in devising schemes for the reform of France. This wisdom of Lorwin's is the result of his profound acquaintance with contemporary France and the French labor movement. Yet his caution does not prevent him from recognizing clearly many of the ills besetting French society as a whole and labor in particular. A few sentences of his deserve to be quoted because they are an excellent summary of his views and because they indicate the flavor of his writing: "As yet no wing of the union movement has developed fruitful or effective forms of political action. Nor has any since the war developed the sort of ideological basis for daily union action which French workers demand. The concept of class, once creative of solidarity and generous vision, now breathes sterile resentments. The union movement, once so rich in ideas if not in bread-and-butter achievements, now has little of either to show" (p. 304). Nor is Val Lorwin in doubt about the profound consequences of a continued failure of France to provide democratic solutions for French problems, and in particular of the French workers to achieve a unionism that can represent them effectively in the life of the nation. But while Professor Godfrey looks for the answer in the adjustment of the French non-Communist left to the "facts of life," Lorwin seems to place his hope—a tender growth indeed—on changes in these very same facts. At least such is the impression conveyed to this reader by Lorwin's carefully phrased reference to the statement of the Monnet Plan that France is "turning its back on decadence."

III

In his brief discussion of the roles and the degree of influence of national and international labor leaders, Lewis Lorwin asks a rare but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

highly significant question. Gradually a group of international labor officials is arising who are dedicated to the development of the international organizations. To a considerable extent, they have mastered the exacting technical skills required for this kind of work, developed a high degree of loyalty toward the principle of international cooperation, and established relations among themselves tending to create an *esprit de corps*. What is their relationship to the leaders of the affiliated national organizations?

The emergence of an international labor bureaucracy is of relatively recent origin. In the earlier days—i.e., in the main, until 1914—the international labor organizations had no staffs of their own, excepting perhaps office assistance. The responsible positions were held by national labor leaders who simply added the international assignments to their "national" work load. Gradually, after World War I, this system was superseded by the appointment of special international Secretaries, though as important an organization as the International Metal Workers' Federation maintained the older method until long after World War II. As an institution the international labor bureaucracy is still very young; it has had little time to acquire a status independent of its creators—the national labor leaders. As in the United Nations, "sovereignty" continues to reside in the national organizations, from which emanate authority, appointments, and financial support. In most cases, work in the international organizations is temporary and is followed by the return of the appointee to his national organization, in which he hopes to continue his career.

As a result of this situation, the international bureaucracy is susceptible to a good deal of pressure from major affiliated organizations. Conflicts among the latter for a larger measure of influence upon the policies, the administration, and the selection of personnel of the international labor organizations are, therefore, by no means rare. Indeed, they form a part of the internal history of international labor in recent years. It is important, however, to see these stresses and strains in their proper perspective.

Professor Windmuller's book is a study of one particular portion of this internal history and of a highly significant one at that. It is no longer a secret that relations between the American Federation of Labor and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions have been somewhat less than happy for a number of years. Windmuller sees one of the reasons for this state of affairs in a lack of mutual tolerance among the major affiliates of the ICFTU. In his own words, "No one geographical area, no one ideological orientation, and certainly no one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country must be allowed to achieve a dominant position" (p. 230). Yet, on his own showing, this precept seems to belong among those not infrequently honored in the breach. The most important questions to be asked are, therefore, why this has been the case and why, in particular, American-ICFTU relations have been less smooth than those between the majority of the other affiliates and the international labor bodies.

The answers might be given partly in personal terms. Trade union leaders of the top rank—who are normally the delegates to the international bodies—most frequently obtain their positions by the acquisition of power in highly competitive organizations and they maintain themselves in office by the effective use of their power. The international organization is for many of them simply another possible instrument of power. There is a wide range of possible uses to which influence in the international organization can be put, from simple patronage to publicity on an international scale. Moreover, to the extent to which the delegate's policy coincides with that of his government or with prevailing currents of public opinion in his country, his successful, or at least conspicuous, advocacy of the "correct line" within the international organization becomes an element of no mean importance in maintaining his domestic power position and status. There are, at least in the short run, greater rewards for the effective defense of national interests than for the spirit of international accommodation.

These considerations, of course, do not apply merely to the American delegates to the international labor bodies, but in varying degrees to those from all countries. To explain the particular difficulties in AFL-ICFTU relations, we have to look for elements more specifically American. They can be found, I believe, first in the relative freedom of American labor's international delegates from domestic control; second, in the internal friction hitherto created by AFL and CIO competition; and third and most important, in the general problem of integrating American labor into a democratic international organization.

Just like the United States as a whole, American labor developed for many decades in relative isolation from international contacts. Even though some forms of cooperation were maintained throughout the 1920's and 1930's, these contacts were limited to high-level representatives and meant little or nothing to the rank and file, or even to most of the leadership. The formal affiliation of the AFL with the International Federation of Trade Unions just prior to the outbreak of World War II implied little actual change in this state of affairs. It was only during the war and after it that international affiliation and activity

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

took on real significance for a portion of the top leadership in both the AFL and the CIO. While the speed of this adjustment was remarkable, it has not yet led to the formation of a public opinion on international labor issues within the American trade union movement. While British, French, or German trade unionists are often involved in heated debates on such issues, American labor leaders in the main are free from such democratic controls in international matters. The fundamental Communist issue is perhaps the only major exception and even on this score many American trade unionists have shown an astonishing indifference, as witnessed by the reelection of Communist leaders by an overwhelmingly non-Communist membership in a number of unions simply because the Communists were regarded as effective trade union leaders. A conflict between, say, a British trade union leader and the majority of the ICFTU would most probably compel the British leader to explain his position before his union and would provide potent ammunition for a rival within the union. Most American labor leaders would neither feel compulsion to explain their attitude nor have any reason to believe that their position would be weakened dramatically by such a conflict. This, obviously, makes the relations between American labor leaders and the international organizations a much more personal matter than is the case in other countries. The formulation of American labor's foreign policies proceeds on the whole within a much smaller circle of persons than the size of the movement would lead one to expect; and personal factors enter into policy formulation to a considerable extent and, even more, into the methods chosen to implement policies. Among these personal elements, an impartial observer might also mention the American labor leaders' relative lack of experience in international work. The sudden emergence of the American trade unions on the international scene after World War II, following a prolonged semi-isolation from international labor activities, was bound to produce a sharp disequilibrium between the small supply of skilled personnel and the large demand for American representatives in all sorts of international organizations and for personnel in United States government agencies dealing with international issues.

The bearing that friction between the AFL and the CIO has had in recent years on the relations of the two organizations with foreign labor is so obvious that little needs to be said on this score. It is probably no exaggeration to say that in the recent merger negotiations the area of international affairs was the most delicate. The International Affairs Committee is the only standing committee of the new organization which has two chairmen, one from each of the two previously inde-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pendent organizations. The bitterness of the inter-union rivalry was bound to be reflected in relations between American labor and the ICFTU.

The most fundamental problem, however, was created by the disparity in the status of the American unions and of those of the rest of the free world after World War II. Within the World Federation of Trade Unions right after the war, the influence of American labor, represented only by the CIO, was offset by the power of the Communist bloc. When the AFL and the CIO joined forces in setting up the ICFTU to the exclusion of the Communists, the weight of the American membership, its influence at home, the power of the country from which it came and, last but not least, the financial resources at the disposal of the American unions were such as to give them unrivaled leadership in the international organization. In much the same way as the United States played a predominant part in the Western alliance soon after the war when Britain and France were weakened to the point of exhaustion, American labor set the tone in the ICFTU at the time of its founding in 1949. This in itself created serious difficulties in a movement in which European leadership had never been questioned. Even seasoned diplomats might have found it difficult to avoid friction and jealousies under such circumstances. And had they by a miracle succeeded in this assignment, they would have discovered a few years later that, as a consequence of the recovery of Western Europe in general and of Western Germany in particular, power relationships had undergone considerable change. Any equilibrium established after the war was bound to be subject to renewed and severe strains.

Given all these circumstances, it is not surprising that relations between American and foreign labor have, at times, been exposed to stresses that put the cohesion of the international labor organization to a severe test. Indeed, it is no minor achievement for the American and foreign labor leaders in the ICFTU to have maintained their organization at a reasonably high level of effectiveness.

Friends of international cooperation may derive from this analysis the comforting conclusion that, on the whole, there is a favorable prospect for the functioning of democratic working-class organizations on an international scale. While some of the difficulties are bound to remain unchanged, most of the others mentioned above should diminish: experience in working on an international scale is rapidly being gained by American laborites; friction in the American house of labor will be somewhat reduced by the AFL-CIO merger; a greater equality of status within the international labor movement will accompany the recovery

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of European labor and in the long run facilitate the task of maintaining cooperation among equals.

IV

Many readers may have registered surprise at the absence in this analysis of a reference to the ideological cleavage between American and European labor. In most conventional discussions, as well as in Lewis Lorwin's and Windmuller's books, this factor ranks high among the causes of friction. Some authors, it is true, have ventured to question whether ideologies have any significant bearing on the actual behavior of unions. Professor Philip Taft, for instance, in his contribution to the volume on *Industrial Conflict*, reaches the conclusion that industrial conflict is not related to union ideologies. He makes one major exception to this generalization: when union members are dissatisfied with their leaders and men imbued with a class-war ideology can exploit their discontent, ideas become a significant factor in union behavior. Other contributors to the same volume, however, do not seem to agree with Taft. In examining the British experience, T. E. Chester shows that it was the loyalty of the British trade unions to the Labour government which induced them to maintain a wage freeze until 1950. Oliver Peterson reports that in a similar situation in Sweden voluntary extensions of wage agreements were obtained from the unions. "It is doubtful," he says, "that a non-labor government could have secured the agreements in the first place or carried them through with equal success." Val Lorwin in his book on French labor demonstrates that for a period Communist influence in post-World War II France served to restrain strike activity.[2]

This kind of discussion operates within what may be called the traditional framework. Perhaps more novel in recent literature is an approach that tends to relate union behavior to objective factors in the particular industry rather than to ideologies. An example of this is a study by Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel on "The Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike—An International Comparison," also included in the volume on *Industrial Conflict*. The authors use data from eleven countries (Australia, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) on strike frequencies in different industries. Their main conclusion is that, on the whole, the same industries in the

[2] The conventional belief seems to be that Communists always intensify industrial strife in non-Communist countries. Actually, Communist behavior is far more flexible than most American authors tend to assume.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

various countries examined seem to be particularly strike-prone or have a low propensity to strike. Even individual firms within the same industries seem to have similar strike frequencies from country to country. There is, however, a group of industries of medium strike-propensity showing considerable behavior variations from country to country and a few exceptions to the observed uniformity of behavior exist.

The Kerr-Siegel study indicates an orientation toward a theory (or theories) of the labor movement in which the independent variable is found in the location of the worker in society, which in turn depends a good deal upon the industrial environment. The authors find, for instance, that miners, longshoremen, sailors, and loggers have a high propensity to strike, while government employees, grocery clerks, railroad employees, and garment workers show low strike frequencies. Instead of regarding radical or moderate ideologies adopted by the workers in these various industries as an explanation of such behavioral differences, the authors look to elements in the environment created by these industries as an "ultimate" explanation. The ideologies then appear, I suppose, as "rationalizations" of psychological trends created by the industrial climate. Thus mining, shipping, work on the docks, etc., tend to isolate the worker either physically, as in the mining town, or socially, as on the waterfront in a metropolitan district. The opposite situation is that of the integrated individual or the integrated group living in multi-industry towns. There may also be factors of relevance in the character of the work, as for instance in jobs requiring heavy physical exertion, or in those of an unpleasant nature, those involving casual employment, etc.

This very interesting hypothesis deserves further examination and testing. In particular, research seems indicated in selected industries in which the "industrial environment" has undergone substantial change as a result of a transformation of technology, or where the introduction of new industries in a particular locale has affected the environment in such a way as to make us expect a change of union behavior and possibly of labor ideology. Cases of either kind should not be too difficult to locate. The authors themselves add, however, that other explanations are required to account fully for union behavior. Moreover, an explanation of strike frequencies alone would at best explain only certain facets of union behavior, while other aspects would remain outside the framework of the theory.

In a more generalized fashion, the "industry-mix" of different countries (or of different areas in a given country) might thus be regarded as one of the main independent variables determining the nature of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the labor movement. We might expect countries with a large admixture of strike-prone industries to have a combative labor movement and those with a preponderance of industries of low strike frequency to develop a labor movement of moderate attitudes. At this point, however, a number of comments seem necessary.

If industrial environment is one of the factors determining the nature of the labor movement, it seems equally plausible that the nature of the labor movement is of relevance for the growth of industry in general, as well as for the selection of the particular industries to be developed by private investors. Given equal expected rates of return, investors will prefer to develop industries with low strike frequencies or, expressed differently, in order to attract capital, industries with higher strike frequencies would have to hold out the hope of higher rates of return. This would affect the "industry-mix" in the country, turning the independent variable into a dependent one.

More important: it is difficult to imagine that the industrial environment will affect the behavior of labor without also influencing that of other social groups such as management, government bureaucracy, commerce, the intelligentsia, etc. The industrial environment will thus influence the entire social structure. This is a familiar thesis derived from historic materialism. In the competent hands of Kerr and Siegel, it has taken on a degree of precision that permits empirical verification —with one major qualification: by pointing out exceptions and thus the need for a multi-causal explanation, Kerr and Siegel have left open a door through which an unknown quantity of phenomena may escape. But perhaps this is only a preliminary stage in the development of a theory in which other factors apart from the industrial environment will later be assigned determinate parts.

Finally, the Kerr-Siegel thesis assuredly does not imply that there is nothing common to industrial labor in general, even in a particular country. Obviously, the workers' position in society has a direct bearing on union behavior. The absence of equal suffrage, the denial of educational opportunities, and social disqualifications have exerted powerful influences on the development of labor movements. They too are part of the particular environment of individual industries. The worker is a human being and a citizen as well as an employee of a firm.

V

The Kerr-Siegel study is an example of comparative research in the field of labor which I hope will set the tone for future work of this kind. It is of course true that by silent inference a good deal of other work

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has been of a comparative nature—often without the author's being aware of it. But this is precisely the point at which the difficulties arise.

The methodology of comparative work on labor problems has not yet been explored in a systematic fashion. Some intriguing remarks are contained, however, in Val Lorwin's book and deserve brief comment. Probably the most faithful way of presenting Lorwin's ideas is to let the author speak for himself:

> Three special hazards or fallacies beset those who report on foreign labor movements and social systems, whether upon brief tours of inspection or after overlong research. The first might be called the Pago-Pago fallacy. It is that of describing everything like a South Sea isle, in terms of what is strange and different. Fascinated by narrow streets, unaccustomed politics, and strange bargaining practices, we magnify the odd and picturesque.
>
> From the touristic wonders of the Pago-Pago variety, it is easy to slide into moral judgments in which different means wrong. This second related pitfall may be called the fallacy of Queen Victoria's lady-in-waiting, taking the name from an account of remarks in the royal box during a performance of Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*. As the unhappy Egyptian monarch pressed the fatal asp to her bosom, one of Victoria's ladies-in-waiting sighed and murmured, "How different from the home life of our own dear Queen!" So it is in some of the reporting from abroad, for example by visitors returning to a comfortable nation from a mission to tell a less comfortable people how to manage its affairs. How different from our own labor movement, and how quaintly wrong. Often fact finding becomes fault finding.
>
> A third, altogether different deformation results from the Judy O'Grady or sisters-under-the-sin fallacy. Of course, we say, there are obvious differences between this foreign movement and the comparable American development. But all these differences are only superficial; they must not obscure the basic identity of problems and institutions. The same appetites and drives, the same resistances and insecurities move individuals and groups under whatever flag they live and in whatever tongue they organize and bargain. Explanations which are valid here must be valid everywhere; forms of action which have proved themselves here are the forms for elsewhere (pp. xvii-xviii).

Little can be said, from a social scientist's point of view, in favor of Queen Victoria's lady-in-waiting. Even less favorable must be the judgment of a citizen of a democratic country, for history itself testifies to the horrors committed by those for whom "different" meant "wrong." The evolution of the modern labor movement has been most seriously hampered by the conviction that there is one and only one "right" method for labor movements everywhere and at any time, and that those who depart from it are guilty not only of error, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also of treason. Judy O'Grady and the Colonel's lady (and by way of the *argumentum a contrario*, the supporters of the Pago-Pago fallacy) present perhaps more of a challenge than Val Lorwin seems ready to admit. The advocates of this approach are clearly wrong in simply *assuming* that while labor problems may differ in their outward manifestations, they are basically the same everywhere. Yet, at some level of abstraction, it would seem that Judy must come into her own. Otherwise social science would have to be replaced by a descriptive kind of anthropology, either because no two cultures contain phenomena which can be grouped in the same logical classes, or, if they can be so arranged, because the characteristics of the classes are so few that we can only formulate vague and uninteresting generalizations about them. There would be, for instance, no science of economics in general but only British economics, American economics, French economics—either because behavior patterns vary in every respect from country to country, or because the common behavior patterns are so few and of so little relevance that propositions about them are almost void of content.

Even pure labor history would not entirely escape this dilemma, much as it might try to protect itself by the extensive use of foreign terms and quotation marks. The apparently simple fact that Val Lorwin speaks of the French *labor movement* indicates that in his view it comes under the heading of labor movements in general, which means that it has some important characteristics in common with the American and other labor movements. All of which amounts to the proposition that—implicitly if not explicitly—the study of foreign labor problems is a matter of comparative research whether the author intends it to be or not.[3]

This clearly is not intended as a solution to any of the manifold problems of comparative research. More modestly, it is an attempt to keep the door open for those brave enough to pass through it—even at the risk of having Judy O'Grady slip through as well.

[3] Another instance is Val Lorwin's statement: "There are no one-man unions in France" (p. 164). The mere addition of the words "as in the United States" would make this an example of explicit comparison, and not even an insignificant one.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Military Policy and National Security

Edited by William W. Kaufmann

This timely book explores the most important decision we face today—how to use our conventional arms and our atomic might both *politically* and *militarily* to maintain our own security and keep world peace. Four ranking experts on international relations offer here a clear, realistic analysis of the choices before us, and of the courses of action open to the communists. They cover such vital subjects as the requirements of deterrence, strategic doctrines for nuclear war, passive air defense, limited warfare, coalitions and allies, NATO and the new German army, and force and foreign policy. Contributors: W. W. Kaufmann, Roger Hilsman, Gordon A. Craig, and Klaus Knorr.

288 pages. $5

The Office of Prime Minister

By Byrum E. Carter

This examination of the functions of the British Prime Minister and authoritative commentary on modern British political life fills an important gap in the field of constitutional studies. Starting with an illuminating historical survey, the author devotes the main portion of his book to the position of the Prime Minister since 1894, with an emphasis on the realities of British politics today.

362 pages. $5

The Politics of Compromise

A Study of Parties and Cabinet Government in Sweden

By Dankwart A. Rustow

"A first rate introduction to the Swedish system of government and political life . . . a work of great merit which reveals the author's ability to penetrate into and understand the political psyche of a foreign people . . . . We Swedes should be grateful for such a useful illumination of our country."—Svenska Dagbladet, Stockholm.

270 pages. $5

Order from your bookstore, or

Princeton University Press • Princeton, N.J.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE BULLETIN

Published Quarterly by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 19, Avenue Kléber, Paris XVI.

Just issued: Vol. VII, No. 4

COMPARATIVE CROSS NATIONAL RESEARCH —ORGANIZATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES— NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS—TERMINOLOGY

OPEN FORUM:

Some observation on Social Science Teaching and Research.

Contributors to this issue: L. Bernot, R. Boguslaw, A. Brodersen, C. Clark, H. C. J. Duijker, J. Meynaud, S. Rokkan, H. Walker.

Single issue : $1.00
Yearly subscription: $3.50

Send your subscription to:

UNESCO PUBLICATIONS CENTER
National Agency for International Publications, Inc.
500 Fifth Avenue, New York 36, N.Y.

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia Past and Present

TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOL. XV, NO. 2, APRIL 1956

Articles

Seven Phases of Soviet Foreign Policy ..... William Henry Chamberlin
The Soviet Design for a World Language ..... Elliot R. Goodman
The Career Woman in the Soviet Novel ..... Xenia Gasiorowska
Tolstoy's Motives for Writing *War and Peace* ..... Richard Hare
Marshal Zhukov ..... P. Ruslanov

Book Reviews

Subscription, $5.00 a year, single copies $1.25
Discount 25% to graduate students and college and university faculty members.

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW
235 Baker Library **Hanover, N. H.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

. . . the only journal of its kind . . .

Contains in Volume X, No. 1, February 1956

I. Articles

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation.....Lincoln Gordon
Inter-American Regional Procedures for the
Settlement of Disputes .....Charles G. Fenwick
United States Participation in the United Nations.....James N. Hyde
The Functional Approach to Political Union: the
Effort to Federate the British Caribbean Territories.....Jesse H. Proctor

II. Comprehensive Summaries of

The tenth session of the General Assembly and meetings of other United Nations organs,
Recent activities of the specialized agencies, and
Recent activities of major regional and functional organizations.

III. A Selected Bibliography of

Pertinent books and articles in American and foreign periodicals.

$1.50 a copy **$3.50 special**
$5.00 a year **student rate**

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
40 Mt. Vernon St.
Boston 8, Mass.

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

A Quarterly Published by
The University of Notre Dame

The April Issue will include the following articles:

Arthur S. Link, Wilson and the Democratic Party.
Robert H. Ferrell, Wilson's Leadership in Foreign Policy.
George F. Kennan, History and Diplomacy.
Raymond J. Sontag, History and Diplomacy.
Bernard S. Morris, Some Perspectives on the Nature and the Role of the Western European Communist Parties.
Andrew Hacker, Original Sin vs. Utopia in the British Labour Party.
A. M. Scott, Challenge and Response: A Tool for Analysis of International Affairs.

Book reviewers include Arthur M. Steiger, C. Mullett, F. A. Hermens, Albert Guerard and W. O. Shanahan.

Annual Subscription: U.S. and Pan-American, $5.00;
Foreign, $5.40. Single issues, $1.50 each.

Address: The Editors, Review of Politics,
P.O. Box 4, Notre Dame, Indiana.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED